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INTRODUCTION
There has been much discussion and comment on the development of the 
Australian Labor Party in recent decades. From this there has emerged a basic 
agreement among commentators that the contemporary Labor Party is no longer the 
Labor Party in its original sense. The Labor Party today is even very different from the 
Labor Party, let us say, of the 1960s. Dean Jaensch (1989a: 21-22) insists that since 
the late 1960s the Labor Party has increasingly shifted to the model which 
Kirchheimer called a "catch-all" party. It is becoming progressively more pragmatic 
and responsive rather than expressive, and is placing much less emphasis on ideology, 
membership, organisational solidarity and expression. Since 1967, for instance, the 
Labor Party has been involved in considerable introspection and some changes, 
involving departures from traditional ideology and policy positions and fundamental 
changes to its internal structures and processes. These developments are still 
continuing. They received their initial momentum from the Whitlam government, 
which launched reforms in almost all sectors, and culminated in the period of the 
Hawke and Keating governments.
The validity of Jaensch's analysis can be seen clearly in the essential 
characteristics of the Hawke and Keating governments. In their roles as the functional 
agency or handmaidens of the Labor Party, the Hawke and Keating governments are 
becoming more and more pragmatic. Both governments have been electorally realist - 
placing the electoral contest above all other considerations. They have become more 
flexible than their predecessors - able to change with the moods of the majority rather 
than be bound by the preferences of a particular segment of society. They have been 
able to achieve "room to move", to react flexibly to shifts in majority opinion in the 
electorate and to attract support from strategic interests and groups within the 
electorate, so that the potential for maintaining their parliamentary majority is 
maximised. In short, the central focus of the Labor Party under Hawke and Keating 
has become electoralism. Its main and immediate objective is the struggle for power
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or for office and the desire to maintain it as long as possible. Jaensch (1989a: 158) 
states: “the foundation and focus of this struggle is the electorate - its moods, 
opinions, values, attitudes, desires, needs, wants, but above all its votes... [Their] 
keystone aim, by whatever means, is to win the votes of enough of the electorate to 
provide a majority of seats in the parliament”. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
although the platform is still regarded as the party's document, the Hawke and Keating 
governments have considered themselves less and less bound by its strictures.
There are many things which have been done by the Hawke and Keating 
governments which reflect the changes in the Labor Party. Learning from previous 
mistakes, in particular the eclipse of the Whitlamism in style and substance, the 
Hawke and Keating governments set out to destroy the image of profligacy which, 
correctly or not, had emerged as synonymous with the Labor Party and to replace it 
with an image of a party and government which had the capacity to manage an 
economy, and was more professional, flexible and solid. In the policy field they have 
launched some new policy formulas. The most important among them being the 
introduction of the so-called "politics of reconciliation and consensus" as embodied in 
Accord. This consensus politics seems to have helped Labor politicians hold the 
middle class ground of politics, pushing their conservative opponents into the narrow 
confines of reaction, and making political opposition difficult for them. Furthermore, 
they tried to be more accommodative to the interests and needs of interest/pressure 
groups. The relationship with unions, environmental movements, media and other 
section of society, for instance, is enhanced. Internally, they also made some reforms 
in both party and government structure, and party and government machines and 
procedures.
There are four interrelated factors which have encouraged such change: a 
changing society, a changing economic and political situation, changing electoral 
circumstances, and changing leaders of the Labor Party itself. Economic growth, the 
development of technology, education, society and politics, domestic as well as 
international, has transformed Australian society very significantly. The decay of old
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divisions especially that of class, for instance, have had important lessons for the 
Labor Party. Similarly, the rapid changes in the international political and economic 
environment has imposed a significant constraints on the Labor Party. Such changes 
have forced the Labor Party, like it or not, to change its view and strategy in its effort 
to win and maintain office. The rise of the new faces in Labor leadership, most of 
them reformists - such as Bill Hayden, Bob Hawke and Paul Keating - has also 
accelerated the opportunity and drive for change. There was a belief among the Labor 
Party leaders, especially among the proponents of change, that unless the Labor Party 
reformed itself, it might become entrenched as the "secondary" party in national 
politics, which could only occasionally and temporarily displace the primary federal 
party (the Liberal/National Coalition parties).
Theoretically, the Labor Party would be in trouble with the electorate if it did not 
adjust to changes, and in trouble internally if it did. On the one hand, if it changes, the 
party might be continue to lose its traditional base of blue-collar support. On the other 
hand it needed to do so to pick up more support from the middle class, white-collar, 
groups in society. For example, in order to appeal to a new strategic class (educated 
and white-collar workers) to win office and put its ideas into effect, the Labor Party 
was forced to change its political practice and indeed its very ideas, and it was called 
upon to adjust its policies and its internal workings in accordance with these changes 
(North & Weller 1980: 14). But such strategy, at the same time, could also create a 
negative electoral impact from the Labor Party's traditional base of blue-collar working 
class voters. So far, however, the Labor Party has been successful in maintaining 
office through five elections, which can be claimed to be a measure of its success in 
adjusting to changes. The 1980s period (till now) can be said to be the greatest period 
of Labor Party electoral success. It has created an historical record, from holding no 
governments at all in Australia in 1969 to winning federal election and holding almost 
all states, except Queensland and Tasmania, in 1983. And even though the economic 
situation was not objectively good, Labor won the next four federal elections in turn.
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This thesis assess the strategic and management practices adopted by the Hawke 
and Keating governments in relation to their efforts to win and maintain office for as 
long as possible. Why and how the Labor Party under Hawke and Keating practiced 
those strategies and management which made them so successful, is a central question 
for this thesis. To what extent these constitute successes, particularly in relation to the 
internal affairs and the future of the Labor Party, is another important question which 
needs to be answered. It is the argument of this thesis that what distinguishes the 
Labor Party in the 1980s and before, is not merely the record of electoral success, but 
more important, that a transformation appears to be in process within it which has 
produced, for the first time, the Labor Party as the "natural" party of government.
This thesis is divided into two parts. Part one is background and comprises two 
chapters. Chapter one deals with the experiences of the Whitlam government. It 
assesses the flaws in the party as well as in government policy, approaches and 
attitude, particularly its economic and social policy. The Whitlam government's 
experiences provided an important source of learning for the Hawke and Keating 
governments.
Chapter two assesses what the ALP did after the Whitlam leadership, particularly 
during the period of Hayden leadership. This period was a chance for the ALP to 
review itself after the Whitlam experiences. The importance of this period lay less in 
the changes to the ALP structure and policy orientations than in the foundation for 
success which the party laid down for the following years.
Part two of this thesis comprises four chapters: three, four, five and six. Chapter 
three deals with the Hawke government's implementation of the ALP’s new 
directions. It covers reform of public administration, bureaucracy and, most 
important, economic and social policy, as expressed in the Accord. The Accord was 
very important for the Hawke government not only in economic terms, but also in 
terms of political strategy. The success of Labor under Hawke leadership cannot be 
divorced from the Accord.
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Chapter four discusses the electoral tactics and policies which the Hawke 
government employed to garner "green" support and to manage the media. As the 
elections from 1983 to 1990 were dominated by environmental issues we have to look 
at how the Hawke government exploited the green issue if we are to understand its 
electoral success. The media management of Hawke government was also decisive. 
The Hawke government was able to turn the media from its traditionally anti-Labor 
stance to one which was significantly pro-Labor.
Chapter five deals with the 1993 election. Following the loss of a popular leader 
Bob Hawke - and held during the deep economic recession and mounting 
unemployment - this election represented a difficult test for the ALP. It was the contest 
between Paul Keating and John Hewson, One Nation versus Fightback.
Chapter six provides a conclusion to the whole of the thesis and also forecasts the 
Labor Party's future. It addresses the question of whether the ALP could now be a 
“natural party of government”.
5
Part One
The Background: Labor 1972 - 1982
6
CHAPTER ONE
THE LEGACY OF THE WHITLAM GOVERNMENT
The three years of the Whitlam government's office were characterised by deep 
and perennial economic crises and a series of political upsets and scandals. They were 
marked by high inflation, high interest rates, high unemployment, a wages explosion, 
flurries of divisive debate, proposals, counter proposals, disputes accompanied by 
press controversy, internal party wrangles, and ministerial changes. All of this has 
been interpreted as evidence of the Whitlam government's incompetence as a political 
and economic manager; a perception of incompetent economic management; poor 
management of the machinery of government; indiscipline and disorganisation within 
the Labor movement - both political and industrial - and poor management of the 
media and public perceptions of the government. These experiences, in turn, shaped 
the perception and orientation of the subsequent generation of Labor politicians and 
determined them to avoid such mistakes. This chapter describes and assesses those 
aspects of the Whitlam government experience which became relevant to the Hawke 
and Keating governments.
1.1. Economic Mismanagement
When the Whitlam government came into office in 1972, it did so on a wave of 
enthusiasm. The first months of government were conducted in an atmosphere 
approaching euphoria. Under the slogan 'It’s time for new team, a new program, a 
new drive for equality of opportunity' (Singleton 1990: 10), it declared its 
commitment to economic planning and development; the restoration of full 
employment; price monitoring; industrial relations policy; urban and regional 
development; the husbanding of the continent's economic resources and natural 
environment; and massively increased governmental services.
The Whitlam government strongly believed that the economy would be tractable 
under its management. As Johnson argues, it assumed “that a capitalist economy
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would function smoothly as long as it was properly managed, [and] that the high
levels of economic growth necessary to Labor’s plans for social reform, could be
achieved” Johnson (1989:54); that “there were no fundamental contradictions between
the government’s plans and those of business” (Johnson 1989:56), and that a massive
expansion of public expenditure would have no deleterious effects on the private
sector. Nor did they believe that there was any fundamental contradiction between
capital and labour. Rather, it was felt, following Keynes, the success of the one would
benefit the other. Whitlam and other prominent Labor ministers consistently
emphasised the common aims of government, industry and labour, and clearly
outlined the traditional links they believed to exist between the Labor government and
manufacturers (Johnson 1989: 55). As Whitlam summed up:
The program of social reform embarked upon by the present government cannot 
be achieved without a strong and growing private sector. Nothing could be further 
from the truth than that we are anti-business or hostile to business. We recognise 
the interdependence of all sectors of the economy (cited in Johnson 1989: 55).
Dr. Jim Cairns, the Party’s most prominent economic spokesman, said:
Government policy is to bring together the collective experience, knowledge 
and ideas of public servants, industry, managers, unionists, academics, 
ecologists and the ordinary citizens who are the consumers of industry’s 
products. The government intends to develop industry planning across the 
whole range of industry both secondary and primary, with all sections of the 
community - especially including trade unions and consumers’ interests - 
participating in the planning (Cairns 1973).
Unfortunately, the government’s performance failed to match its rhetoric. Some 
commentators found that the government's commitment to comprehensive planning 
was honoured more in the breach than the observance (Johnson 1989: 54). All of this 
planning, and the assumptions which underpinned most of the government’s policies, 
were to prove problematic in practice. The Whitlam government firstly misjudged the 
strength of the recovery and subsequently aimed for an unsustainable level of 
economic activity. What become evident was that the Whitlam government’s three 
years in office were characterised by a growing economic crisis, which overshadowed 
the party’s proposals for reform. A number of key economic variables during the 
Whitlam years did provide something of a "scale shock" (McKinlay 1981: 37). The
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high rate of inflation had not been experienced since the early 1950s, as it rose to 20 
per cent in 1975. Unemployment was also on a scale unprecedented in the postwar 
period, reaching 4.5 per cent in 1975. So too the rate of increase in public sector 
outlays and receipts and, in particular, the scale of budget deficits were unprecedented. 
The Whitlam government did made some successful policy. Legal aid, increased 
educational funding, and a more independent foreign policy, modem divorce laws and 
Medibank were some of its landmarks (Solomon 1982: 321). However, these 
successes have been overshadowed by its ultimate failure. What went wrong?
The W hitlam government m isunderstood the necessities of economic 
management, particularly in their first two years in office. One of the most fatal flaws 
of the Whitlam government was that it too eager to implement what it claimed as to be 
a "mandate for social reform". It became trapped by its own program. The government 
tried to get many programs launched as quickly as it could without closely analysing 
the capacity of resources (economic and political) needed or available to support these. 
Determined to fulfil its election promises, the Whitlam government continued develop 
their new programs although its economic advisers argued against any increases in 
public expenditure (Weller and Smith 1977: 66-67). Everyone, from the Prime 
Minister down, was anxious to get on with the task of implementing the program and 
fulfilling the mandate. There was no careful consideration of what policies the 
government could institute and what programs it could launch in the existing economic 
situation. Within the ALP, this complaint was an echo of the more general complaint 
“too much too soon” (Freudenberg 1978: 285).
The relatively high level of unemployment in its early time in office reinforced 
Labor’s sense of mission and its commitment to rapid implementation of its program. 
The consequent high level of inflation did nothing to encourage restraint, patience or 
caution either in Cabinet or Caucus. Even after the level of inflation had began to 
attract critical attention, many ministers still regarded pressing on with their own plans 
as more important than making sure that these plans were founded on a firm economic 
basis (Weller and Smith 1977: 58). For example, although the government inherited
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an inflation rate of 7 per cent, the highest since 1951, it placed its priority on getting 
unemployment down (Freudenberg 1977: 277-8).
Labor had an important reason for giving the priority to reducing unemployment. 
The party had a philosophical and constitutional commitment to protect full 
employment even of some cost in electoral support (Singleton 1990: 99). As Whitlam 
said "Labor would not put people out of work to cure inflation” (Lloyd & Clark 1976: 
95). The problem was that it sough to trade-off inflation against employment: stability 
in the labour market had been achieved at the cost of higher inflation. This because 
Whitlam’s understanding of economics and his policy prescriptions were based on the 
Phillips curve notion that there was a trade-off between unemployment and inflation, 
and so took for granted that unemployment could be dealt with by increasing 
expenditure and thus budgeting for deficits. As a result the Labor government's social 
aims and policies called for massive increases in public spending (Parker 1976: 13) 
without taking proper account of inflation. Whitlam ignored the fact that inflation itself 
was the central problem for his government.
It was suggested by some of Labor politicians at the time that Labor's program 
could not be achieved without expansion of public sector. However, sensible 
economic management during this period should in any case have required 
government to restrain its expenditure programs. But the Whitlam government had 
never fully resolved the question of the desirable size of the public sector, or of the 
level and type of taxation needed to finance it. Similarly, many observers argued that 
the impact of consequent recession (Hmy, Hughes & Mathews 1993: 50) could be 
minimised if real wages had been reduced. Only by doing this, and at the same time 
imposing large increase in rates of taxation, could the Whitlam government have 
accomplished its programs without serious acceleration of inflation (Gruen 1976: 26- 
7). But the government was reluctant to dishonour its election promises not to increase 
taxation. This was why the Cabinet rejected Treasury advice for "a short sharp shock" 
to reduce inflation by dampening demand, which required both restraint of 
government expenditure and increased taxation, as well as restraint in wages growth.
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Moreover, the Whitlam government worried that such prescriptions would cause 
unemployment and would constraint its program of social and urban reform (Singleton 
1990: 30). However, when many of the government's spending programs were still in 
their initial take-off stage, the automatic increase in government revenue was not 
adequate to implement Labor's policies. The 1973 and 1974 budgets, for example, 
were a miscalculation in fiscal judgment merely providing an inflationary stimulus 
(Gruen 1976: 26-7).
The Labor "mix" of new programs annoyed too many privileged groups at the one 
time, allowing a broad opposition coalition of special interests to develop (Wilenski 
1980:43). It underestimated the ease with which shifts (or foreshadowed shifts) in 
government policy - especially in sectors used to preferential treatment - could disturb 
and upset business interests and trade unions. For example, the economic growth that 
Labor needed to pay for its various programs relied upon a profitable and expanding 
private sector. But many of the reforms which would make a real and lasting change in 
the social structure were those that the business community, or particular parts of it, 
found most threatening and resulted, in the short term, in reduced business confidence 
and investment.(Wilenski 1980: 53). In sum, the Whitlam government did not 
anticipate the likely macro-economic effects of the large increases in federal 
government spending entailed by its programs.
1.2. Lack of Planning.
The Whitlam government experience proved that the efforts to reduce high 
inflation and high employment by means of a Keynesian strategy of managing demand 
was no longer credible (Singleton 1990: 100). This period provided the lesson that 
Labor was no longer operating in a simple Keynesian world in which some reduction 
in unemployment could, apparently, always be purchased at the cost of some inflation 
(Emy, Hughes and Mathews 1993: 50). In fact, the use of an expansionary policy (in 
the form of larger budget deficits) as a means of reducing unemployment simply did 
not work. Indeed, these deficits were positively harmful: more inflation simply led to
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more unemployment. The impact of deficit budgeting was more costly than Labor 
contemplated before coming to office. It not only exacerbated both inflation and 
recession, but also raised conflicts within government circles and wider sections of 
society. For instance, opposition to indefinite increases in wages and public spending 
came from the Treasury and the business world. Support for deficits came from 
radical ministers, the spending departments, and the trade unions. While unemployed 
and welfare beneficiaries were harmed by escalating inflation.
The Whitlam government did take action on some other fronts to solve the 
problem of inflation and unemployment. But the government's approach was not an 
integrated one. Beside tariff cuts (soon reversed through the imposition of import 
quotas), its main weapon of trying to curb price increases was through a Prices 
Justification Tribunal (Bentley 1973: 91). The government hoped "that moral suasion 
with state governments, unions, employers, and upper income groups and the 
operation of the Prices Justification Tribunal (PJT) would be sufficient to combat 
inflation" (McDonald 1985: 10). But the attempt at persuasion failed. The PJT did not 
work and was merely "window-dressing". It could not control prices as well as a 
system of price controls. The problem was that in many sectors of economy the 
government did not have sufficient constitutional powers to enforce the 
implementation of the PJT’s rules (Bentley 1973: 88). The only form of sanction was 
a consumer boycott following wide publicity when a firm disobeyed the rules. 
Moreover it was difficult to obtain business and unions cooperation because they 
tended to argue one against another. When they as well as unions (and/or workers) did 
not like decision they have went outside the formal industrial relations system.
Some commentators saw the Whitlam government policy as failing in the 
intellectual effort that might conceive effectively radical reforms even within the basic 
assumptions of a non-socialist mixed economy. Gruen (1976: 18-19), for instance, 
described the economic policies of the Labor government, particularly from December 
1972 to May 1974, as "a bit like the curate’s egg - good in parts. And the bad parts 
contaminate the whole”. He saw Labor’s fiscal policy as "inept" and argued that it had
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a crucial influence on subsequent developments. The Whitlam government failed to set 
the job of government to "get the setting right", that is, to remove such distortions as 
high budget deficits, inflation, high interest rates and real wages, and to increase the 
profitability of business activity.
Wages indexation was a perfect example of the Whitlam governm ent’s 
unwillingness or inability to accept economic realities. Many commentators expected 
that "if an equitable prices and incomes policy could be brought into operation the 
prospects of substantial economic recovery without a resurgence of inflation would 
have been maximised" (Willis 1980: 95). However, the Whitlam government lacked 
an appreciation of the importance of an incomes policy as a vehicle to combat inflation. 
Firstly, Whitlam doubted its effectiveness and viewed it as a not politically-wise- 
option (Bentley 1973: 91). Secondly, and more importantly, the Whitlam government 
failed to obtain consensus among a significant proportion of the community - in 
particular the trade unions, though also major business firms - for an incomes policy 
(Bentley 1973:49). The unions, for example, were determined to protect their wage 
interests (Singleton 1990: 29). This was the major factor which poisoned relations 
between the Whitlam government and the trade unions. This was compounded by the 
style of the Whitlam government, which tended to ignore consultation and had little 
apparent sympathy for union interests (Singleton 1990: 29). W hitlam’s dominance 
over the government’s policy, together with his "hefty contempt for the trade union 
movement" and the ACTU's determination not to be uncritically subservient to the 
government, set the tone of their relationship (Singleton 1990: 14). Yet, an incomes 
policy could not succeed without the voluntary co-operation of the trade unions.
Towards the end of its term of office, the Whitlam government retreated from its 
mildly progressive Keynesian approach to economic management towards a 
monetarist-oriented approach, which sought to control inflation by curtailing further 
public sector expansion and by the creation of further involuntary unemployment 
(Stilwell 1980: 125). This shift was institutionalised in the Hayden Budget of 1975. 
The budget focused on reducing inflation as more important than restocking the
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economy, and fiscal and monetary policy became less expansionary (Jolley 1978: 
104). But this attempt to rectify the existing economic problems was too late. The 
Whitlam government was defeated in the subsequent election.
Gruen (1976: 25) criticised Labor’s dilettante method of decision making and a 
substantial deterioration in government handling of the economy, marked by a lack of 
discipline in the face of adversity and an inability to come to grips with the very 
difficult choices which were thrust on it. Although, increasing unemployment and 
inflation became the dominant economic and political problem for the Whitlam 
government, its responses to the problems tended to be ad hoc. For instance, it raised 
taxes and then cut them, cut spending and then raised it, tightened the money supply 
and then expanded it {National Times, 18-23 November 1974).
One commentator precisely and completely described the problem of the Whitlam 
government in handling the economy:
Labor arrived in office without an economic policy, a coherent arrangement 
that would consistently resolve the competing claims of ministers and 
community groups. There are 13 items in the Labor platform under economic 
planning, and not one of them has been relevant to the actual business of 
making economic policy.(National Times, 11 November 1974)
This account may suggest why, although a whole section of the ALP Federal platform
is devoted to economic planning, the economic editor of the Age could write in
February 1975 that:
The main weakness of the Labor government since it has been in office has 
been its inability to plan. Alongside its almost mystical commitment to planning 
has been an extraordinary degree of ‘ad hoccery’ in making its economic 
decisions.(The Age, 5 February 1975).
Finally, there is another factor which might be able to explain the Whitlam 
government’s economic mismanagement: that was Whitlam himself. Whitlam had no 
great interest in economics and gave his government no leadership in this area. He did 
not at the outset identify economic management as one of the government's most 
significant tasks (Weller 1977: 58-9). For him, monitoring the economy and making 
adjustments to it were mundane and mechanical tasks for lesser minds (McMullin 
1991: 374-8). Whitlam himself recognised the truth that little in the platform or
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policies as developed by 1972 prepared his government to deal with the unique 
economic problems it was to face (Whitlam 1985: 183). It was not surprising that 
Whitlam and most of his ministers used unemployment and inflation as "the only yard 
stick of the degree of slack in the economic system" (Gruen 1976: 19). This Whitlam 
view is different, for instance, from that of Bob Hawke who had a much better 
practical grasp of the economy. Hawke, in contrast to Whitlam, believed that good 
economic management was a fundamental component in the overall performance of a 
national Labor government (McMullin 1991: 348).
Bob Hawke and Paul Keating have their own words in describing the failures of 
the Whitlam government in handling the economy. In an address given in 1987 
Hawke maintained that:
The problem of the Whitlam government was that the gap between ideals and 
outcomes grew to a chasm over that three-years period. The party was hungry 
for government, but when it is in government it failed to mature as a 
government. The ideals and objectives were constant but the economic growth 
upon which the 'program' was based, was disappearing. The task became not 
the distribution of wealth but its creation, but neither Whitlam nor his successor as 
Prime Minister seemed to recognised it. Over a decade la ter,... we are reminded 
of Gough's success in refurbishing Labor and returning it into office; but we must 
also be struck by the vulnerability of any party which maintains a static of 
economic posture in rapidly changing times (cited in Emy, Hughes & Mathews 
1993: 60).
Keating expressed his impression of the Whitlam government by saying: "While 
Labor's ideals must remain true to its basic faith, the means of achieving its objectives 
must adapt in a changing world. The mismatch of ends and means was a fatal flaw in 
the make-up of the Whitlam government" (Keating 1987: 3).
1.3. Mode of Government
Soon after it was elected, to make the public service more attuned to Labor 
initiatives and to illustrate the Labor Party’s new priorities, the government created 
new departments and reshuffled others. It established the department of Urban and 
Regional Development, separated the Department of Education and Aboriginal Affairs, 
and unified the four armed service departments within the Department of Defence. To 
provide jobs for the twenty-seven ministers elected by caucus, the Whitlam
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government created several other small departments. It also expanded the number of 
private advisers in ministerial offices; established several commissions and committees 
of inquiry as instruments for extracting information and providing advice; and selected 
a number of permanent heads who were thought to be responsive to its program. 
Finally, the Labor government also established the Priorities Review Staff - 
comprising economists and social scientists drawn from the Reserve Bank and 
Universities - as a think tank for government (cf. North & Weller 1980: 64-66).
However, the three years of the Whitlam government were marked by apparently 
never-ending conflicts between the cabinet, the caucus and the prime minister (Kelly, 
1976: 203); the problems arising from Labor’s style of organisation and the 
assumptions underlying its approach to office. Some of its most damaging problems 
arose from the fact that Labor had difficulty in making good use of the central 
institutions of government (Hughes 1979: 23). There was a pattern of hostility and 
suspicion between politicians and public servants; there were also pervasive inter­
departmental battles. Individual ministers differed in their awareness of the need for a 
strategic view, especially of their own department, and few tried systematically to 
coordinate departmental policy responsibilities with the overall course of government 
policy. As McMullin noted, "Strong-willed ministers taking their cue from the 
diumvirate, sometimes gave the impression of busily charging ahead with reforms in 
their own spheres without much regard for how the government was faring as a 
whole" (McMullin 1991: 344).
The damaging and destructive relationship between the government and the 
Treasury was a perfect example of the Whitlam government’s lack of cohesion. In the 
budget sessions of Cabinet in August 1974, for instance, there was a battle between 
Whitlam and Crean as Treasurer versus Cameron, Cairns, Uren and Hayden. 
Whitlam’s backing for the Treasury line was not enough to prevent the opposition led 
by Cameron, Cairns, Uren and Hayden from blocking the implementation of Treasury 
policy (Hughes 1979: 24). This damaging and destructive relationship arose partly 
from inter-departmental rivalry, partly from the failure of two successive Treasurers,
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Crean and Cairns, to exercise effective political leadership; and partly from the 
reluctance of the cabinet and caucus to accept any economic advice on the deteriorating 
economy that was antithetical to traditional ALP attitudes (Jupp 1982: 123).
The role of the cabinet in tackling such difficulties was critical, but the functioning 
of the cabinet was a problem throughout Labor’s period in office (Weller and Smith 
1977: 59). The cabinet had a limited capacity to assess the government’s overall 
position and to make adjustments in policies as circumstances changed (Kelly 1976: 
59). Furthermore, although the Labor caucus set up a twenty-seven member cabinet 
and established a system of cabinet and caucus committees, Labor's approach to the 
opportunities and responsibilities of office continued to reflect Whitlam's own style 
rather than any sense of collective strategy. Whitlam put too low a value on the 
political advantages of consultation: he tended to “stamp his own imprint on his 
government's policy” (Singleton 1990: 13).
At the same time, the system of Cabinet committees was over-elaborated. By 
August 1974, there were 117 committees, commissions of inquiry, and task forces, 
(Reid 1976: 60) plus other non-public service advisers of various kinds in ministerial 
staffs, designed to delegate many decisions away from full cabinet to lighten its load. 
Whereas the committees meet frequently before the 1974 election, they met seldom 
thereafter. Gradually they were replaced in 1975 by a series of ad hoc committees 
selected by the Prime Minister (North and Weller 1980: 67).
The Labor government was conscious of the difficulties of working through the 
traditional bureaucracy. While there were important additions to the machinery of 
government, there was little change to the central bureaucracy itself. Although Labor’s 
major reform program had to be carried out through the apparatus of the state, it gave 
low priority to reform of that apparatus. There continued to be a considerable 
adherence to the view of a public service equally able to serve both political sides. But 
all evidence went to the contrary. The conservative tendency of the public service 
presented Labor with serious problems at a number of levels. Most officials co­
operated with Labor within the confines of their conception of the appropriate role of
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government and of the public servant and according to their own values- which 
inevitably accorded more closely with those of their own socio-economic background 
than of those in the Labor Party (Wilenski 1980: 48). It was, moreover, symptomatic 
of Labor's larger failure to attain mastery over the bureaucratic machine which alone 
enabled the wheels of government to turn.
Worse still, senior public servants - including those occupying the all-powerful 
positions of permanent heads of departments - tended to think firstly of the interests of 
their own departments or the public service in general, rather than of the more abstract 
notion of the interest of the government both as a whole and as a political entity 
responsible to electorate (Sexton 1979: 32). Some of them were even clearly 
unsympathetic politically to Labor, and opposed any changes the government made. 
Yet Whitlam consistently failed to recognise this conflict of interests. He, at least in the 
first two years, refused to countenance either the structural changes in public service 
that were necessary if its major programs were rapidly to be implemented, or the 
changes in key personnel without which those structural changes could not be feasible 
(Sexton 1979: 5). For example, Whitlam refused to replace the most powerful and 
established permanent heads, a measure necessary for the success of the government's 
program implementation.
The Whitlam government’s difficulties in maintaining a cohesive image were not 
helped when Caucus occasionally exercised its right to review or alter a cabinet 
decision. Whenever this occurred, or looked as if it might, the government’s critics in 
parliament and the media quickly pounced, alleging that this was dramatic evidence 
that the government was in "crisis". This public image of instability was augmented by 
the practice of some ministers opposed to a particular cabinet decision of arguing for 
its reversal in caucus. Backbenchers were generally more aware that the helter-skelter 
approach to alleviating the neglect of decades led not only to some ill-considered 
decisions, but left no time for adequate consultation beforehand or explanation and 
promotion afterwards. Whitlam seemed not to grasp or care that while the dizzy pace
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of change excited and exhilarated some voters, more were alarmed and alienated by it 
(McMullin 1991: 345).
Therefore, it is not surprising that almost everybody had some complaints - 
Ministers, Caucus members, departments, staff, party officials, State Premiers and 
state leaders, trade unions, industry organisations, women's groups and welfare 
organisations - about the co-operation between the political leaders (Freudenberg 
1978: 277-83). One of the most common criticisms was that the cabinet was too large. 
The Caucus’ decision to keep the number of ministers at twenty-seven, but not to 
divide these into small inner ministry (cabinet) of twelve or thirteen and an outer 
ministry, contributed significantly to inefficient and ineffective planning and decision­
making processes. A cabinet of the whole ministry was unworkable and damaged the 
Labor's political management. It took too long to deal with the business. It was too 
large for effective policy-coordination (Lloyd and Reid 1974: 45). As a result it could 
not plan the government's political strategy.
In short, the need for new machinery to take the public service in the directions 
that Labor wanted to go was unquestioned. However, the cost of this excess was too 
high. First, Whitlam’s action of creating several new departments and reshuffling and 
renaming the old ones to create a pool of portfolios sufficient to cover all contingencies 
in placing his 27 ministers was criticised as ridiculous. These steps were inefficient 
since they were as much to accommodate the personal interests and demands of the 27 
newly elected ministers and their supporters in Caucus (the Parliamentary Labor 
Party), as to adapt administration to the needs of the party platform. Commentators 
generally agreed that there were "too many ministers for the posts" (Lloyd and Reid 
1974: 57). And the reshuffled departmental functions and the creation of new 
departments effectively wrecked the party’s pre-election plans for an orderly 
reconstruction of government services.
Secondly, ambition, coupled with the desire to get the new programs going on as 
many fronts as possible, discounted the need for coordination and cooperation. Some 
policy making or planning and field work overlapped or was divided. For example,
19
economic policy making was split between the Prime Minister, the Treasurer, the 
Minister of Trade and Secondary Industry, the Minister for Labour, and six or seven 
others - with no obvious central leadership. The Prime Minister, the Cabinet, the 
bureaucracy (and newer bodies such as the Priorities Review Staff), all failed to 
develop any overall coherence among the many desirable initiatives. Three main 
institutional advisers to the government - the Treasury, Labor's own economic 
advisers and its senior ministers, Whitlam, Cairns, Crean, Cameron, Hayden and 
Uren - all proceeded from different diagnoses of the economic problems to different 
solutions, and operated on different value systems. The cost was huge in confusion 
and votes. The Cabinet severed its relations with the federal Treasury. Treasurer Frank 
Crean was subjected to a cruel political execution by the Prime Minister. The relations 
between Cabinet and Caucus reached their nadir. Similarly, relations between senior 
figures in the Labor government became deeply embittered (Kelly 1976: 59).
Thirdly, the effect of these tendencies on the growth and use of the planning 
machinery was itself contradictory. Like other parts of the machine, planning and 
policy review units proliferated. But nobody took much notice of them, and then more 
were created to remedy the situation. Some of these creations, indeed, were no more 
than moves in the jockeying for power between ministers and major departments. In 
due course the Forward Estimates Committee of the Cabinet, after a few desultory 
meetings, faded away. The same fate overtook most of the other ad hoc cabinet 
committees the Prime Minister had established (Parker 1976: 9).
Fourth, any new organisation, even if created with the maximum co-operation 
from all the agencies concerned, takes at least six months to establish, and may take a 
year or more before it working smoothly. This view had become even more valid as 
the Whitlam government was the most inexperienced since Scullin became Prime 
Minister in October 1929. As with the Scullin Ministry, not a single member of the 
Whitlam government had ever held a national ministerial position, including the Prime 
Minister himself (Robertson 1974: 37).
Fred Gruen (1976: 27) comments on this:
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Labor’s cumbersome machinery of government - its 27 men cabinet with a 
possibility of reversal by a 90 member Caucus - would have made it very 
difficult for the government to agree on any order of priority, even if Labor had 
been convinced at the time that there was need for the establishment of such 
priorities. Individual members cared too much for their individual programs 
rather than to make decision in the interests of either the government as a whole 
or of its total aims.
While Kenneth Davidson {The Australian 2 June 1975) echoes Gruen's comments:
...the main trouble of the government in its first few months has not been the 
absence of planners in the bureaucracy, ...but the failure of its Ministers to act 
as a team. IiTespective of the quality of the bureaucracy, the ministers see 
themselves primarily as ministers out to get a big slice of the government 
expenditure cake to add to their power and prestige by extending their 
departmental influence.
In sum, the Whitlam government faced two basic problems: it could not secure 
meaningful control of the machinery of government, and it could not direct that 
machinery effectively towards its own priorities (Sexton 1979: 177). The Whitlam 
government failed to show any notion of the government as a single entity, with 
policies and priorities against which individual ministers and departments were 
required and, moreover, felt required, to test their own programs (Sexton 1979: 6). At 
this stage, the Whitlam government lacked an appreciation that its performance would 
be judged by the electorate as a unit; it failed to discuss political tactics or the effects of 
its decisions in electoral terms.
1.4. Relation with Trade Unions and Business
A successful Labor government should act in concert with those groups in society 
which were sympathetic to its goals. The most important of these is the trade union 
movement. There would be a greater chance of achieving Labor’s goals if a Labor 
government and trade union movement were working together than if they were 
working at odds with one another. But the Whitlam government ignored this 
proposition. During its three years in office, the Whitlam government failed to 
maintain good communications and consultation with the trade unions (Whitlam 1985: 
198). In much policy formulation the Whitlam government - outside of some limited 
areas of industrial relations policy - did little to consult the union movement, let alone
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to seek its active support and involvement. Most decisions, particularly economic 
decisions, were made in the board rooms of companies or the government’s own 
semi-independent statutory corporations (Catley & McFarlane 1974: 74). The trade 
unions were associated with government involvement rather than consulted (Singleton 
1990: 13). As Freudenberg stated "to the extent that Whitlam had done or initiated so 
much of the work himself, and to the extent that the Platform now embraced a great 
many of his ideas, formulas and priorities, the policy speech was highly personal 
document" (Freudenberg 1977: 226). Therefore, it is not surprising that, at least from 
the trade union point of view, the policies of the Whitlam government reflected the 
priorities of the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party (FPLP), and in particular Whitlam, 
rather than those of the unions.
The problem was that the Labor government regarded workers’ participation in 
policy-making with some suspicion rather than as an opportunity to qualify and 
restrict the degree of power that ownership of property traditionally carried with it. 
This explained why any limited moves by the government were regarded by workers 
as diversions from their primary interest in wages and conditions (Wilenski 1980: 53). 
The Whitlam government was not able (and did not try particularly hard) to increase 
the organised power of its supporters in the social and industrial structure.
As a result, the Whitlam government failed to persuade the trade union movement 
to accept the central organising concept of its program. The trade unions strongly 
supported efforts to increase spending on social welfare, health, education and other 
public sector commitments. They also supported the government’s initial attempts to 
increase wages and its initially supportive interventions in the Arbitration Court. 
However, they were concerned about high unemployment and inflation and 
inconsistencies in economic policies (The Australian, 14 July 1975). The unions 
criticised government measures such as across-the-board tariff reductions almost as 
much business did, because of the effect of tariff cuts on employment (Johnson 1989: 
84). They also opposed the referendums to give the federal government power over 
prices and incomes, and so guaranteed their defeat in December 1975 (Freudenberg
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1977: 284). The increasing trade union dissatisfaction with the government was 
expressed farcically after the government’s ignominious defeat in the Bass by-election. 
A wide-cross-section of union officials joined in the criticism, arguing that declining 
support from trade unionists had contributed to the defeat. Bob Hawke, then president 
of the ACTU, came out with a strong statement attacking Whitlam. In his view, 
Whitlam had treated the Labor Party like his personal property and had failed to 
acknowledge that Caucus was the supreme decision-making body in the party {The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 7 July 1975).
Similarly, by the end of its term of office, Labor seemed to have lost whatever 
ambivalent support it had originally enjoyed among some sectors of business. 
Business organisations, for instance, criticised Labor for failing to use wage 
reductions to deal with inflation, its inability to cut public spending sufficiently and to 
control the trade union movement. Faced with a deepening recession, business 
organisations increased their calls for further reductions in government expenditure, 
further cuts in wages and more substantial, but interference-free, forms of assistance 
to industry. They were disinclined to accept Labor’s limited attempts to influence the 
nature and direction of investment. Despite its concessions to private enterprise, the 
level of Labor’s commitment to the public sector and to improving lower levels of 
standards of living, was still such as to lead to conflict with business forces (Johnson 
1989: 84). Businessmen also complained constantly that they were not having 
sufficient access to governmental policy creation. And finally, the criticism that 
government was not bothering clearly to explain its policies, or to develop clear 
policies in the first place, was also very common.
As a result, business become increasingly partisan in their criticisms of the 
Whitlam government. They seemed to be virtually united in opposition to the Labor 
government planning and in calling for the return of the Liberals. In March 1975, for 
instance, W.J. Henderson, the Director General of Associated Chamber of 
Manufactures (ACMA), came out explicitly in support of the Liberals. He argued that 
the general direction of policies outlined in the Liberal-Country Parties’ National
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Economic Program for 1975 should be supported by majority of manufacturers 
(Industry News 1975). Other business groups, such as ACMA, the Metal Trades 
Industry Association (MTIA) and the Australian Chamber of Commerce (ACC), 
mounted an anti-Labor campaign which played a major role in the Whitlam 
government’s falling prospects (Johnson 1989: 76-77). Not all employer groups were 
as blatant in their support for the Liberals as the ACMA. However, it is clear that by 
December 1975 Labor had lost what little support it had from some sections of 
industry in 1972.
1.5. Mass Media Management
By the end of its term in office Labor faced far more virulent media opposition 
than in 1973. In the beginning the Whitlam government was supported by some of the 
media. It entered office in 1972 with considerable support from the press, especially 
from Murdoch’s Australian and the Melbourne Age. The Australian depicted Whitlam 
as a man of vision while arguing that McMahon was merely offering the same old 
policies that had failed in the past (Johnson 1989: 53). More than this, Murdoch 
provided substantial funds for the Labor party's campaign. However, in 1975 the 
media presented a united front against the Whitlam government. In this year, the 
government was subjected to relentless scrutiny by the media which, in turn, severely 
damaged Labor electorally. The media intensively reported every facet of the Whitlam 
government's performance in a year of extreme pressure.
Relations between Whitlam and Murdoch soured by 1975, and the Australian 
became hostile to the Labor. For instance, it made it quite clear how people should 
vote in the 1975 election. It argued that "the scandal-ridden government was 
responsible for record inflation, record interest rates, record unemployment and for 
transferring resources from the private to the public sector" (The Australian, 12 
November 1975). Similarly, the Age - though it did denounce Kerr’s dismissal of the 
Whitlam government as one of the most regrettable days in the political life of nation - 
during the election campaign in 1975 shifted its view arguing that "Sir John Kerr had
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taken the only course of action open to him' (The Age, 12 November 1975). While 
the Sydney Morning Herald stated that "it was mistaken enough to vote Labor in 1974 
since it returned to power a ‘gang of one-eyed zealots seeing only the attraction of 
change, of an doctrinaire restructuring’ of society, and blip to the economic 
imperatives governing the dynamism and stability of society" (The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 11 December 1975). Such comments were merely the culmination of an 
extremely vitriolic anti-Labor media campaign which had already been evident during 
"Morosi" and "Loans" affairs.
The Labor case was made more difficult by the fact that the government did not 
appear to have a good record as economic managers, particularly in managing 
inflation. The rapid growth of unemployment and inflation in Australia from the end of 
1974 had been a major basis for news attacking Labor throughout the following years. 
Media investigations and revelations triggered crucial political events such as the 
dismissals of Deputy Prime Minister Jim Cairns and, the Minister for Minerals and 
Energy, Rex Connor, and the Morosi and Gair scandals.
Labor's media problems in the period 1972-1975 were in the main caused by 
matters unrelated to the policies of the government, for the most part by matters of 
personal conflict, scandals or the impact of its misconduct. This is not to say that those 
policies were not also unacceptable to sections of the media and would not have been 
the subject of attack in the absence of more lurid events. But it was suggested that the 
m edia’s capacity for damage would certainly have been decreased if it had 
concentrated on issues rather than personalities (Sexton 1979: 274).
So, the Whitlam government lost the general elections 1975 because of its internal 
weaknesses (lacked of professionalism and skills to handle contemporary 
Government), the image it gave of confused incompetence, and its unimpressive 
handling of what was admittedly a complex and difficult economic situation which had 
produced inflation and unemployment on a scale unmatched since the Great 
Depression of the thirties. Labor’s more considered and substantial but still 
controversial policy initiatives, and the activities of an emboldened and increasingly
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ruthless Opposition, had generated widespread uncertainty and apprehension. The 
continued economic slowdown and increased political controversy began to alarm 
large sections of the electorate, particularly in the light of concentrated press and media 
criticism of the government and an extremely effective attack from the Opposition 
(Archer and Maddox 1979: 141). While the rapid escalation of inflation and the 
trebling of unemployment between 1974 - 75 were undoubtedly crucial in moving 
public opinion away from the ALP government, the general impressions of chaos and 
dissension were also extremely important (Jupp 1982: 125). Although relatively few 
people saw any basic threat to the established order, ALP governments frightened the 
electors. Many were alarmed by "the antic posturing, mutual disloyalty, and apparent 
incompetence of ministers, and by the random damage done to the existing economic 
mechanisms which Labor nevertheless assured would continue to sustain the 
population and its own programs" (Parker 1976: 17).
Whitlam himself has admitted that the Labor government would have been in 
serious trouble with or without the "coup" (or dismissal) by the Governor General 
(Whitlam 1985: 199). Sir John Kerr, in sacking the Whitlam government, provided a 
"coup de grace" to a government whose prospects were already poor. Ian McNair 
Anderson has established in his research that 63 per cent of all voters in the 1975 
election believed that the state of the economy was more important than the dismissal 
of the Whitlam government. And more than a half of them accused the Labor 
government of economic mismanagement (McNair 1977: 94-100). Therefore, though 
Kerr's action was constitutionally questionable - and it has been seen as constituting 
the greatest political upheaval since federation in Australia - it gave the electorate an 
opportunity which the majority clearly welcomed (Parker 1976: 17).
It is true that the Whitlam government - like the other ALP federal governments 
before it - was plagued by an external crisis not of its own making. But there is little 
doubt that its own policies aggravated these afflictions - or, at any rate, that many 
electors thought so. But this only reinforced the cumulative impression left by the 
record outlined before and by matters not mentioned there; the fact that Whitlam had to
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transfer or dismiss four of his most senior ministers for incompetence or worse; the 
apparent misuse of some ministerial patronage; the government’s cynical (and inept) 
manoeuvre to gain control of the recalcitrant Senate by appointing one of its bitterest 
political opponents, Senator Gair, as Ambassador to Eire; the "Loans Affair" in which 
a minister sought to borrow "petro dollars" by unorthodox (and also inept) methods; 
and so on (Parker 1976: 17). It is not that non-Labor governments were exempt from 
such weaknesses, but that a Labor government can less easily afford them.
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CHAPTER TWO
RECONSTRUCTING LABOR UNDER HAYDEN
The years 1972 - 1975 left their mark on the Labor Party. It was left scarred and 
somewhat disillusioned by the experiences of the Whitlam government, both by its 
electoral defeat and the tactics adopted to remove it from office and by its own failures 
to create the changes it hoped for in some areas. Learning from these experiences of 
failure, Hayden initiated a broadly based reform of the party: its structure, its machine 
politics and its policy orientation. These reforms were very important for Labor, not 
only because they represented significant changes in the Party's traditional structure 
and policy orientation but also because they became the basis for the re-development 
of Labor that followed. The reforms laid the ground work for the successes of Labor 
under Hawke and Keating from 1983 until today. This chapter assesses the nature 
and the extent of reform Hayden undertook within the ALP.
2.1. Restructuring the Party
The experiences of 1972-1975 did not immediately cause a rethinking within the 
Labor Party. After the trauma of 1975, debates on party structure seemed less 
important for Labor than denouncing Governor General K err’s infamy and 
maintaining its rage. The Labor Party tended to believe that success in the future 
would depend more on the performance of the Fraser government than on convincing 
alternative economic programs or internal party reform. There was a belief among the 
party’s leaders that with inflation and unemployment rising, Labor could wait for the 
pendulum to swing back to it and ensure Fraser’s demise (Jaensch 1989b: 41). But 
this failed to occur. In the December 1977 election Labor was utterly defeated. Labor's 
vote, and share of seats, declined even further to a post-war nadir. The party won only 
one new seat, Capricornia, in Queensland. No new seats were won in Victoria or New 
South Wales, and once again the Labor Party won only one seat in Western Australia 
and none at all in Tasmania (see Weller 1977: 72). The defeat was as shattering as that
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of 1975, and the more demoralising because it was unexpected and had been sustained 
at a time of consistent unemployment.
The 1977 defeat stimulated a wide-ranging self-assessment. Dean Jaensch saw the
event as "the spark for attempt by the party to put its house into order" (Jaensch
1989a: 41). The experience encouraged the party to review its structure as well as its
policy orientation. A majority of Labor leaders perceived the 1970s and the beginning
of 1980s would be years of major change and problems in world. Therefore they must
reassess Labor position; they must decide how Labor would meet these problems and
what strategies would be needed. Such a reassessment was of particular importance
for the Labor Party, not least because it was in Opposition and must, therefore, plan
how to gain office as well as what it wanted to do in government. They were no
longer optimistic that Labor would be elected to government simply through a "swing
of the pendulum" or through public discontent with the Liberal-National Party
Coalition government. In this context they did not believed that all they had to do was
simply brush up the party’s image and improve its public relations. Rather they
believed that the party itself had to undergo changes affecting policy, structure,
organisation and membership. As David Combe reminded them:
For the Australian Labor Party, memories of the past five years are all too clear. 
But while they remain so, we must learn from them. The time has come for us 
to desist from further self-indulgent, unhelpful superficialities, generalisations and 
recriminations. Rather we must now examine closely all of the assumptions 
previously made about Australian politics, the electorate and the party, and even 
the conventional wisdom which are held, often strongly (Combe 1978: 15).
This feeling that change was essential was shared by many throughout the entire
structure of the party, and particularly by ambitious backbenchers and would-be
candidates for parliament. However, there were some sections of the ALP, particularly
those identified as left, which were reluctant to agree that any changes were necessary,
or feared the direction that change might take. But they seemed too small to impose
their will upon the supporters of change.
One of issues which had been debated was the need to reform the structure of 
Party. One effort to promote this idea of change and to provide some focus for it was
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the establishment of a special committee of inquiry by the National Executive of the 
ALP in a meeting in January 1978. This Committee, later known as the National 
Committee of Inquiry (NCI), consisted of party members, academics, and members of 
parliament, and was headed by the Parliamentary Leader, Hayden, and the party 
President, Bob Hawke. The task of this committee was to examine and report upon, 
among other things, "the changing social economic and demographic structure, 
particularly in respect of aspirations for a better society" and "the most effective 
functioning of the party in terms of maximising the involvement and satisfaction of the 
party members and of communicating the policies and ideas of the party to the 
Australian community" (see National Committee of Inquiry 1979).
One of the most important things that the committee of Inquiry found was that the 
basic structure of the National Conference laid down in 1902 and had remained 
unchanged ever since. Given constant pressure for reform (since the "36 faceless" 
men incident), in 1976 Whitlam and federal secretary Cyril Wyndham had set out a 
program for reform. For the first time the number of delegates - which were only 36, 
coming in equal numbers from the six ALP branches (Lloyd 1983: 231) - were added 
to as the parliamentary wing of the party was granted formal representation in 
Conference: the four federal parliamentary leaders and the six state parliamentary 
leaders were given official membership. Further, the four federal parliamentary leaders 
were also granted membership of the Federal Executive. However, the NCI noticed 
that this reform did not affect the party's basic structure (National Committee of 
Inquiry 1979: 21).
The Committee argued that, although it had worked effectively for 76 years, the 
Conference was no longer appropriate. This was because the NCI had detected a 
changing trend in Labor’s electoral base. It found that there had been a slow but 
steady decline in the proportion of blue collar workers voting for Labor since, at least, 
the 1960s (NCI, 1979: 18). Recognising this, there was an agreement that a Labor 
government could not depend solely on working class, let alone trade union, votes to 
win office. The Report noted that the continuing decline of the "blue collar element" in
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the workforce made imperative a broadly based electoral strategy. Although the party
still had to shore up its blue collar support, its appeals, and its policy expression, had
to be wider. Hence, while pursuing the interests and the needs of blue collar workers,
the ALP had to avoid alienating other groups essential to electoral success. Of these,
the most significant were the white collar workers (Jaensch 1989a: 63). In terms of the
specific focus of its report, the National Committee of Inquiry noted that:
In organisational terms, it is arguable that one of the greatest failures of the ALP 
has been its inability to attract affiliation in the growth areas of trade unionism, 
such as the technical, professional and white collar areas (NCI 1979: 86)
The Committee, therefore, noted the need for a larger, more national, more
representative, and directly elected conference of the ALP. It believed that "larger,
more national, more representative and more directly elected Conference would lessen
the incongruity of a party with a democratic and national commitment being headed by
such a small, indirectly selected and federalist Conference" (National Committee of
Inquiry 1979: 21). For this reason, the Committee recommended that there should be a
representative from each of the 124 Federal electorates, with another 124 delegates
elected by trade unions affiliated with the party in more than one state. A federal
component should be retained with a group of 40 delegates made up of six from each
State and two from each Territory (including the state party leaders). The
parliamentary party should be represented by twenty members of the Parliamentary
Executive, but Federal parliamentarians should be excluded from selection as Federal
electorate delegates. With two delegates from Australian Young Labor, the Committee
recommended a total Conference of 310 delegates (see National Committee of Inquiry
1979, and see also Lloyd 1979: 232).
The Committee also paid special attention to the place and role of women within 
the party. It recognised the ALP's need for new strategies and new structures to 
achieve the high level of female support it should have. The following extract from the 
Committee of Inquiry indicates the changing attitudes to women within at least some 
sections of the party:
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The ALP must recognise that it is not just ‘a working men’s party’...There is 
therefore a need for a critical consideration of attitudes to women and about 
women by both the party and the unions. It is time to consider whether we ought 
to project an image of a party which is less confrontationist in political style, less 
urban, less industrial...This is not to say that policies ought to become more 
conservative, that the identification with working people ought to be blurred. We 
should present the party with more subtlety than has been the case in the past 
(ALP, 1979: 35).
There was a belief that if Labor could attract more women, especially younger 
women voters, then the benefits would be significant. The Committee stated that, if 
the same percentage of women as men had voted for the ALP at the 1975 and 1977 
elections, the ALP would be in government at that time (NCI: 73). Therefore, the 
Committee recommended some new rules which established a minimum representation 
of women at all levels of the party (McMullin 1991: 399-3400). It suggested an 
affirmative action program within the party, suggesting positive discrimination in 
favour of women for a fixed period of seven to ten years based either on proportional 
representation or a blanket 50 per cent of offices to set be aside for women (NCI 1979: 
34-35).
Although the party did not adopt all of the recommendations of the Committee 
promptly (some of them were even rejected) the Committee had been a valuable agent 
in defining and analysing the flaws in party structure and recommending policy 
changes critical to Labor's electoral strategy (Hayden 1980: 241), including economic 
policy and the Party's relationship with trade unions. Its findings and 
recommendations were important factors in encouraging ALP reform in the following 
years. Its submission provided the basis for intense discussion throughout the Labor 
movement on the nature of electorate, and what the nature of the party should be in the 
future if it wanted to win office.
In the 1979 Conference the ALP agreed to double the number of delegates with 
additional positions going to the States in accordance with the number of House of 
Representatives Divisions in each. Thus the principle of equal representation of the 
States was breached for the first time in the party's history. Furthermore, to ensure 
balanced representation from each state, the delegates would be chosen by the
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proportional representation method of voting. Finally, it was agreed to ensure that at 
least a quarter of delegates of state branches should be women (ALP 1981: 217).
At the 1981 conference, Labor moved even further by carrying out a major 
reform. It did not accept the initial proposal of the NCI for proportional representation 
based on total party membership, and replaced it with a system based on additional 
representation according to the total number of federal electorates in each state, thereby 
it enlarging the conference to 99 delegates (Jaensch 1989a: 107). These consisted of 
seven from each state (including the parliamentary leaders), the four federal leaders, 
two from the Northern Territory and one each from the ACT and Young Labor. At this 
conference, too, the size of the National Executive was expanded, including 
representation by women. Further, the Conference even agreed to apply a principle 
that all delegates to the future Conference would be elected by proportional 
representation. According this formula, the NSW would be represented by 24 
delegates, Victoria 20 delegates, Queensland 15, SA 11, WA 11, Tasmania 9, ACT 2, 
NT 2, Federal leaders 4, and Young Labor 1.
The process of greater centralisation of the ALP was completed in the 1982 
National Conference in Canberra. One of the important procedures adopted by the 
Conference was that “State Conferences cannot bind delegates to this or any future 
Conference as they would be selected by proportional representation” (ALP 1982: 4). 
This resolution opened the way for a wider re-organisation of the National Conference 
on the basis of cross-State factions (Lloyd 1983: 254). In this conference also the 
number and composition of representatives were increased, including the 
representation of women and trade unions, as were the extensive used of proxy 
delegates and an enlarged number of speakers.
This restructuring of the party organisation paid political dividends for Labor 
(Lucy 1979: 72). As a result of reforms made since the 1979 National Conference, the 
ALP became more centralised: a genuinely national and representative organisation, 
enshrining the representation of population rather than states (Wran cited in Lloyd 
1983: 253). Although the principal organs still remained curious hybrids of both
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federal and national elements, the reform of the party that occurred since the 1979 
Conference has accelerated the movement to a national organisation. The Executive 
remained resolutely federal in its composition, but the conference went part of the way 
to adopting the structure of a national body (Lloyd 1983: 252). The presence of more 
delegates/representatives of state and national parliaments since the 1979 National 
Conference made the delegates less "faceless" and more representative.
2.2. Reforming Machine Politics
According to the formal constitution and history of the ALP, the extra- 
parliamentary wing of the party was the supreme and ongoing authority in the party. 
Therefore, theoretically, its parliamentarians have been regarded by the ALP as the 
products and instruments of the Party organisation (Parkin 1983: 17). The problem 
was that, prior to 1970s, state branches of the ALP had often caused electoral damage 
for a national Labor Party in its drive for office. This was mainly because of the 
domination of the traditional Left in state branches. In the late 1950s and much of the 
1960s, the traditional Left of the party, under the leadership of Joe Chamberlain, was 
a dominant force in the Executive, its influence out of proportion to its representation 
on the National Conference, to its strength in the Federal Caucus and to its factional 
strength in State branches (Lloyd 1983: 235). In 1970, for instance, 65 per cent of 
delegates of the Victorian ALP conference and 77 per cent of the NSW conference 
were left-dominated union representatives (Emy 1978: 628). Since the socialist left 
dominated the party’s organisation they could exercise considerable influence, not 
only at the state level, but - as the state branches elect Federal Conference and Federal 
Executive - at the federal level as well.
Since membership in unions and in the ALP overlapped so much, not only among 
state and federal Labor parliamentarians but on the Federal Conference and Executive 
as well, and since they may well have different interests, the delegates could easily 
become identified with factional and doctrinal disputes which might have originated 
outside the ALP itself (Emy 1978: 630). Since disputes in the unions inevitably spilled
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over into the ALP, inter-union disputes became intra-party disputes. For example, in 
the late 1960s, the ALP faced a major problem in the Victorian branch, which it had 
broken into three, almost independent, factions. These maintained their own 
organisations and fought bitterly for positions of power (Jaensch 1989a: 40). The 
same occurred in Queensland, when a small claque of trade union officials ran the 
local branch of the Labor party. As a result, the national party was weak, lacked 
coordination and cooperation, and sometimes even created internal disputes. Any 
division between the state branches and the federal machine could (or could be seen to) 
diminish the electoral chances of Labor. Thus, the domination of unions in the party 
organisation was seen a source of electoral liability.
Before the 1970s, it was very hard for the ALP to reform itself because of the 
relative autonomy of state branches and the weakness of the Federal machine. When 
the Federal leaders attempted to initiate a reform, they failed to do so because of very 
tightly organised cliques and control at the state level (Jupp 1982: 93). In this way, the 
ALP seemed to spend much of its time and energy in resolving disputes between its 
own members and it had little time left to devise national electoral strategies for gaining 
office. The party could not effectively and efficiently present a coherent face to the 
electorate. Until 1970, for instance, Labor’s campaigns had been run by and from the 
states, with little co-ordination and often no co-operation among the states (Jaensch 
1989a: 40). As a consequence, electoral campaigns were ineffective and inefficient in 
terms of gaining electoral support nationally.
To succeed in government, for example, the ALP needed people of ability and 
with a proven record. Yet too often the safe seats, those from which ministers would 
eventually be drawn, went to branch officials or simply members of the dominant 
faction who had little to offer to the party in government. The pre-selection of Bob 
Hawke as the Labor candidate for the safe seat of Wills was one good example of this 
case. Hawke was, according to the polls, the most popular political figure in the 
country, a man of proven record, great ability and experience, and inevitably an asset 
to the Labor party in its efforts to win office. Yet his selection was proceeded by a
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bitter, though unsuccessful, campaign by the Socialist Left in Victoria (Weller 1980: 
23).
Weller (1980: 23) assessed the Labor Party at the time as it was "primarily a large- 
self-perpetuating machine where positions of power in the organisation were prizes in 
themselves, not tactical positions designed to help win or retain government. Factions 
often used policy issues as tool rather than as ends”. An individual’s view on a policy 
was often determined by his or her factional alignment. As a result, it was hard for 
Labor to agree on how problems should be solved even if it could decide on 
objectives.
It was this kind of internal infighting which encouraged Whitlam to put together a 
coalition of forces to intervene in and reconstruct the Victorian branch in 1970-71. 
This attempt was successful, and federal Labor was able to shift the balance of power 
between the Left and the Right in the party. Since that intervention, the domination of 
trade union representatives has been reduced to a maximum 60 per cent in every state 
branch. This was followed with other cases - such as intervention in the New South 
Wales branch to secure proportional representation for the selection of National 
Conference and Executive delegates (Lloyd 1983: 236). It culminated in the reform of 
the Queensland branch in 1980.
This efforts by Whitlam to reform the party was not completed, however, until 
1979. A number of issues were left unresolved by Whitlam. Inter-state co-ordination 
was still weak. States Secretariats had little regular contact with the federal office. For 
instance, the New South Wales branch was still reluctant to give any information to 
the National Secretariat. The national organisation seemed powerless to do much about 
the Queensland branch of the party. Proposals for a national conference based on 
federal electorates were still unapproved. Nonetheless, "the legacy of Whitlam years 
was that ALP looked more like a national party and less like a loose confederation of 
state organisations" (Jupp 1982: 112).
Reform was accelerated after Hayden became the leader in 1977. This reform 
arose partly because of increases in the size and composition of State delegations as
36
has been mentioned before. The importance of the reforming of the party's structure 
was not only in terms of increasing the number of delegates and the size of the 
Executive, but also in terms of the parliamentary wing playing a more influential role 
in the party policy making process. The changes were crucial in that they provided a 
greater opportunity for "majority rule" within the national party, and hence a potential 
for real and substantial increase in the powers of the national organs of the party. This 
did not mean the federal structure was ended, but it was a key development towards a 
national process (Jaensch 1989a: 107).
The effect of federal intervention in Victoria in 1970, and of the restructuring of 
other branches as well as other reforms and changes in the following years was to 
reduce the total domination of the party's National Conference and Executive by trade 
union officials without diminishing its dependence on union organisations for funds 
(Jupp 1982: 97). The function of the Executive, for instance, changed significantly; 
not only did it continue its traditional role of interpreting party policy between 
meetings of the Conference, but it also became much more closely involved in the 
administration of the party as well as increasingly engaged in the party's Federal 
election campaigns (Lloyd 1983: 236). The fact that each policy committee is 
appointed directly by the National Executive meant that these policy committees ware 
more influenced by politicians. In other words, the quality of the Committee's work 
was very much a reflection of the commitment and calibre of the chairperson from the 
National Executive. As the work of Conference is very much determined by what 
policy committees put before it (Green 1981: 309), the power of committee 
appointment meant that it was more likely that the party’s Conference would be 
dominated by the National Executive (Lloyd 1983: 242). As power groupings on the 
Executive tended to coalesce around the pragmatic Federal leaders, particularly 
Hayden, Hawke and Keating, the Executive could largely be steered in accordance 
with these leaders’ wishes.
Following the establishment of a full time national office the role of the National 
Secretary /Secretariat was increased to include the responsibility for running national
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campaigns. Since 1979, the National Secretary has also had a greater role in the 
party's policy and strategy planning. Now the National Secretary has had a central role 
not only in the general administration of the party, but also in the planning and co­
ordination of election campaigns, co-ordination of research and media under-takings, 
public opinion polls, contact with relevant pressure groups within the electorate and 
with individual experts. The Secretariat also has a decisive influence over the policy 
image Labor presents to the electorate (Stephen 1980: 42). It has the potential to 
promote particular approaches, to down play others, and to emphasise those parts of 
party policy according to its idea of what the market will bear.
The rise of the “new” skilled machine politicians who had reached political 
consciousness during the 1950s and 1960s, has made the shift even faster. With the 
death or retirements of Jim Cairns, Rex Connor, Frank Crean, Bill Brown and Joe 
Chamberlain, younger leaders such as Bill Hayden, Bob Hawke, Paul Keating, John 
Button, David Combe and Mick Young came into prominence. These younger leaders 
were different from the old: they were more likely to have been university-educated, 
less likely to have been manual workers and more likely have had careers other than in 
the union movement.
The 1982 Conference, for example, was seen by commentators as a moment 
where politicians asserted their primacy in a way unprecedented in the party's history. 
It was the first time that all reports for platform changes were presented by 
parliamentary spokesmen or spokeswomen. A few years before it would have been 
unthinkable for National Executive members changed with responsibility for 
convening and chairing platform committee not to insist on their right to present the 
report of their committees (Combe 1982: 72). Hayden was able to influence the floor 
of the Conference decisively in order to keep the platform parameters as broad as 
possible. In this Conference, for example, he won a sequence of major policy 
victories such as wages and income policy, capital gains tax, uranium etc (Lloyd 1983: 
253). Perhaps this predominance of parliamentarians explains why the ALP under the
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Hawke government found it relatively easier to take a pragmatic approach to and 
consensus on some major policies.
Undoubtedly all of these changes contributed to the new revitalised image of the 
ALP after 1979. The Labor party appeared not to be as divided as it had been in the 
past. Certainty factional disputes still continued, but they rarely erupted into open 
conflict. Since then, too, the division between "machine" and "politicians" has been 
blurred, and the leadership coalition become dominant in the Conference: the role of 
politicians in policy-making is increasingly larger than the party’s constitutional 
principles suggest (North and Weller 1980: 38, see also Jaensch 1989a: 130). 
Although the National Conference is theoretically the supreme policy-maker, most of 
its business is to approve or amend recommendations of the National Executive or the 
Policy Committees. As a result the ALP is more cohesive, efficient as well as effective 
both in managing its own internal organisation and in formulating a strategic policy. 
Further, while the Liberals have appeared fragmented and lacking in co-ordination, 
Labor’s co-operation and co-ordination of state branches such as in campaign strategy 
have become more effective and efficient and fragmentation has been avoided.
2.3. The Need for Economic Management
The defeat in the 1977 election also encouraged the ALP to review its policy 
orientation. Judging from public opinion polls, ALP analysts recognised that “two 
factors... contributed most to Labor's loss: Whitlam’s leadership and the party's lack 
of credibility as sound economic managers” (Singleton, 1990:70). David Combe, 
National Secretary of the ALP, reminded the party that the most important contributing 
factor in its defeat was the fact that the ALP were simply not believed by the electorate. 
“After two years, according to him, the ALP had not been forgiven by the electorate 
for what they had been persuaded by the Liberals and the media to believe were the 
incompetence, the crises, and the extravagances associated with the later part of the 
Whitlam government in office” (Combe 1978: 15).
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In a speech at the Adelaide conference Hayden indicated his view on the major 
issues Labor was facing and the way he wanted to solve them. According to Hayden, 
there should be three key political objectives for Labor Party strategy for the 1980s: to 
win an election ( and this stage was top priority); to conduct an effective and enduring 
national government; and to provide a policy basis for the longer term success of the 
party (Hayden 1980: 237-238). For these aims to be realised, Hayden stressed, 
“Labor policy had to meet two essential criteria: to be electorally acceptable and to 
promote Labor's philosophical objectives” (Singleton 1990:109). Since Labor Party 
understood that its loss of economic management credibility was the main obstacle to 
its ability to develop successful electoral strategies, the ALP embarked upon a major 
re-evaluation of its economic policies. Hayden himself believed that sound economic 
management would be the “cornerstone of any successful Labor government in the 
future” , and that “if Labor could not manage the economy properly, then the reform 
proposals of a Labor government [could not] be implemented” (Hayden, 1980:240). 
In his view, Labor had lost in the past primarily because it was not seen as an 
economically responsible party.
Hayden reminded ALP members that “it was not possible to wind back the clock 
to the heady days of the early seventies, and Labor would not find its way back to 
office by trying to re-create the atmosphere and the issues of 1972”. He argued: “We 
will not find our future in the past”. Instead “Labor had to convince the electorate that 
it could manage scarce resources with more efficiency and compassion than the Fraser 
government “ (cited in McMullin 1991: 394). Hayden continued: “Much and all as we 
may regret it, now is not the time for the visionary reform programs of earlier years. 
This is the period of the hard slog ... and the scope for reform will have to be won by 
hard work, by discipline, and by a common sense approach to policy” (quoted from 
Oakes 1979: 29). He outlined his objectives to delegates at the 1979 ALP National 
Conference:
First, and above all, we must demonstrate beyond doubt that we are competent
economic managers. That competence and public’s recognition of it is the absolute
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essential underpinning of everything we want to do. Without i t ... we might just 
as well pack our bags and give the game away (Hayden quoted in McMullin 
1991: 394).
Some commentators interpreted this speech by Hayden as a sign of a new vision 
and policy approach by Labor for the future. Although Hayden also stressed the need 
to combine an image of economic responsibility with social reformism, many 
commentators saw this was the beginning of the enthusiasm and vision of 1972 being 
replaced by caution and pragmatism (Weller 1980: 90). The Sydney Morning Herald 
( 29 September 1979) described it as the ending of Whitlamism, and said: “the speech 
may well prove a watershed in the affairs and thinking of Labor for it proclaimed a 
clean break with the past pro-reformist euphoria of the Whitlam era which ended in 
economic disaster; and it promised a commitment to pragmatic politics in line with 
public taste”. The Australian Financial Review (29 September 1979) referred to 
Hayden’s “low-key but effective imposition of economic rationality upon his own 
party”.
There was a long debate on whether the party should learn to manage capitalism 
more effectively or shift radically to the left. An argument underlying this debate was 
that if the ALP could manage capitalist system effectively and efficiently, as Singleton 
(1990:4) argues: “it would enable Labor to deliver its electoral promise of increased 
economic growth to generate employment and improve the standard of living of 
Australians - a promise that had its basis in Labor's fundamental beliefs in social 
justice and equity”. Despite this, the ALP recognised that many Australian electors had 
also come to accept a general argument that the economic problems of the Australian 
economy were deep-rooted ones which are somehow connected with government 
spending, the money supply, wage levels, and the structure of Australian industry 
(McCawley 1977: 24-25). Therefore, if Labor could not move too far to embrace the 
capitalist system, at a minimum level it might devise acceptable explanations to justify 
public spending, might develop a consistent wages policy that was acceptable to the 
unions and industry and might create some alternatives to existing economic and fiscal
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policies. An economist, Peter McCawley, acknowledged the problem and argued 
persuasively:
Unless Labor spokesmen are prepared to justify higher levels of government 
spending and taxation, then they had best abandon social welfare goals, because 
it is clear that the electorate is not prepared to finance government programs 
through credit creation and inflation. And if these goals are abandoned, why 
should the electorate vote Labor at all? ( McCawley 1977: 24-25).
As a result, by 1978 Labor's spokesmen stated that Keynesian policies in the
absence of an incomes policy as brought about by the Whitlam government were not
credible. They also could not accept the monetarist macro-economic alternative to a
Keynesian approach combined with an incomes policy. Labor decided, therefore, to
modify Keynesian demand management. To dampen any inflationary side-effects of
economic recovery, it combined an incomes policy focused on wage and tax
indexation.
Thus, Labor's economic policy had to produce economic growth while reducing 
unemployment and inflation ( Solomon 1982: 321). There was a belief that the key to 
electoral success was a credible economic policy containing stagflation. Apart from the 
need to tackle inflation and unemployment, this necessarily should produce the 
conditions for economic growth. In this context, Hayden (1980:240) states that: 
“Labor’s cardinal principle would be economic prudence, and reforms would be made 
in strict accordance with the ability of the economy to sustain them”.
Hayden worked hard to ground his ideas of economic management either into the 
party platform or in practice. At the 1977 National Conference, for example, Hayden 
pushed a new approach to economic policy. He fought to keep a more flexible and 
open policy choice and won in the face of determined opposition from the left and the 
unions. Hayden successfully demolished the left-wing, which sought to push the 
party into a greater commitment to government intervention in the economy; he 
supported a "more flexible economic platform" that would give a Labor government a 
free-hand {National Times 11-16 July 1977).
This effort by Hayden culminated in the 1979 National Conference. At this 
Conference the ALP successfully abandoned the old approach to the economy, and
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charted new directions as it entered the 1980s. Compared with the earlier platform, the
1979 platform was expanded in its scope. It was full of explanatory passages and
references to recent events, and most of the items were presented under the heading
“Proposal for Reform”. The introduction to Labor’s proposals on the economy is
worth quoting to give the flavour of the document. This document recognised the
problems Labor was facing and indicated the will to solve them:
We no longer live in the relatively calm and quiescent economic world of the 
1950s and 1960s. New forces are at work, both in Australia and elsewhere, 
generating more difficult economic problems, particularly with regard to 
unemployment and inflation...A Labor government will accept responsibility for 
achieving full employment and stable prices, but these will not be achieved simply 
or as matter of course. Broad-brush approaches, through monetary and fiscal 
measures alone, are not adequate in a situation where economic problems ere 
becoming more complex and severe. We need detailed sectoral and regional 
consideration and planning of our economy. We need to look at the parts as well 
as the whole (ALP, 1979: 4 ).
There was still debate on the need to clarify the party's objectives. Change was 
important to clear away any ideological confusion, especially about the distinction 
between communism and democratic socialism that had contributed so much to the 
ALP’s failure throughout the 1960s (Jupp 1982: 92). For decades the Labor Party’s 
objectives were perceived, almost universally, to be synonymous with 
"nationalisation". This image was exploited by the non-Labor parties for electoral 
benefit by their continuing to label Labor as "socialist". This is, of course, was 
electorally damaging for the ALP.
In order to remove such an image, the 1981 conference agreed to rewrite the 
objectives of the party in the Labor platform. Gareth Evans - one of the main 
advocates of the altering the objectives - argued that change was needed because the 
objective was incomplete, misleading, lacking in contemporary relevance, and had for 
decades given ammunition to Labor’s opponents without doing the party any 
noticeably redeeming good.
Evans admitted:
The notion that ‘socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange 
means nationalisation is totally and permanently entrenched. ‘Democratic 
socialism’ is a term which is and always has been capable of encapsulating very 
precisely the kinds of principles which the Labor Party ought to be about, and it is
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one - which properly explained - should not cause any embarrassment at all, 
electoral or other-wise to the party as a whole or any member of it (Evans 1982: 
174).
He proposed the adaptation of a "fundamental objective" affirming Labor’s dedication 
to the realisation of a society founded upon the principles and values of democratic 
socialism - "a society built upon liberty, equality and democracy".
Evans's view was shared by Hayden. Hayden wanted to omit the reference to 
democratic socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange, which had 
been the cornerstone of ALP objectives for some 60 years. He asserted, “there comes 
a point when sentiment has to give way to reason” (Hayden, 1980: ? ). As a result, in 
its 1981 National Conference Labor successfully re-wrote its "socialisation objective", 
by which a commitment to the socialisation of industry, production, distribution and 
exchange, written into the Federal platform in 1921 was interpreted moderately to be 
applied only to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation (Lloyd 1983: 244, and 
Crisp 1985: 277ff). There was a clear resemblance to the old objective in the wording 
of new fundamental statement:
The Australian Labor Party is a democratic socialist party and has the objective of 
democratic socialisation of industry, production, distribution and exchange to the 
extent necessary to eliminate exploitation and other anti-social features in this 
field (cited in McMullin 1991: 400).
Although the ALP, at the beginning of 1980s, was still appealing to the working class
- in that conferences and conventions were constantly sounding to familiar rhetorical 
mentions of the "working class", "working people", the "underprivileged", and so on
- nonetheless, since 1979-81 Labor’s appeal has been focused upon wider sections of 
society.
2.4. Approaching the Unions
One of the most important steps Hayden took to realise his idea of economic 
management and planning was to approach the trade unions to gain their co-operation. 
Learning from W hitlam’s experiences as well as the Fraser government’s, Hayden 
recognised the importance of wages to national economic policy as well as to Labor
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credentials in the electorate. As Singleton (1990:100) states: “The Whitlam
government had failed to reduce high inflation and high unemployment by means of a 
Keynesian strategy of managing demand. While the Fraser government’s “inflation- 
first” approach had relative success in containing inflation, it caused high 
unemployment.
At the time the community in general accepted that excessive wage increases were 
responsible for inflation and consequently for the recession. Labor under Hayden 
wanted to deal with this problem, as it would need to, if Labor did win office (Kelly 
1984:69). But Labour would need a wages policy to deal with inflation and 
unemployment at the same time. As Kelly states, this intellectual approach sprang 
from the necessity to for Labor to have “a mechanism to prevent a wage explosion 
during periods of economic growth” (Kelly 1984:73). It was central to the ALP’s 
claim that it could not only manage economy better than the Coalition, but it alone 
could reduce unemployment without increasing inflation. Hayden believed that an 
incomes policy was a precondition of Labor’s effort to promote short-term 
employment growth, improve profitability and contain inflation as well as build a 
harmonious industrial climate. As Kelly (1984:74) argues, “if the next Labor 
government failed due to a wage explosion - thereby repeating the fate of the Whitlam 
government - the long-term damage to the party would be catastrophic”. The decision 
by the ALP in 1979 to fight stagflation with incomes policy brought the latter to the 
top of the party's agenda (Singleton 1990: 126).
Hayden was aware that Labor could not proceed unilaterally. An incomes policy 
could not work without co-operation from the unions (Singleton, 1990:118). As Kelly 
states: “Labor’s ties with the trade unions movement meant its wages policy had to be 
broadly consistent with the aspirations of the trade unions” (Kelly 1984: 69). This was 
in the line with Hayden’s strategy to seek maximum electoral advantage but at the 
same time to remain within the broad limits of Labor’s basic objectives and traditional 
area of support. The ALP saw that an arrangement with the union was necessary if a 
Labor government was to pursue expansionist policies in line with the economic
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objectives of the unions. For the ALP, such agreement offered a Labor government a 
way of managing their relationships with the unions and provided the basis for an 
alternative expansionary economic policy whilst containing fears of an outbreak of 
wage inflation. The fact that the Australian government lack the constitutional power 
over prices and incomes reinforced the ALP’s idea of cooperating with the unions to 
obtain support for a voluntary accord on prices and incomes. In this regard, a 
commentator suggested:
Planning must be conducted in a democratic fashion, not merely because that is 
the political philosophy to which we subscribe, but because planning is unlikely 
to be effective unless those whose lives are being influenced are genuinely 
consulted and become part of the decision making process. Genuine democratic 
economic planning of this kind is not an easy task, but it is vital for our future 
(Ironmonger 1977: 290).
The ALP also needed cooperation with the unions as part of its electoral policy. 
Good co-operation with the unions in incomes policy would not only ensure the 
success of Labor’s economic strategy, but would also, it was believed, help the ALP’s 
image in the electorate. Close cooperation with the unions through an accord implied 
that Labor, at least in appearance, had been able to reform those attitudes of the unions 
which had made them unpopular in the past. Cooperation with the ALP offered the 
unions a method of achieving their industrial and social goals in a less adversarial 
fashion. Such an arrangement showed that the ALP relationship’s with the unions 
could be positive and more electorally fruitful. In the past the ALP’s close relationship 
with the union movement had often been an electoral liability for Labor. Trade unions 
were seen by the community as having “too often sacrificed the cause of national 
economic progress on the altar of short-term sectional interest. They blamed the 
unions’ demands, (often accompanied by strike action) for wages rises which 
exceeded profitability, for resisting technological change and insisting on outdated 
employment practices, all causes of retarded productivity and growth” (Kelly 1984: 
74) as well as unemployment and inflation.
Thus, as Kelly states: “Labor’s [close] ties with the unions were to be revitalised 
and used as an electoral asset” (Kelly 1984:74) and not discarded as electoral
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liabilities. Hayden believed that an agreement with the trade unions which allowed an 
“understanding over the issue of wages and prices” would be “electorally saleable” 
(Singleton, 1990:132). Such an agreement would mean that Labor campaign on the 
basis that it had support and arrangements with the unions (Singleton, 1990:132). An 
incomes agreements would show the electorate that Labor, with the co-operation of the 
trade unions, had the capacity to manage the economy effectively (Singleton, 
1990:126).
Unlike Whitlam who was pessimistic about the prospect for any agreement with 
the trade unions, Hayden had a more positive view of co-operation with the unions. 
He believed that cooperation with the ALP was the only alternative for the unions to 
the Fraser government’s use of the “blunt, unselective tool of monetary and fiscal 
policy which bears so unfairly on those least able to bear it” (Hayden quoted in 
Singleton 1990: 110). As a result, the ALP gave priority to a co-operative arrangement 
with the trade unions (Singleton 1990:111). Hayden called for a consensus based 
prices and incomes accord, with the unions in return given a more direct voice on 
other matters of economic policy affecting trade unionists. Hayden revived and 
intensified discussions and negotiations with the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) through ALAC, the formal body for co-operation, consultation and 
consensus between the peak union councils and the ALP.
This initiative of Hayden’s was matched by the trade unions. Escalating 
unemployment and inflation in 1982 had a significant effect on union behaviour. It 
changed the way the unions were thinking in protecting and securing their interests. 
The emphasis on economic self-interest that had dominated the unions’ wage 
behaviour in the late 1970s and early 1980s was now tempered by a new awareness of 
the need to protect low income earners from inflation and maintain socially 
disadvantaged groups via an adequate social wage. To obtain this new objective, the 
unions needed a Labor government in office, because only Labor could serve their 
interests properly, while the ALP needed the unions’ cooperation to establish sound 
economic management as well as a political image necessary for it to win office. This
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change in both the ACTU’s and the ALP’s attitudes and emphasise oiled the process 
of negotiation between the two on an integrated income policy.
Certainly, there were a lot of obstacles faced by the ALP during the process of 
negotiation and discussion. However, through a series of intensive negotiations - 
which sometimes produced tension - Hayden was able to break the barriers to a 
substantial co-operative agreement on incomes policy. In 1980 for the first time, the 
two wings of the labour movement - the ALP and the ACTU - reached an agreement 
on the need to have a common approach to economic issues as they produced a joint 
statement for a comprehensive economic policy. Later on in June 1982, this agreement 
was followed by the release of the Draft of a Discussion Paper on Economic Policy 
which became the basis for the Accord.
This co-operation represented a major change in the relationship between the 
federal Labor Party and the union movement (Castles 1982: 382). In the past there had 
been relatively few formal ties between federal Labor governments and the ACTU. 
Both sides relied on established formal and informal relationships within the Labor 
movement as a basis for government - union understanding. However, as events 
under the Whitlam government showed, broad agreement on common goals was not 
sufficient to prevent major policy differences between the unions and a Labor 
government.
To conclude, Labor under Hayden’s leadership, was able to develop its new 
image. Under Hayden Labor seemed more cohesive, effective and efficient. Its 
structure had been reformed in the direction of more comprehensive representation, a 
greater possibility for women’s involvement and more centralisation in decision­
making as well as increased appeal to the electorate. Labor’s credentials as an 
economic manager were also improved significantly through the party’s new policy 
orientation, which stressed economic matters more heavily. As a result, though the 
ALP failed to win office in 1980, Hayden successfully took the ALP to the brink of 
electoral success (Kelly 1984: 67). In the 1980 election, for example, the ALP’s 
performance marked the beginning of recovery from the traumas and disasters of the
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second half of the 1970s. The ALP had gone close to bridging the gap in the popular 
vote - opened up in 1975 and maintained in 1977 - by winning 49.6 per cent of the 
two-party preferred vote in the election of 18 October 1980, a swing of 4.2 per cent to 
the ALP over 1977. It won thirteen House of Representatives seats from the 
Government, the largest number of seats won since the election of 1969. The election 
had also cost the Fraser government its majority in the Senate, where a combination of 
Labor and Australian Democrat Senators would henceforth control the Upper House 
(McKinlay 1981: 158, see also Bewett 1981: 2). It was a remarkable result for Labor, 
particularly given media expectations prior to the election campaign.
But the most important of all was that Hayden had successfully laid the 
foundation for Labor’s success in the future. First of all, he successfully laid the basis 
of the ALP - ACTU integrated Prices and Incomes Policy (the Accord) which was so 
central to the political and economic strategy of the Hawke government. Although the 
final agreement and statement was reached under Hawke’s leadership, the Accord 
would not have been possible without Hayden’s leadership. It was Hayden, together 
with Ralph Willis and Bob Hawke, who made possible the production of this 
politically viable arrangement. He successfully championed the Accord from mid-1979 
onwards by encouraging consultation and co-operation with the ACTU, a process that 
assumed greater importance with each passing years (Kelly 1984: 72).
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Part Two
The Hawke - Keating Era: Labor 1983 - 1993
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CHAPTER THREE
LABOR UNDER HAWKE: THE NEW DIRECTIONS
The success of the ALP in the federal election of 1990 reinforced the claim that 
the Hawke government was the most successful Labor government in Australian 
political history. Being elected on four successive occasions at the federal level, and 
through a period of major political, economic and social challenge, constitutes a 
record for the ALP. This success was possible only because of the Hawke 
government’s political skills. Prominent among these was its capacity to manage 
economic problems while simultaneously from that economic managerial capability 
securing political and electoral benefit. This chapter assesses the political skills of 
the Hawke government, with particular attention to means by which the Hawke 
government used the Accord and its consensus politics for economic and political 
advantage. The management of Cabinet and bureaucracy will be assessed on the 
assumption that they contributed significantly to the successes in economic and 
political management.
3.1.1. Managing the Cabinet
There is no doubt that an efficient Cabinet is an important element in the success 
of any government. Although there is no single criterion for a government's success, 
it is generally accepted “that management of Cabinet is a precondition of efficient 
policy making” (Weller, 1990:16). As Weller (1990: 16) argues...“if Cabinet is not 
well organised and run, as for example, its ministers publicly disagree or are seen to 
be divided, then it could not work effectively and efficiently”. An inefficient Cabinet 
means the image of the government will soon decline, and in turn, electoral support 
will erode.
The Hawke government was well prepared in establishing, running and 
managing its machinery of government. The experience of the Whitlam government
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provided a good lesson for the Hawke ministry on how Cabinet should and should 
not be run and on the need for professionalism and internal party discipline 
(Gerritsen 1986: 47). “ As Jaensch (1989:164) states, “Hawke, from the beginning of 
his government, asserted a prime-ministerial authority which previous Labor leaders 
were unable to effect”. Hawke's first step was to convince Caucus of the desirability 
and necessity of dividing its ministry into two divisions: an inner Ministry (Cabinet) 
and an outer Ministry (Jaensch 1989a: 164). Although the Caucus retained the right 
to elect the ministry, the Cabinet ministers were chosen by the Prime Minister 
(Campbell and Halligan 1992:17). On the one hand, this decision broke the 
precedent set by the Whitlam government and earlier Labor governments to the 
effect that Cabinet comprised the whole Ministry. On the other hand, the fact that the 
Prime Minister was able to select those who would form the Cabinet meant that he 
got a crucial and additional power over his ministers.
In addition, the Hawke government applied Cabinet discipline through so-called 
collective responsibility or Cabinet solidarity. Hawke recognised that the application 
of discipline was important for the cohesion ( or the appearance of cohesion) within 
the government and, particularly, the parliamentary party. As Jaensch (1989a: 148) 
states: “Discipline was necessary to ensure that the government’s programs would 
have some chance in a hostile environment”. The Hawke government might allow its 
component parts to disagree or to argue, but in the final analysis, discipline enforced 
cabinet and parliamentary party cohesion. There was an argument that “if the smaller 
Cabinet were to achieve the objective of greater cohesion and discipline, then 
solidarity had to be maintained by all Cabinet ministers at all times” Weller, 
1990:22). Thus Cabinet ministers had to vote for Cabinet decisions in Caucus. And 
everyone was bound to defend Cabinet decisions in public (Weller 1990: 22-23).
The decision to divide the Cabinet into an inner and an outer Ministry and the 
application of cabinet solidarity was a crucial step in controlling not only the 
Cabinet, but also the parliamentary party as a whole. This decision made power 
more centralised and enhanced the prime minister’s authority (Campbell and
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Halligan 1992: 17). It was essential for effective decision-making. The practice of 
these principles enhanced cabinet authority within the party arena (Campbell and 
Halligan 1992: 17). As a result, during the Hawke government years the Cabinet 
dominated Caucus (Gruen and Grattan 1993:5). Caucus thus retained its increasingly 
symbolic check on the official policy of the government, but under this new 
managerial style, the senior ministers' authority was almost untrammelled (Gerritsen 
1986: 51). “The Cabinet has been a bulwark against a recalcitrant Caucus” (Gruen 
and Grattan 1993: 3).
Despite arguments that factionalism has created some rigidities in the party, the 
post 1983 development of factionalism has also contributed substantially to the 
stability of the Hawke government. The factional system has become an effective 
strategy for reducing opposition within the party and enhancing consensus. 
According to McAllister (1991: 223) organised factions could absorb the 
dissatisfaction of traditional supporters, unhappy with changing appeal of the party 
or policies. As the traditional social bases of the ALP contracted, it was argued, the 
electoral imperative forced it to broaden its appeal to a wider range of social groups. 
One consequence of this was to divide party activists as they became dissatisfied 
with the party's message. The institutionalization of highly organised political 
factions in the ALP was one means of adapting to this change, producing minimal 
disruptions to the party. In this context factions acted as integrative mechanisms, 
reconciling parts of the organisation to necessary political change. The existence of 
organised factions ensured policy platforms were fought out within the party through 
formal, organised procedures, rather than through fragmentation. Through this 
system ideological differences could be channelled so that any opposition to the 
government decision could be contained in private. If there were any conflict or 
differences between the ministry and the party, they tended to be negotiated between 
the ministers and factional leaders. Organised competition between party factions 
thus replaced intra-party rivalry, personal intrigue, and their ultimate consequence, 
fragmentation. The fact that faction system under the Hawke government were open,
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policy-oriented groups, as distinct from the situation in the mid 1950s where factions 
enjoyed no organisational legitimacy, and were based as much on patronage as 
ideology, supported the argument that faction system accommodative rather than 
disruptive (McAllister 1991: 211).
The application of collective responsibility to Caucus debate and the formalised 
development of the consensus-seeking faction system has reduced the influence and 
involvement of the caucus as a whole in policy making. In the case of National 
Conferences of the ALP, ministers would support the government position and argue 
fiercely for the effectiveness of existing policy. As a result, Caucus dissent was 
limited. This was in contrast to the Whitlam government, when Cabinet became 
divided, poorly organised and ineffective as a forum for decision-making (Weller 
1990: 16). The ability of the ALP to resolve conflicting issues such as the future of 
uranium mining in the 1990s is an example of the efficiency of the factions.
McAllister (1991: 223) furthermore identified the fact that organised factions 
(though this role is less significant than their integrative organisational one) also 
played a significant electoral role: the factional system enabled the party to present a 
broader policy appeal to voters at elections while still retaining a common party 
label. Organised and institutionalised factions in the ALP thus permit it to broaden 
its political appeal to win votes, while more successfully integrating a diversity of 
internal interests among its members.
This McAllister argument supports Gerritsen's view that one of the factors 
contributing to the success of the Hawke government was the fact that it could 
combat the ambiguities and uncertainties of the policy field by formalising what he 
called “a strategic elite-led policy system” (Gerritsen 1986: 51). Under this system, 
the Prime Minister and the Cabinet (or the relevant committee of cabinet and other 
ministers), together with various advisers and faction leaders constituted the group 
that, through strategic calculation, fashioned the policy of the government. The 
importance of the faction leaders was that at all times political/electoral factors were 
part of the decision-making process. The application of the committee system
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ensured wide involvement by all ministers in decision- making. This was made 
possible because the ministers outside cabinet were members of those committees in 
which their departments had a policy interest (Weller 1992: 12). Unlike the Whitlam 
government - which had its ad hoc “kitchen cabinets”, with fluctuating memberships 
and the system revolving around Whitlam - Hawke was “first among equals” and the 
chairman of the Cabinet (Gerritsen 1986: 51).
Further Gerritsen argues that this type of decision making system was an 
efficient mechanism for engaging in sort of pragmatic politics required to maintain 
office (Gerritsen 1986: 52). While the Whitlam government was hampered by an 
inefficient traditional ALP decision making mechanism, the Hawke government’s 
strategic elite model, made the most of Labor policy to manipulate its politico- 
economic environment. For instance, the government...’’was able to reverse 
entrenched, electorally unpopular ALP policy, as over uranium” (Gerritsen 1986: 
51). In addition, since the decision-making process was controlled by certain people, 
well-known to the electorate, this strengthened the image that the government was 
really controlling the decision-making process.
This new machinery of the Hawke government was more than just a reaction to 
the perception that confusion pervaded the Whitlam government. According to 
Gerritsen it was a rational adjustment to the electoral requirements of making policy 
(Gerritsen 1986: 51). This was a result of the Hawke government’s efforts to secure 
predicability and stability in Government decision-making. It recognised the 
problem that the electorate abhors uncertainty. It was also a part of a strategy to 
restructure the parliamentary ALP policy making process to avoid the perceived 
failures of the Whitlam government. Thus, the Hawke government was better 
equipped for long term survival than was its predecessor (Gerritsen 1986: 52). It was 
the Hawke government’s strategic elite-led policy system that made it much more 
politically formidable than its predecessors.
The fact that the ministers of the Hawke government showed themselves to be 
tremendously competent, disciplined, and energetic managers of their departments -
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together with the policy community’s perception that the Hawke cabinet was the 
most talented and solid cabinet in modern Australian history - enhanced the popular 
perception that the Hawke government was superior on the basic criteria of 
successful government: leadership, unity, policy credibility and political 
professionalism. This does not mean that there were no tensions or conflicts among 
the three semi-official factions of the Labor Party, or between the Cabinet and the 
Caucus; there was in fact constant and continuing tensions and conflict (as seen in 
the MX missile crisis of 1985). However, unlike during the Whitlam government, 
such tension and conflicts were manageable and did not cost the Hawke government 
too dearly politically.
Finally, the figure of Hawke himself was another factor contributing to the 
effectiveness of his Cabinet. Hawke was regarded as an excellent Cabinet chairman. 
He played a more conciliatory role in Cabinet than Whitlam, controlling the 
meetings and giving direction to the discussion, but still giving great scope for 
autonomy for his ministers. Generally Hawke was concerned to conciliate, to 
identify the points of difference and then to reach an agreement. He was concerned 
as much, and at times more, with the process of decision-making as he was with the 
particular outcomes. Hawke also avoided the use of votes in Cabinet. He tended to 
seek to extend his consensual approach into Cabinet and always tried to ensure that 
decisions were made through consensus. Therefore, most decisions in the Hawke 
government were collective. Nevertheless, Hawke himself did not hesitate to 
discipline his ministers. The resignations of Mick Young and John Brown are 
examples of the casualties of the Cabinet discipline applied by Hawke. Only 
occasionally were there times when Hawke made a decision outside the Cabinet 
arena and tried to manipulate processes to that end. The MX commitment and Gulf 
War commitment are two such examples (Weller 1990: 24-25). This approach 
explains the predicability and continuity of Cabinet procedures under Hawke's 
leadership.
Weller (1990: 25) describes the Hawke Cabinet, in some respects as “the delight
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of constitutional theorists, and as more readily fitting models of Westminster 
cabinets than many of its predecessors”. It reverted somewhat to the Chifley model - 
one described as a “co-operative consultative style of decision making” (Hawker 
1979:61). “It works as a cabinet, with collective decision making, established and 
predictable procedures, and the development of a consensus”. (Weller 1990: 25).
Gruen and Grattan share other commentators’ view that one of the factors 
contributing to the success of the Hawke government was its capacity to control the 
party, in particular the parliamentary party. According to them, the ALP under the 
Hawke government seemed to be far more flexible and compliant, willing to be 
persuaded and led. The Cabinet and caucus members were ready to accept the need 
for more discipline and less self-indulgent behaviour. “Only rarely did it become a 
fetter on what the government wanted to do” (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 3). This was 
why the Hawke government's Cabinet was much more stable than those of its 
predecessors, particularly that of Whitlam.
3.1.2. Managing the Bureaucracy
In order to implement its programs and policies effectively and efficiently, a 
government needs an effective, efficient and responsive bureaucracy. An ineffective 
and inefficient as well as rigid, unresponsive and divided bureaucracy not only will 
vitiate program implementation, but also, in turn, create political trouble for the 
government. Therefore, it has become generally accepted that new governments had 
every right and concern to expect the bureaucracy to be cooperative rather than 
obstructive or apathetic. This expectation was implemented during the Hawke 
government.
The experiences of both the Whitlam and the Fraser governments had taught the 
Hawke government some important negative lessons about how relations with the 
Public Service should not be conducted. The Whitlam government had both 
distrusted and been distrusted by its bureaucrats. For its part, the bureaucracy was 
suspicious of the brash and expanded ministerial staff of the Whitlam ministers.
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Moreover, the Whitlam government lacked policy co-ordination, and some senior 
bureaucrats did not necessarily follow the will of Cabinet or the will of the Prime 
Minister (Thomson 1989: 214). Some senior bureaucrats were appalled at the short­
cut style of administration of that Labor government. The morale of bureaucracy was 
very bad. The bureaucracy turned on the Whitlam government in ways great and 
small, including leaking to the media with extremely damaging results (Gruen and 
Grattan 1993: 40). During this government - as well as during the Fraser government 
- there was a mutual suspicion between ministers and the public service. Some 
Whitlam ministers, for instance, believed that elements in public service were 
deliberately attempting to sabotage the government (Thomson 1989: 216). During 
the Whitlam years, the public service had been presented as the “pacesetter” for the 
Prime Minister's vision. Under Fraser, the public service was seen as a parasite 
(Thomson 1989: 215).
The Hawke government recognised the necessity to avoid the mistakes that both 
Whitlam and Fraser had made, if it wanted a successful working relationship with 
the public service (Thompson 1989:219). Therefore, unlike its predecessors, the 
Hawke government viewed the bureaucracy in a more positive and less 
confrontationist way. For Hawke, the bureaucracy was seen as an instrument for 
achieving its over-riding goals: macro economic reform; deregulation of market 
forces; managerialism; an export re-orientation; debt reduction (Wiltshire 1990: 39), 
and (more importantly), burnishing its image as a competent, efficient , stable and 
unified government. Nevertheless, the Hawke government was also aware that to 
achieve this objective, it had to launch some reforms of the public service. Attempts 
to codify these were made long before the Hawke government was elected. When 
the Labor Party was in opposition, it had been acutely conscious of the need to 
prepare effectively for government, as can be seen in the paper entitled “Labor and 
the Quality of Government” (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 41).
The first wave of reforms to the Australian Public Service was made in June 
1984 when the government passed the Public Service Act (1984). The aims of all
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these reforms were to improve the responsiveness of the public service to 
governmental priorities, enhance its efficiency and increase its concern with issues 
of equality within it own workforce and in the delivery of government services 
(Thomson 1989: 221). To this end the government strengthened the power of the 
ministers over the public servants.
The abolition of what used to be called the “second division” and its 
replacement with a Senior Executive Service (SES), removing central personnel 
agency functions from the Public Service Board, granting Department secretaries 
virtual autonomy on organisational matters (provided they stayed within the 
frameworks set by the budget and positions classification guidelines established by 
the Public Service Commission) and consolidation of administrative appropriations 
into larger program votes, effectively enabling secretaries to transfer funds across the 
range of functional input, were just some the formal changes that the Hawke 
government made in its first term of office (Thomson 1989: 221).
The government also made other changes - greater openness in recruitment for 
senior executives; re-focused public service management attention on outputs rather 
than on process; and an innovative approach to organisational change, and in 
particular, a move towards less hierarchical structures. The government accepted the 
need for equality, fairness and representativeness in the public service. It also 
accepted and institutionalised the Ombudsman, Freedom of Information, the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal and the Administrative Review Tribunal. Finally, 
in order to change the norms of the bureaucracy and strengthen the career service's 
capacity for policy formulation and implementation, the government made a 
fundamental change through the creation of a senior executive service (Thomson 
1989: 222).
In order to lessen the potential tension between ministerial staff and career 
bureaucrats, the Hawke government assimilated the former into the fabric of 
ministerial government. This proved a success. Creating a panel to screen the 
applications for ministerial staff positions ensured that the Prime Minister could
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control appointments to some extent (at least in the first few years of government), 
and that unsuitable choices were discouraged (Thomson 1989: 223).
The reforms outlined in the Public Service Act 1984 endorsed an active role for 
the Public Service in Australia's future policy programs construction and delivery. 
Even more fundamentally, it was concerned to define efficiency, effectiveness and 
equality in terms of greater accountability, and to usher in an educated, innovative 
administration that was responsive to community needs and the establishment of fair 
and professional standards of management and employment (Public Service Board 
1984:3-4; Dawkins 1984: 2151-8).
In 1986-87, the Hawke government once again reformed the Public Service. 
Unlike the previous reforms, however, the 1986-87 reforms were more reactive than 
reforming. The Hawke government's initial reforms were mainly aimed at 
reaffirming and strengthening ministerial responsibility and control. Through this, it 
hoped every department could meet its goals and objectives (Dawkin 1984: 61). The 
latter reforms emphasised the need to accommodate more effectively the notion of 
“managerialism” (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 43). These were a direct response to the 
economic crisis of mid 1986, the $ 1000 million blow-out in the budget deficit and 
Treasurer Keating's 'banana republic statements' (Thomson 1989: 224). Given the 
serious economic problems at the time, the government concluded that it had no 
choice but to cut back the public service and make it more efficient. Thus, according 
to Campbell and Halligan, under this framework, “there is a shift from 
administration to management, from a process orientation to a performance 
orientation and from central-agency control of transactions to managing for results” 
(Campbell and Halligan 1992: 165).
Some important reforms at this stage were that the government gave the Public 
Service Commission the power to transfer SES staff within the public service in the 
quest for efficient management of the Service. It also gave departmental secretaries 
more power to remove inefficient staff, and to switch monies between wages and 
other administration expenses. In addition, it abolished the right of appeal over
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promotion of all, except junior, staff. The government created new redeployment and 
retirement procedures to facilitate the staff cuts. And finally, the government 
established an Efficiency Scrutiny Unit to systematically scrutinise public sector 
operations, and report directly to the Prime Minister (Thomson 1989: 225).
In 1987, the Hawke government restructured its Public Service yet again. 
Twenty six of the existing twenty-seven departments were changed into sixteen 
“mega departments”. It was argued that the government's objective in combining 
departments was that to gain a more rational use of limited resources ( Campbell and 
Halligan 1992: 180). It changed the ministry into a two-tier structure and 
amalgamated departments to achieve economies of scale by removing perceived 
competition, overlap and duplication. And finally the government abolished the 
Public Service Board, and gave its functions to individual departments and to a 
Public Service Commission (Thomson 1989: 227).
There is a general agreement that such a mega departments system has been 
productive (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 45). Codd (1990: 8-9) argued that these 
changes brought a range of benefits for the Hawke government. It enhanced 
ministerial control, produced better coordination and decision making processes, a 
broader perspective and greater scope of advice, and more coherence in policy 
advice and program development. It also allowed greater scope for delegation to 
portfolios, reduction in overlap and duplication, greater flexibility in operation and 
potential stability in machinery of government. The amalgamation of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade is one of the examples of this claim. Such a new structure has given a 
more practical edge to the needs of Australia in facing the problem of 
internationalising its economy.
In sum, despite some criticism that it had politicised the public service, the 
Hawke government largely achieved its aim of establishing an effective, efficient 
and harmonious working relationship with the bureaucracy. The government 
established strong political control over the bureaucracy (Campbell and Halligan 
1992: 204). This, as a result, has contributed to the achievement of administrative
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efficiency and improvement in budget processes, and enhanced policy co-ordination 
(Thomson 1989: 227). Contrasting the Hawke government with the previous 
governments, Campbell and Halligan noted that the Hawke government ministers 
had more control over the APS than had their predecessors. In their view, “the 
bureaucrats under the previous governments really were making recommendations 
and policy suggestions, but with this government that’s not so... the ministers tell 
you what they want” ( Campbell and Halligan 1992: 204). This means the policy 
capacity of the ministerial office was stronger than before, and there was a reduction 
in the capacity of senior bureaucrats to exert an improper degree of influence upon 
government policy. The political directions emanated from the political executive 
and the minister's office, not from the department. “Far from bureaucrats dominating 
the scene and stage... the ascendancy has been really well and truly in the political 
corner” (Campbell and Halligan 1992: 204).
This argument of Campbell and Halligan has been supported by Pusey. In his 
research Pusey found that a considerable majority of senior executive service (SES) 
officers he interviewed had a great respect for the competence of the Hawke 
government. Although senior public servants often resented the “politicisation” of 
particular issues and problems, they nonetheless welcomed strong ministerial 
leadership. They believed that strong ministers and an effective, strongly-led and 
united cabinet were the indispensable first conditions of good government. Poor 
leadership, in contrast, was seen as the factor that most threatened the consistency 
and coherence of policy and management; strong control was judged the best 
bulwark against such problems (Pusey 1991: 66-67). It was in this respect that the 
Hawke government has been judged positively not just by the bureaucracy but by the 
Australian electorate as a whole.
3.2.1. New Policy Directions
One of the worrying features of the Australian economy that the ALP 
government identified was the tendency of the Australian system to suffer wage
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explosions whenever the level of demand in the economy increased significantly. 
Such above-average money increases seemed to lead to large surges in inflation and 
unemployment (Gruen and Grattan 1993:116). Ross Gittins, an economic columnist 
from the Sydney Morning Herald, recognised this problem - arguing that “every time 
our economy begins to climb out of recession and build up some steam there seems 
to be an explosion of wage demands which set the inflation rate off again” (cited in 
Stilwell 1986: 26).
This trend actually began after the election of the Whitlam government in 1972, 
and has been associated with the public perception that the Whitlam government was 
incompetent at economic management. The fundamental criticism of economic 
policy during the Whitlam years concerned the emergence of a series of 
“imbalances”, which were responsible for the deteriorating performance of the 
Australian economy. Amongst these imbalances were increased government deficits, 
a larger public sector, and higher inflation rates. Outstanding among these was so- 
called “real wage overhang”: the increase in the share of national income going to 
wages and the consequent high inflation and decline in the proportion accruing to 
profits (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 97).
When the Fraser government replaced the Whitlam government it made 
attempts to solve these difficulties. Prominent among these was the so-called 
strategy to “fight inflation first”. This involved the use of a wide variety of economic 
weapons such as restrictive fiscal, and monetary policies, an overvalued exchange 
rate as an anti-inflationary device, and submissions to the Arbitration Commission 
advocating real wage reductions. Unfortunately, these policies failed to solve the 
problems. From 1978 onwards the Fraser government's industrial and wages policies 
seemed conspicuously fruitless. This period was marked by the collapse of 
centralised wage fixing, the end of wage indexation and a wages explosion following 
the 1981-82 federal budget (see Davis 1989: 79).
As a result, when the Hawke government came to office in March 1983, 
Australia was almost at the bottom of the then worst economic recession for decades.
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For the first time since the Great Depression of the 1930s unemployment broke the 
10 per cent barrier, and economic activity had declined to a substantially lower level 
than at any time in the previous two decades (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 98). Inflation 
was 11 per cent when the Hawke government came to office. Unemployment rose 
unevenly from 5 per cent in 1975 to 10.3 per cent in mid-March 1983, while 
employment growth plummeted to minus 2.2 per cent and Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) growth rate was also minus 1.0 per cent (see Stilwell 1993: 78). There is no 
doubt that one of the most important factors which contributed to Fraser’s loss in the 
1983 election was this wages explosion, which contributed to a severe bout of 
domestic stagflation (Kelly 1992: 50).
Thus Fraser, who had exploited the political benefits of Whitlam’s failures, was 
felled by the same process in the 1983 election. His government had fallen at the 
same hurdle as the Whitlam government - its inability to hold together Australia's 
traditional system of centralised wage fixation, its craft union structure and strong 
demand conditions (Kelly 1992: 51). Like the Whitlam government, the Fraser 
government misjudged the essence of the economic problems of its time and 
preferred to concentrate on the symptoms instead of the causes (Kelly 1984: 428). 
The Fraser government left office having failed to find a method of securing 
sustained low-inflation growth. It failed to apply an appropriate wages strategy to 
handle the resources boom expectations which it had created (see Walsh 1991: 36). 
At times the Fraser government deflated the economy to get inflation down; but 
when growth took off it was unable to thwart a wage-price spiral.
The experiences of the Whitlam and Fraser governments encouraged the Hawke 
government to define politics largely in terms of careful economic management. It 
recognised that political difficulties faced by the Whitlam and Fraser governments 
were not political problems in their own right, but rather obstacles to the solution of 
or the impact of economic problems (Pusey 1991: 43-44). Therefore the Hawke 
government decided that “it would not have to confer a fixed program priority over 
the requisites of economic management” (Gerritsen 1986: 47). A stimulating article,
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written by Gareth Evans in 1986, encapsulates neatly some of the lessons which the 
Whitlam government provided for the Hawke government. Evans argues that the 
Whitlam government had to “bear responsibility for the sheer inattention to 
economic discipline that was evident in the higher reaches of the Cabinet at least 
until the government’s last few months in office”. “The Whitlam government’s 
experience” ... “is certainly evidence that it is impossible to govern successfully in a 
difficult economic climate without a primary pre-occupation with economic 
management” (Evans 1986: 172).
In contrast to Whitlam, who insisted that economic difficulties were no excuse 
for avoiding reform, Hawke himself shared Hayden’s (1980: 240) view that sound 
economic management had become the principal factor in the ALP's electoral 
strategy and the cornerstone of a successful Labor government. Hawke regarded 
economic management as paramount (McMullin 1991: 414), and recognised its 
importance for his political future. Failing to manage the economy properly, he 
believed, could have terminal consequences for the ALP, as was the case during the 
Whitlam and Fraser governments (Kelly 1992: 61). He argues “it didn't matter what 
we achieved in the area of social reform or international relations, the government 
would live or die according to what it achieved in the economic field” (Hawke cited 
in National Times 15-20 March 1976). This means, like other political parties, Labor 
would henceforth have to contest elections primarily on its capacity to manage the 
economy and solve economic problems (Maddox 1985:223). As a result, almost all 
areas of policy under the Hawke government were correlated with the idea of 
promoting sustainable economic growth (Stutchbury 1990: 54).
Unlike the Whitlam government, which did not seem to see the connection 
between wages and inflation and unemployment, the Hawke government regarded 
wages control as a essential for sustained economic recovery. The Hawke 
government saw incomes policies as the best way to solve the economic problems 
affecting Australia. It believed that income policies could control inflation whilst 
simultaneously enabling fiscal and monetary policies to encourage the smooth
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conduct of economic activity and employment. The argument was that the 
government would be able to stimulate economic growth through considered fiscal 
and monetary stances if the trade unions would agree to restrain real wage increases. 
This would avoid the previous episodes of wages-led inflation. Also, it would ensure 
that the profit share of national income was boosted. This, in turn, would elevate 
business investment in new productive capacity and sustain the initial growth kick- 
start from fiscal policy (Stutchbury 1990: 55). However, since the basic efficacy of 
an incomes policy requires wage restraint, then it cannot be attained without the 
voluntary support and co-operation of trade unions. Therefore, the ALP needed an 
agreement with the ACTU to achieve substance and credibility in the key element of 
its electoral strategy: its capacity to deliver economic recovery through the medium 
of an incomes policy (Singleton 1987: 4).
3.2.2. Consensus Politics and the Accord
As was mentioned in chapter one, during the Whitlam governments' period in 
office there were conspicuous grounds for policy and public friction between the 
political and industrial wings of the labour movement. This problem re-emerged 
during the Fraser government years. Like the Whitlam government before it, the 
Fraser government never achieved a harmonious relationship with the unions. The 
issue of wages become one of most important factors causing conflict between the 
unions and the government (Singleton 1990: 55). On this critical issue, Fraser’s 
predilection for confrontation made any viable trade-off or accord with the trade 
union movement impossible (Kelly 1984: 428). The unions were uncomfortable with 
the Fraser government’s inflation-first strategy, which suggested that a high level of 
unemployment sustained for considerable period was necessary to block unions from 
seeking excessive wage increases and thus to dampen inflationary expectations 
(Hughes 1979: 40). As a result, the unions opposed every policy the government 
proposed because they believed that such moves adversely impacted upon the living 
standards of union members. For instance, they attacked the cut in federal funds for
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housing; the privatisation of the Medibank scheme; a reduction of education 
expenditure; and taxation on most welfare benefits (Sheehan 1980: 124). The lack of 
voluntary support and co-operation of the unions (not only because they did not have 
the constitutional power to control them) caused the Fraser and the Whitlam 
governments to fail to control wages and price increases.
Unlike Whitlam and also Fraser - both of whom had regarded the unions 
negatively and therefore kept them at a distance - Hawke viewed the unions more 
positively, seeing them as having the capacity to assist Labor's economic 
management. As the then-ACTU President, Hawke knew the problems the unions 
had produced for both Whitlam and Fraser, and how the power of the unions was 
firmly established in Australia. Hawke realised how potentially damaging the 
negative relationship he knew the Fraser government and the unions had had and 
was determined to avoid that in his administration (Kelly 1992: 61). From the early 
stages of his government Hawke adopted the basic position that a successful Labor 
government had to be based on the trade union movement. In this Hawke’s interest 
was not only limited to making the unions more cooperative but he wanted a more 
positive relationship between the unions and his government. Hawke saw industrial 
relations as an extension of the predominant political relations at any given time 
(Carney 1988: 66). He recognised that every industrial issue contained a good deal 
of politics (Lewis and Spiers 1989: 202). Learning from the Whitlam and Fraser 
governments, Hawke was aware that the politics of 1980s would be very much 
centred on industrial relations. Therefore, he believed that benefits for the unions had 
to be achieved through the political process, not by unions taking industrial action. 
Since the strategy had to be political, not industrial, this meant the unionism had a 
vested interest in helping Labor govern in the national interest and staying in office 
(Kelly 1992: 283).
Seeking to avoid the style and the economic management practices of both the 
previous Whitlam and Fraser governments, the Hawke government offered a new 
direction in government, reconciliation and consensus. Central to the consensus
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strategy was the open recognition by the Hawke government that there was a large
degree of mutual interest among the major participants in the Australian social and
economic system (Hawke 1984: 39). By consensus, the Hawke government signalled
that it would base its strategy for managing the economic and social problems of
recession and recovery on a close association, instead of confrontation, with the
organised trade union movement, and at the same time, seek to accommodate
business and harmonise the relationship between capital and labour (McEachern
1986: 25). In other words, the Hawke government expressed its intention to embrace
and consult with these community interests, hoping to gain their acceptance and the
support of government policies designed to produce economic recovery (Singleton
1985: 12). Labor’s consensus politics, therefore, was a product of a process of a
revision in thinking and policy decision-making engendered in response to perceived
past Labor policy-making failures, the confrontationist style of the Fraser
government, and existing economic and political problems.
The chief instrument of consensus was the Prices and Incomes Accord. The
Accord was an agreement (or a compact) for a partnership in office that was reached
between the ALP and the ACTU just prior to the federal election of March 1983.
The document covered every area of domestic concern such as the economy,
industrial relations, tax, welfare, foreign investment, health, education, industry and
immigration issues. But the primary objective of the Accord was to thwart a wages
breakout during periods of strong economic growth and thereby deliver sustained
growth. Therefore, wages policy became the heart of the Accord and the principal
device whereby the Hawke government and unions sought to reconcile their goals:
A mutually agreed policy on prices and incomes in Australia for 
implementation by a Labor government... offers by far the best prospect 
of enabling Australia to experience prolonged higher rates of economic 
and employment growth, and accompanying growth in living standards, 
without incurring the circumscribing penalty of higher inflation, by 
providing for resolution of conflicting income claims at lower levels of 
inflation than would otherwise be the case (Accord: 2).
The economics of the Accord was very different from the Fraser government’s 
“restrictionist” or “monetarist” policy approach. The stagflation of the 1970s implied
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that attempts to secure full employment, would be accompanied by accelerating 
inflation. To decrease inflation, therefore, the government had to slash the growth of 
the money supply. The method used was to cut the public sector call on capital 
markets by winding back the government’s budget deficit. The macro-economics 
behind the Accord abandoned these diagnoses and prescriptions. Instead it 
maintained that fiscal policy was the best device to apply to cyclical demand 
management. An expansionary fiscal policy, the Accord held, was required to kick- 
start the economy. The Hawke government saw inflation mainly as the consequence 
of interest group struggles for income shares. This, it thought, could be resolved by a 
political agreement with the economic actors, particularly the unions, rather than by 
forcing up unemployment (Stutchbury 1990: 56). Therefore, unlike the Fraser 
government’s wage freeze - which was perceived as a unilateral imposition - the 
Labor Accord would build consensus into the process and limit the socially divisive 
consequences of wage restraint over time (McEachern 1991: 40).
The Accord can thus be seen as a documentary set of policies determined by the 
ACTU and the Government and directed at stimulating economic recovery and 
reducing unemployment and inflation through a comprehensive prices and incomes 
policy and through full wage indexation imposed via a centralised wage-fixing 
system. In return, an incoming Labor government was to implement “social wage” 
improvements to social security benefits and a range of other helpful policies 
designed to promote union objectives (Singleton 1987: 1).
It is clear, however, that the Accord was not only the basis of Labor's credentials 
for sound economic management (a comprehensive incomes policy for achieving 
economic growth, low inflation and low unemployment) but was also, as Hawke 
himself recognised, “encompasse [d] a spectrum of economic, industrial and social 
policies and provides a framework for continuous consultation and co-operation 
between the government and the trade union movement” (Hawke 1984: 40). And 
more importantly, it was a fundamental political instrument and the basis for the 
Hawke government’s electoral strategy. Politically, the importance of the Accord
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was that it has created a close, interdependent relationship between the government 
and trade unions. For the government, the Accord provided a way to handle the 
demands of the organised unions in manageable trade-offs, vital to winning 
elections. First, by entering into an agreement with the ACTU, which linked 
economic growth and recovery to consensus, the ALP hoped to convince the 
electorate of its capacity to govern Australia through the difficult economic time 
ahead. Second, through the Accord, the Hawke government indicated that it had a 
capacity to handle one of the main actors in Australian political and economic life, 
the unions. This signalled that the Hawke government was able to reconcile three 
different set of interest: the essentially economic self-interest of the unions, a sound 
national economic policy and its own electoral drive.
For the unions, the Accord provided a formal channel to the political, economic 
and social policies-making process. In return, the union movement offered industrial 
discipline and wage restraint. Thus the Accord was both the product and tool of 
closely related objectives within the political and industrial wings of the labour 
movement, the instrument for achieving their disparate but interrelated economic, 
electoral and philosophical objectives (Willis 1979: 6). It incorporated a policy 
process, the willingness of the trade unions and the government to negotiate their 
differences and to pursue policy solution in Accord. In this sense, the Accord, to 
borrow Gerritsen’s words, comprises “a set of attitudes which make possible a 
“bargained bilateral” relationship between the government and the unions” 
(Gerritsen 1986: 49). Gruen and Grattan saw the Accord in even broader terms: “as a 
relationship between the Labor government and the union movement - as a process 
both for making deals and for settling problems as far as possible to the mutual 
benefit of two parties” (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 111).
The Accord - together with the personal popularity of Bob Hawke - provided a 
the basis for a very marketable package - a charisma-led recovery, with co-operation 
from the union movement (Stilwell 1986: 24). The Hawke government cleverly 
turned the special relationship with trade unions to its political advantage. The co-
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operation of the trade unions was presented to the electorate as evidence that the 
Hawke government could work constructively with the unions in contrast to 
Whitlam's dismissive style and Fraser’s confrontationist stance towards the unions 
(Singleton 1990: 126).
3.2.3. Embracing Business
The Hawke government was aware that the Accord was only one element - and 
an insufficient one in that - in shaping its policies and electoral strategies. It 
recognised that it was important to co-opt business groups into line with the Accord 
principles, if even part of the Accord was to be implemented successfully (Teicher 
1987: 20). Experience indicated that to achieve a successful prices and incomes 
policy, it is not enough merely to get support from the unions, but at a minimum the 
support of business is needed as well. Labor politicians recognised the reality of the 
social and economic dispersion of power in which organised business (with 
organised unions) was one of the major players. Business’ relationship with the 
government is pivotal to the workings of the political and economic process. 
Business, together with labour and government, had sources of potential power at 
their disposal (McEachern 1991: 11). Therefore, in order to advance its broader 
political program and, more importantly, to get the business support necessary for 
maintaining office, the government needed to be more accommodating towards the 
needs and claims of business (McEachern 1991: 10). At the minimum level, it had to 
be able to avoid intense, united business bitterness which could frustrate its efforts to 
be seen as “a good economic manager”(McEachern 1991: 7).
The need for cooperation with business was also exhibited in the government’s 
effort to undermine the image of the perceived interventionist style of the Whitlam 
government. There was a recognition that the economic disarray surrounding the 
descent of the Whitlam government was partly sustained as impact of inappropriate 
government intervention in the economy. Such interference, whether failed or 
successful, was seen at the very least as fuelling business hostility and opposition to
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almost every government policy. If continued, this, in turn, would make it difficult 
for a government to devise strategies for re-election. Therefore, if the Hawke 
government wanted to seek economic restructuring without recourse to massive state 
interference (which would lead to active opposition by business), then the 
government would need to tailor its actions to projects endorsed by or at least 
acceptable to private firms and sectors (McEachem 1991: 7).
For this reason, the Accord was cemented at the National Economic Summit in 
May 1983. The Summit was attended by representatives of the union movement, 
state governments, business groups and consumer and welfare organisations. Despite 
a lot of criticism and debate prior to it, the Summit was widely regarded as a 
tremendous success. The Summit participants released a Communique which 
formalised the new agreement and was much more comprehensive in terms of the 
incomes groups covered by the arrangements, and instruments set and the objectives 
to which they were assigned than the original Accord document (Lloyd 1985: 16). It 
added a number of details; proposing a return to a centralised system of wage fixing 
based on the Arbitration Commission and agreeing that “income of the employed 
should increase in line with increases in productivity”. It agreed to a prices 
surveillance instrument, supported an active government industrial development 
policy; committed the government to a reform of the taxation system; and indicated 
a number of areas where the government could improve the “atmospheric 
conditions” for private business - that is, by making compromises which would 
increase the profitability of some sectors (such as through improved transport and 
infrastructure and export incentives). But, most important, was the fact that the 
Summit Communique enunciated a new set of principles for policy making based on 
an effort to derive a national consensus from a framework of (albeit symbolic) 
tripartite consultations. For this aim it supported the establishment of an independent 
representative economic advisory body, called the Economic Planning Advisory 
Council (EPAC) (Lloyd 1985: 16).
The Summit was significant in attempting to move from a bipartite agreement
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(statement of Accord) to a tripartite agreement. It was a brilliant strategy launched 
by the Hawke government for co-opting the representatives of business groups - 
although not as clearly organised as the trade unions in terms of a single peak 
council - to get involved in the decision-making process. It was a vehicle whereby 
the government was not only able to flesh out the details of the economic strategy to 
be used and refine the terms of the original Accord document (McEachern 1991: 24) 
but also to co-opt business into a broader recovery strategy. It secured compliance of 
business with the government’s economic model, the Accord, and at the same time it 
established new positive image among the business groups that it was a “business 
government” (Kelly 1992: 68). This resulted in some significant changes in the 
nature of business’s commitment to the government policy. At the very least, it 
meant the government had minimised the likelihood of criticism from business on 
most of those elements in the Accord which indicated the government’s potential for 
intervening in the economy.
The fact that the Summit endorsed a communique which contained all the 
Accord features, although it made no formal commitment to the Accord itself, 
indicates the tremendous success of the government’s strategy. Since the 
communique was ratified by all of the participants, except the representative of the 
Queensland government, the Summit reflected a major achievement in consensus 
policy making which made a clear break from previous methods of policy making. 
“The upshot was a liberating circuit-breaker which banished the disintegrating 
confrontation of the Fraser era and ushered in Hawke's consensus-based approach” 
(McMullin 1991: 418). Thus, in Kelly’s view, the Summit, in its atmospherics, 
repudiated the class bias of ALP politics: “It was a political idea which Hawke used 
as a substitute for Labor ideology of class conflict; which he, along with most the 
modern ALP, repudiated” (Kelly 1992: 272). The Hawke government succeeded in 
establishing what Katherine West describes as a style of government based on the 
three major power blocs in Australia society: government, big business and 
unionised labour (West 1984: 3). This approach has made it easier for the
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government to manage and control community politics.
The Summit was an example of coalition-building in action - the virtuoso 
performance of an essential political task - and the coalition Hawke built extended 
far beyond his base within the ALP. It is undoubtedly the case that the Summit was 
the transparent proof of Hawke's intention to translate his influence as an election 
winner into a central policy role. This, in turn, laid the foundations for Labor's 
continuing political domination at the federal level. As Mills (1993: 37) insisted, 
“while the Summit fulfilled Hawke's deep yearning to bring balm to a troubled 
nation, it was also the vehicle of his own ambition to exercise personal political 
supremacy, in the Labor Party and in the nation”.
The Hawke management style provided economically more favourable results 
than did Fraser’s. Many business executives believed that they had been able or 
would be able to achieve company goals they could not achieve under preceding 
governments. The business community saw the Hawke management style as the best 
hope Australia had to prevent further decline in the Australian economy and to 
increase international competitiveness (West 1984: 8). They shared the Hawke 
government’s primary concern for increased growth and reduced inflation. 
Economic success (and the weakness of the conservative forces in politics) enhanced 
the position and image of the Hawke government (McEachern 1986: 26). The fact 
that the Accord has not only benefited both the government and the unions, but also 
business as well made many companies were generally happier with the Hawke 
government than with the preceding Whitlam or Fraser government styles of 
economic management (West 1984: 9).
The Hawke government’s more conciliatory - compared with Fraser’s more 
polarising - approach to political and economic problems has also enhanced this 
business community view (West 1984: 9). The fact that the Hawke government 
rhetorically defined private business as an ally and not an enemy and attempted to 
have business support in managing a response to the recession enhanced the positive 
attitude of business towards the government. The Hawke government never blamed
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business for the recession it subsequently faced. Instead it repeatedly acknowledged 
that a healthy private business sector was an essential part of its recovery strategy. At 
the formal level, the Accord indicated the government's desire to use it as a means 
for restoring the conditions for private sector profitability. For example, it clearly 
facilitated business investment and profitability through increased private profit 
shares.
Thus, business reluctance to criticise the government was not necessarily based 
on approval for the government's consensus-based policy, but rather on a grudging 
recognition of some of the benefits that business could gain from it and substantial 
doubts about the electoral and policy viability of the Coalition parties. It seemed that 
there was no other choice for business, but to co-operate with government-led 
policy. “Given government offers of co-operation and a trade union movement 
willing to talk in friendly terms, what else could be done?” (McEarchem 1991: 87). 
With a newly-elected, popular, pragmatic Labor government supported by ACTU 
and a demoralised opposition, stark business hostility was like to prove counter­
productive. As the then Director General of the Confederation of Australian 
Industry, Bryan Noakes (1988) acknowledged:
We had a government which had just won an election with a very large 
majority, which had a contract with the trade union movement - a 
written contract - which tied it hand and foot. Our task, as we see it, is to 
work with government, not against government in the general sense, but 
to work with governments to the extent that we can in an attempt 
to get the best results possible for our membership under given set 
circumstances and I believe we did that in the economic summit. That 
does not mean to say we liked i t ... but we had to live with the political 
reality of a new government with a large majority and written contract 
with the trade union movement (cited from Carney 1988: 66-67).
To enhance its image and position necessary to capture conservative votes,
Hawke deliberately and successfully used the rhetoric of social order, the language
of consensus and patriotic appeals to national solidarity (West 1984: 2). The failure
of the Fraser government’s confrontationist style was used to discredit the
Opposition, and at the same time to establish a new image for Hawke’s leadership.
Hawke’s leadership style appeared to share responsibility for the political and
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economic program the ALP would have undertaken in any case. Here, the notion of 
consensus was used in its broader meaning: a sense of responsibility on the part of 
its main actors for any of its policies (West 1984: 11). This was very important, 
particularly in preventing damaging business criticism of the kind that would attack 
the political credibility of the government as well as its electoral image. By linking 
economic recovery and consensus, the Accord minimised criticism from the 
opponents of the Hawke government's electoral strategy. If the opponents criticised 
the government's grand plan, then it could be alleged that they were opposed to 
economic growth and recovery, that they were divisive, and antipathetic to long-term 
survival needs of Australia (Dabscheck 1989: 45). As a result, the natural political 
hostility felt by many sections of business to the Labor government could be 
contained (Pemberton and Davis 1986: 55). This, in turn, gave the Hawke 
government flexibility in arranging and re-arranging its priorities with little serious 
opposition (Pemberton and Davis 1986: 6).
The electoral success of the Hawke government was not simply the product of 
business support for it, but the Hawke government never faced united, public and 
virulent business opposition whenever it went to an election. As with the unions, it 
seemed that the Hawke government succeeded in managing the relationship with 
business more effectively than any of its predecessors. It succeeded in garnering 
support from some sections of business, neutralised or contained the suspicions of 
others, and profited from divided and uncertain business support for its political 
opponents. Certainly, this was not an accidental product of circumstances but the 
result of the Hawke government's political skills and calculation (McEachern 1991: 
152).
3.2.4. Managing Exogenous Economic Shocks
Besides the tendency of the Australian system to produce wages explosions, one 
of Australia's most serious and intractable economic problems is the continued poor 
performance of its balance of payments. Although Australia has traditionally been a 
capital-importing country which runs persistent current account deficits, during the
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1980s the size of these deficits increased dramatically, resulting in a substantial 
build-up of Australia's foreign debt. This trend had actually begun long before the 
Hawke government came to office. However, the problems became more serious 
after that.
One of the most influential economic decisions of 1980s was the floating of the 
Australian dollar and the deregulation of the financial system, announced by Paul 
Keating in December 1983. The aim of this float was to expose Australia to the anti- 
inflationary discipline of overseas forces (Kelly 1992: 77) which resulted from a 
capital inflow crisis in October 1983. This crisis became worse in December, 
resulting in too much speculative capital inflow. This capital inflow crisis 
undermined government efforts to contain inflation through the Accord. 
Furthermore, since that capital inflow was not equity capital but debt capital 
(borrowed funds), it actually increased the Australian foreign debt. The crisis made it 
obvious that the international markets - notwithstanding the managed exchange rate - 
were able to disrupt domestic interest rates and the money supply. It was clear that 
the existing managed exchange rate system could no longer halt massive capital 
flows boosted by speculators to force the Australian dollar upwards or downwards 
for their own profit (Kelly 1992: 80-81).
The ideas underpinning financial deregulation were a belief in markets, a faith in 
competition and a conviction that the economy must be internationalised. This was a 
fundamental shift in Labor politics (Kelly 1992: 93). The argument behind this 
strategy was that since the future was unpredictable and the Australian economy 
could not escape from the impact of international market development, then the best 
tactic was to stake national progress on the market rather than on failing regulatory 
mechanisms (Kelly 1992: 77). In other words to let the speculators speculate against 
each other, rather than the Reserve Bank. Thus financial deregulation was driven by 
the change in the world economy and the growing international isolation of financial 
markets (Kelly 1992: 91). The centrepiece of this deregulation consisted of four 
main reforms: “surrounding official control of the exchange rate; abolishing
77
exchange control over movement of capital inside and outside Australia; 
deregulation of interest rates; and foreign bank entry” (Kelly 1992: 76).
The Hawke government soon saw financial deregulation as a fundamental 
element of its economic strategy. Keating described the financial system as “the 
economy’s main artery; improve its efficiency”, he believed, and “the body 
functioned better”. For him, financial deregulation was a basis for achieving 
economic growth, for improving economic efficiency and for maintaining anti- 
inflationary discipline. Thus, it was believed that deregulation meant a more efficient 
financial sector and that market forces, not official intervention, would better direct 
capital to achieving a more efficient economy. Labor drew a new equation: 
deregulation would promote growth and help to reduce inflation (cited from Kelly 
1992: 92).
As stated by Kelly (1992:77), “Financial deregulation in tandem with the ALP- 
ACTU Accord came to be the twin pillars of Labor’s unusual economic management 
model...they provided the ingredients for Labor’s 1980s growth strategy”. As Kelly 
also argues: “The mixture of the float and the Accord, meant that while the 
government let the financial markets operate on market forces, the labour market still 
relied on political agreement. The float was to secure a major depreciation, while the 
Accord was to achieve wage restraint to retain the competitive advantages of the 
depreciation. This, in turn, would supposedly attack and eradicate the balance of 
payments weakness and the constraint it imposed on growth and employment” 
(Kelly 1992: 93).
But more importantly, states Kelly, “the float transformed both the economics 
and politics of Australia. For the Labor Party, the move to financial deregulation was 
a step of historic dimensions. Philosophically and methodologically, financial 
deregulation was a convincing break with ALP dogma” (Kelly, 1992:76). 
Throughout its history the Labor Party had sought to develop the capitalist economy 
through the intervention of the state. The float “signalled the dissolution of the old 
Australia - regulated, protected and introspective, and harnessed the Australian
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economy to international marketplace” (Kelly 1992: 76). By means of the float, the 
Hawke government sought to improve the economy by unleashing the weapon of the 
market. Through the Accord and financial deregulation the Hawke government had 
put in place a remarkable affiliation of organised labour and capital markets.
The political impact of the float was almost greater than its monetary effects. 
Most important, it locked in a de facto alliance between the government and the 
financial markets. The liberalisation of capital movements has given the business 
community greater leverage over economic policy settings (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 
139). The dismantling of controls on capital movements meant that economic 
policies became more favourable to business interests. It made Keating the hero of 
the markets. For a while Labor became the fashion within the financial sector and 
even in sections of the corporate sector. The float turned politics upside down 
because Labor displayed courage where the Liberals had "squibbed the issue" the 
previous year. In electoral terms, the float was used by Labor to clinch what was 
supposedly Liberal terrain - it pushed non-Labor to the right. The Hawke 
government practised its skills in torturing the Liberals. In fact, it mocked them for 
the decade as the deregulators who had been too scared to deregulate. It was the 
Labor government which had delivered for finance, business and markets. “It never 
let the Liberals or the markets forget” (Kelly 1992: 94). Finally, it brought the 
Opposition into disrepute among its own supporters because Labor had shown more 
faith in market forces than the Liberals (Kelly 1992: 77).
3.2.5. Managing External Problems
As stated by Gruen and Grattan (1993:101), “during early 1985 increasing 
economic and political problems emerged, including a growing awareness that 
Australia faced deep external problems. After June 1985 Australia's terms of trade 
declined quite sharply - by about 10 per cent, compared with a long term average 
decline of about 1 per cent per annum”. The Australian dollar plummeted in value by 
about 30 per cent in the first half of that year. By early 1986 it was obvious the crisis 
was more serious than had been foreseen. In 1986, the current account deficit blew
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out to 6 per cent of GDP as compared with 4.5 per cent in 1985 (Kelly 1992: 197). In 
mid-May 1986, the Hawke government came face-to-face with its fundamental 
political dilemma of the 1980s. This engendered a sense of economic crisis. On a 
talk-back radio program, Keating warned the nation that if the situation were not 
addressed, then Australia faced the risk of becoming a “banana republic” (cited from 
Singleton 1990: 166).
Kelly (1992:200) states that “there were three factors responsible for the rapid 
deterioration in the current account deficit - the resources boom, excessive domestic 
spending, and the terms of trade decline - [but they] merely reflected deeper 
structural issues. In the first place, many commentators saw the existing current 
account deficit to be the result of [Australia’s] failure to move towards a more 
diversified export base with more raw materials processing. Australia was forced to 
face the realities of international trends in 1986, when the terms of trade for raw 
materials, including petroleum, fell to the lowest levels in recorded history. The two 
further underlying issues for Australia at the core of its current account deficit crisis 
were its lack of international competitiveness and its inability to generate higher 
national savings to reduce its call upon overseas saving”. The problem was that 
strong domestic growth was spilling into a level of imports which Australia was 
unable to finance through its exports.
Kelly also states that “the 1986 crisis was quite different from the expectations 
of 1983, when Hawke came to office to end Australia’s recession through a new 
compact with the unions. The crisis generated awareness within the government that 
the recovery it had made contained a nasty shock. The crisis, to some extent, 
revealed the structural and competitive deterioration of the economy namely poor 
productivity, reliance upon raw materials exports, and inadequate national savings to 
fund investment. This legacy of decades confronted Labor with electoral and 
philosophical challenges as severe as any in its history” (Kelly 1992: 219). On the 
one hand, the crisis represented a “confluence of short-term economic policy and 
long-term cultural traditions” (Kelly, 1992:196). Once again, the crisis was a
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warning and an admission that Australia’s underlying institutions and ideas 
(protection, regulation, introspection, arbitration and commodity reliance) drastically 
required drastic (Kelly 1992: 197). The crisis required an assumption of 
responsibility in government if the Hawke administration was to sustain the claims 
to sound economic management that was the basis of its electoral strategy (Singleton 
1990: 166).
Confronting ways of addressing the current account deficit crisis while avoiding 
a recession, forced the Hawke government to change Labor’s traditional policies 
dramatically. As a result, the Hawke government moved decisively towards a free 
market economic rationalist agenda which flew in the face of ALP policy tradition. 
Further, the government moved from public sector expansion to contraction (Kelly 
1992:211).
This inaugurated a new era in Australian economics and politics which was to 
endure far into the 1990s (Kelly 1992: 196). Firstly, government, through the 
framework of the Accord, persuaded the ACTU and the then Arbitration 
Commission to reduce the rate of money wage growth below the rate of the growth 
of prices. Under the terms of the original Accord, the increase of 2 per cent in 
inflation would have meant a corresponding increase in award wages. But the 
government recognised that such an increase would in turn increase labour costs 
(costs of production), which would undermine the international competitive 
advantage of Australian products. This, in turn, would increase the balance of 
payments deficit. Therefore, the government needed to offset the rising costs of 
production. As a result, after a considerable period of negotiation, the Accord was 
renewed to become the Accord Mark II. Under this new formula, the ACTU agreed 
with the government proposal to a 2 per cent discounted wage indexation in order to 
prevent a debilitating upward spiral of costs and prices as the effect of the dollar’s 
depreciation took hold. In addition, a national productivity-based pay rise was 
deferred. This was subsequently awarded as a 3 per cent employer contribution to 
superannuation (though the Arbitration Commission disallowed this in 1987).
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Promised tax cuts were also deferred until later in the year. Thus, the Accord Mark II 
was designed to cut real wages in order to hold the competitive gains from 
depreciation (Kelly 1992: 206). This first re-negotiation of the Accord was highly 
important. It broke down the previous commitment to full wage indexation and 
showed how much the government was concerned to accommodate employers' and 
the nation’s interests (Stilwell 1993: 72).
Later on, Accord Mark II was re-negotiated, in response to the continuing 
deterioration in Australia's balance of payments during 1986. It was already clear 
that the dramatic fall in Australia's terms of trade was swamping the effects of the 
two per cent previous wage discounting (Stilwell 1993: 73). It also become apparent 
that wage indexation was inappropriate in the present economic climate and that the 
problem of restrictive work practices had to be addressed. Further, there was a 
recognition that full wage indexation was incompatible with redressing the balance 
of payments slump. Put simply, the depreciation would make or break the Accord as 
wages policy. Therefore, while the government slowed the economy moderately by 
tightening both monetary and fiscal policy, a further discounting of wage indexation 
was important to reduce real wages so that Australia's international trade 
competitiveness would be increased while at the same time it acted as a 'circuit 
breaker' on the domestic wage-prices spiral. The result was Accord Mark III. Under 
this new formula, the ACTU and government agreed to implement a two-tier wage 
system to replace wage indexation. The arrangements established in the National 
Wage Case of March 1987 involved a first-tier increase of $ 10 per week in award 
wages and salaries, while giving agreement to a further wage increase of up to four 
per cent of existing wages and salaries. But to achieve this four per cent, there would 
be guidelines involving the elimination of restrictive work practices. Therefore, this 
Accord Mark III, as many employers recognised, involved a further shift away from 
a cost-of living criterion towards a productivity-based criterion for the determination 
of wages.
This strategy proved a success, at least temporarily. In spite of the economic
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slowdown the budget deficit was further reduced, by more than $ 2 billion in 1987- 
88. Although unemployment increased marginally (from 7.6 per cent in June 1986 to 
8.5 per cent in March 1987), as the result of the economic slowdown and a 
commodity price recovery driven by an unexpected rebound in international 
economic activity, the current account deficit was reduced from over 6 per cent of 
GDP in 1985-86 to 3.7 per cent two years later (Gruen and Grattan 1993: 102). The 
government reined in its budget deficit and ran budget surpluses for three years after 
1986-87; the size of the government was reduced, and so was inflation.
The improving economy from 1986 to 1987, enhanced the perceptions of the 
competence of government, in particular of Treasurer, Paul Keating. The Hawke 
government proved its claim to be a sound economic manager. It showed it could 
handle a the “banana republic” crisis with both discipline and competence. This 
success provided the opportunity for the government to call an early election in July 
1987. “Capitalising on politically debilitating feuding within the Opposition Liberal 
and National Parties, the government was returned to office only a year after the 
trough of the balance of payments” (Stutchbury 1990: 66).
3.2.6. The 1987 Share Market Crash
The ALP's victory at the 1987 election saw the Hawke government succumb to a 
complacent euphoria about its ability to manage Australia's economic difficulties. 
Hawke and Keating declared that in the first half of their third term Australia's 
problems had been solved. Hawke pledged sustained rises in living standards; 
Keating declared his economic management was “bringing home the bacon'“(cited 
from Kelly 1992: 362). However, the economy remained shackled by a large foreign 
debt burden, which required further policy attention. The commodity price recovery 
in international markets in fact did not produce a commensurate improvement in the 
economy's external account (Stutchbury 1990: 65). At the same time a series of 
surprise events, of which the most surprising was a consumption and investment 
boom (Kelly 1992: 361), made the situation worse.
Emerging complacency about Australia’s economic predicament was halted by
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the international share market crash in October 1987. Following a massive drop in 
Wall Street share prices, the Australian All Ordinaries Index dropped by 25 per cent 
on 19 October 1987. As a result, $9 billion was shaved off equity values during the 
course of the day. By the end of the month the All Ordinaries had fallen to 44 per 
cent below its peak of mid-September. The crash created panic in Australian market 
(Stutchbury 1990: 68). This panic translated into political pressure on the 
government to respond.
Despite political pressure to do something in response to the crash, the Hawke 
government chose a wait-and-see approach. Keating, the architect of policy during 
this period, had chosen a gradual response to the share market crash. He choose to 
ride out the late 1987 climate of uncertainty rather than exploit it. While the post­
crash recession did not eventuate, the event nevertheless gave impetus to the micro 
economic, or structural reform policy agenda. In May 1988, seven months after the 
crash, Keating brought down a further modest tightening of fiscal policy plus a series 
of industry reforms. The government decided to cut new budget outlays by $ 982 
million and targeted a budget surplus of over $ 3 billion in 1988-89, with another 
round of spending cuts yielding $ 1 billion in savings (Kelly 1992: 384).
Simultaneously the government sought further agreement with the ACTU. The 
result was the Accord Mark IV, a combination of centralised wage-fixing through 
the National Wage Case, tax cuts and award restructuring. Its aim was to maintain 
both real wages and employment growth, and thus ensure the continued support of 
the ACTU (Singleton 1990: 173). This new arrangement embodied a two-tier 
system, in that all workers became eligible for a 3 per cent pay increase from 
September of that year, subject to their agreeing to review the awards under which 
their wages were determined.
In the end of 1980s, once again, the flexibility of the Accord was tested. This 
time the government was facing a renewed, chronic foreign debt problem, and a 
continuing deficit in merchandise trade. To solve this problem, again the government 
negotiated with the ACTU. The result was Accord V, a multi dimensional wages
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policy - the outstanding wage-tax trade off - linking award restructuring to 
substantial pay increases; and supplementary payments for low-paid workers 
(Singleton 1990: 174). Finally, in the early 1990s the government revised this 
Accord Mark V, which resulted in Accord VI and facilitated a reform of trade union 
structures and the award system. This new formula was an effort to develop a system 
that would deliver an aggregate wage ceiling while redefining the segmentation of 
organised labour along enterprise lines. Its aim was to achieve productivity and 
profitability for Australian industry (Ewer, et al 1991: 56). Under this new formula, 
there would be a 1.5 per cent wage increase for December 1990 quarter, plus a flat 
$12 per week six months later. This was to be augmented by a tax cut from January 
1991, averaging $7.85 per week. And it was agreed that additional over-award 
payments could be gained through demonstrable productivity increases by workers 
in individual enterprises. Thus Accord Mark VI put the onus even more strongly on 
the productivity-based agreements as the means through which individual groups 
could raise their real wages (Stilwell 1993: 76).
As a result, by mid-1988, the economy appeared to be performing to plan. The 
“mini-recession of 1986” (Stutchbury 1990: 70) had given away to solid economic 
growth and lower unemployment. At the same time the current account deficit was 
shrinking and inflation was decelerating. Australia finished the 1980s with renewed 
appreciation of the benefits of low inflation: that it encourages national savings, 
international competitiveness, better living standards and, in its own right, better 
equity. The Hawke government claimed that its economic strategy had achieved 
substantial success in reducing stagflationary unemployment and inflation 
simultaneously.
The 1980s was a most unpredictable period. The sharp and massive external 
shocks imposed upon Australia made economic management a high risk exercise. 
The Hawke government had to deal with a sharp fall and then a sharp rise in 
Australia’s terms of trade. This meant that there was uncertainty which led to a high 
risk of policy miscalculation (Kelly 1992: 385). But the Hawke government sensed
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the danger, took up the challenge, and successfully confronted the problems through 
three main avenues. Firstly, it sought to improve Australia’s international 
competitiveness primarily by securing money wage restraint and thereby real wage 
reductions negotiated under the Accord framework. Secondly, it made structural 
adjustments to the economy. This strategy consisted of a variety of measures, mainly 
deregulatory (for example, deregulation on the banking and financial sectors) 
designed to increase market competitiveness and so improve the economy's ability to 
utilise resources efficiently. Thirdly, it introduced fiscal austerity, consisting of real 
reductions in federal public expenditures and producing federal budget surpluses 
(Smith and Mahony 1993: 40-44). The problems of the 1970s and 1980s, however, 
had been quickly superseded by the economic problems of the 1980s: mounting 
external account deficits, rapidly escalating foreign debt and a sharp decline in 
exchange rates (Stutchbury 1990: 75). By the end of 1980s, it became clear that the 
problems of a chronic foreign debt, and a deficit in balance of trade, had not yet been 
solved. As a result, Australian foreign debt mounted from 7 billion in June 1980 to 
150 billion by late 1992, or from about five per cent to 32 per cent of GDP (Kelly 
1992: 680). While the inflation rate fell to below 3 per cent, unemployment moved 
above 11 per cent. Later on, this was to become a serious political and economic 
problem for Paul Keating's leadership.
3.2.7. The Economic Impact of the Accord
In order to know how far the Accord contributed to the Hawke government’s 
electoral success, in the first place we have to know how successful the Accord was 
economically. Put simply, the economic success of the Accord would be transferred 
directly to political support for the government which instituted it. The more 
successful the Hawke government was in managing the economy through the 
Accord, the more it would be seen as a competent economic manager and the more 
electoral support it would gain.
The dilemma in assessing the impact of the Accord is that we cannot know what 
might have happened in its absence (Lewis and Spiers 1989: 2). Moreover, since the
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policy instruments are interdependent, it is difficult to isolate the effects of various 
aspects of a policy such the Accord. In addition, it is difficult to isolate the effects of 
the Accord from the effects of external factors beyond the influence of Australian 
government (such as global economic developments) (Stilwell 1986: 25). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that while some commentators saw the Accord contributing to the 
positive economic development during the Hawke government, others concluded the 
opposite. For instance, some commentators have doubted that the reduction in wages 
growth/fall in real wages reflected a restraint exercised by unions that would not 
have occurred without the Accord.
However, there is a general recognition that following the introduction of the 
Accord, the principal indicators of economic performance were impressive by 
comparison with those for preceding years. The following table reinforces this 
argument:
Australian Economic Indicator 1977 to 1991
Year Rate of
inflation
(% )
Employment
Growth
(% )
Unemployment
Rate
(% )
Number of 
Ind. disputes
Total working 
days lost
1977 4.9 0.6 6.5 2374 3162
1978 8.2 0.8 6.1 2441 3211
1979 10.1 1.2 6.2 2042 3964
1980 9.8 2.7 5.9 2429 3320
1981 10.4 1.2 6.1 2915 4189
1982 11.5 -0.2 6.7 2060 1980
1983 11.3 -2.2 10.5 1787 1641
1984 7.9 3.6 8.5 1965 1307
1985 5.8 3.2 7.9 1895 1256
1986 8.4 3.6 8.0 1754 1391
1987 9.3 2.5 7.8 1517 1312
1988 7.3 3.7 6.8 1508 1641
1989 7.4 5.1 5.7 1402 1202
1990 8.1 1.3 7.0 1193 1377
1991 6.3 -2.0 9.5 1048 1608
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, 6101.0, 6203.0, 6321.0. (Adapted from Stilwell 1993: 78 and 
Smith and Mahony 1993: 35)
From the figures above, it is clear that since the introduction of the Accord there 
has been a significant overall decrease in inflation and, until 1991, unemployment.
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During 1986-87 the inflation rate (measured by the CPI) rose 9.3 per cent compared 
with an increase of 8.4 per cent in 1986. This increase, although high enough 
compared with 1984, was nonetheless still under the inflation rates achieved before 
the introduction of the Accord which had reached 11 per cent. Lewis and Spiers 
(1990) noted that the important influences contributing to inflation in 1986-87 were 
import prices, large increases in fresh food prices, and increases in indirect taxes 
announced in the 1986 budget. Inflation has declined since 1986-87 initially in part 
due to lower level of import prices because of an appreciating Australian dollar, later 
because of the domestic import of the international recession.
On the employment front, just prior to the introduction of the Accord, 
employment actually fell, but since then employment has not only been growing but 
also growing at a trend rate greater than that for most of the 1970s. Unemployment 
eased in 1984 and continued to decline after that (Lewis and Spiers 1990: 56-58). 
Further, the target of the government to create some 500,000 jobs in three years was 
attained by November 1985, five months before the deadline. In 1991, the rate of 
unemployment again reached the critical point of 9.5 per cent. However, it did not 
rise to the double digit level until the next year. In part also this level of 
unemployment reflected increased labour force participation rates - which grew from 
56 per cent to over 62 per cent during the 1980s, mostly due to increased female 
labour market participation.
Another very important achievement of the Accord was the decade of greatest 
relative peace in the Australian workplace in more than twenty years. The numbers 
of industrial disputes and working days lost, which were high during 1979-81, have 
declined significantly since the introduction of the Accord. There was a unexpected 
jump in 1988, in which the figures were higher than in 1986-87, but they were still 
lower than those for any year since 1967. Certainly, there have been a number of 
major disputes since the introduction of the Accord, for example, disputes which 
involved coalminers in NSW, Queensland and Tasmania, electricity supply workers 
in Queensland, the Builders Labourers’ Federation and so on. However, in terms of
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the aggregate statistics on the number of working days lost in industrial disputes, the 
trend has clearly been downwards (Stilwell 1986: 56) For instance, the numbers of 
working days lost in February 1989 was the lowest figure since monthly records 
began in 1969. This tends to support the claims of the Hawke government about the 
effectiveness of the Accord - proof that Australia had moved from confrontation to 
cooperation (Mills 1993: 40). Both the ACTU and the Hawke government 
ceaselessly argue that the Accord has helped controlled the level of industrial 
disputes, despite the fall in real wages (Lewis and Speirs 1990: 62).
Finally, a key achievement of the Accord was that it prevented the trend to 
wages explosions in the Australian system. Lewis and Spiers (1989) argue that the 
Accord has achieved its original objectives of controlling labour costs and inflation 
while the economy was expanding and restoring the share of national income going 
to company profits. Moore (1989) noted that there have been substantial reductions 
in real wages and increases in employment since 1983. For example, he pointed out 
that employment growth was protected in the first half of 1986 despite a contraction 
in the growth of GDP. In addition, wages now move in a way entirely novel for the 
Australian economy - in every year of the Hawke government, wages came in at or 
below the government’s budgetary targets (Moore 1989:159). Real labour costs, 
which had risen inexorably through the 1960s and 1970s, flattened through the 
1980s. In the March quarter 1983, during which the Hawke government was elected, 
the average full-time male worker earned $394.70 a week; in December 1991, when 
Hawke was replaced by Keating, the same worker’s wage had increased in real terms 
by exactly 30 cents, to $395.00. During the life of the Hawke government, the share 
of the nation's gross product devoted to wages fell consistently (Mills 1993: 40). 
Thus the fall in real wages during the period of the Accord explains a large part of 
the growth in employment during this period (Lewis and Spiers 1989: 16-17).
Beyond this, the Accord also has had a significant impact on the economic 
behaviour as well as the political consciousness of both the ACTU and business. The 
Accord, has changed how unions and business think and thereby has had an impact
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on economic conduct. The revised expectations element is the most obvious. 
Because the trade unions are assured that rates of inflation and unemployment are 
being reduced, then they become less militant in defending the level of real wages by 
seeking money wage increases, and, therefore, inflationary pressures are curtailed. 
Similarly, once business was more optimistic about the future, because of reduced 
anxiety about industrial disputation and/or rapid changes in wages costs - investment 
was greater and economic growth accelerated (Stilwell 1986: 24). All of this has had 
a very important beneficial effect on employment and industrial relations (Lewis and 
Spiers 1989: 2). Given such facts the Accord in 1980s can be seen to have achieved 
its objectives to help revive the economy, create jobs and generate conditions for 
strong economic growth (Kelly 1992: 61). The Hawke government's success in 
economic management was certainly central to its subsequent political success. 
Although it is difficult to discern with any certainty a causal relationship between 
economic performance and electoral success, the fact that in 1990 the Hawke 
government was re-elected for the fourth time since 1983 with the economy in sound 
condition can be seen as evidence that the Accord had been working well in 
accordance with the government's goals and electoral hopes. The extent to which 
that success was not, in fact, solely the result of the Accord (but of the impact of 
other policies or external forces) was no longer a matter of substance. The electorate 
judged the government on the performance of the economy as a whole regardless of 
which particular policy was most influential in securing these results.
Thus, the electoral success of the Hawke government and the durability of the 
Accord are not coincidental; the tenure of the government in office has come to 
depend upon the published claims that it is the only government which can deliver a 
creditable, comprehensive and effective incomes policy. The Accord, as the 
government claimed, succeeded in solving the economic problems of the 1970s and 
early 1980s.
3.2.8. The Resilience of The Accord
Numerous commentators repeatedly predicted that the Accord would break
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1down (as overseas equivalents had). One of the reason was that, according to them, 
not all elements in the Accord benefited the trade unions; for example, the two-tier 
system under the Accord Mark III. This new formula was seen as necessary to 
minimise the possibility of negative effects arising from expected divisions in the 
workforce, especially between white and blue collar workers, generated by the 
Accord Mark II. Stilwell argues, that this Accord Mark III was “the death-knell of 
wage indexation and launched the structural efficiency principle as the central 
determinant of wage fixation. In contrast to the national productivity emphasis of the 
original Accord, structural efficiency was apply at the industrial level” (Stilwell 
1993: 74). Since it abandoned the maintenance of real wages by revoking full wage 
indexation without compensatory tax benefits (Singleton 1987: 19), this means that 
the higher wage earners suffered a disproportionate loss in real income, thus 
abandoning the principle of maintenance of real wages for all workers which had 
been critical to the ACTU's agreement to the original Accord (Singleton 1990: 167).
Similarly, Accord Mark IV was seen by most commentators as a clever 
agreement. As Stilwell argues:
Certainly, it was an astute blend of partial indexation, a two-tiered 
system, a wage-tax deal, superannuation provisions and productivity- 
based pay bargaining. As such, it built on various elements of previous 
phases of the Accord, welding them into a sophisticated package. It also 
partially reconciled the demands of the weaker sections of the workforce 
for across-the board wage increases with the demands of the stronger 
unions for opportunities to seek higher wages through direct 
bargaining with employers (1993: 76).
However, this Accord Mark IV was again seen as moving too far towards the 
advocacy of enterprise agreements, and therefore, the ACTU and the government 
seemed to be accommodating some of the employers' demands for a more general 
application of enterprise bargaining in the system of wage fixation (Stilwell 1993: 
76). Yet, despite such adverse effects of Accord Mark III and IV, the ACTU 
endorsed the system. It proved that the Accord prospered, it its periodic renegotiated 
variations (McMullin 1991: 418). The Accord proved that it has been able to adapt 
to the unexpected demands made by the 1980s, which put severe pressures on an
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economy attempting to internationalise. As was explained earlier, the Accord has 
significantly and flexibly contributed to the delivery of wage restraint. With the re- 
election of the Labor government for a record five terms, the Accord has currently 
reached its sixth phase since 1983.
Singleton (1990) argues that the critical factors that maintained the continuous 
ACTU support the Accord were the previous bad experiences of a contracting 
economy, deteriorating employment, high inflation and a hostile and confrontationist 
anti-labour stance by the Whitlam and Fraser governments. These, reinforced the 
belief of the ACTU that there was no choice for it, but continued co-operation with 
the Hawke government with more prospects for gaining its goals, or, alternatively 
moving away from the Accord with consequence a return of the Liberals to 
government and implementation of policies similar to those under the Fraser 
government. If the ACTU did not co-operate with the Hawke government, then 
Labor could not govern, with the consequence that it (the ACTU) would have been 
saddled with the sorts of policies it experienced under Fraser (Singleton 1990: 152).
Another factor which also significant to the ACTU's continued support for the 
Accord was the fact that (in its opinion) the relationship with the Hawke government 
provided the best means available for gaining its goals of employment growth, the 
long term maintenance and improvement of real wages through future economic 
growth, and more equitable distribution of wealth and income ( Singleton 1990: 
191). Besides, the unions received other benefits from the Accord. ACTU President 
Crean acknowledged that “the Accord had given the ACTU legitimacy as a genuine 
partner in social and economic reform at all levels of the economy'“(Crean 1989: 1). 
It has given the ACTU access to political power and a measure of influence stronger 
than before over many areas of government decision-making, which was considered 
necessary to gain the ACTU’s goals (Singleton 1990: 200) The fact that the Hawke 
government recognised the legitimacy of union interests and its strong commitment 
to the Accord has enhanced the continuation of the ACTU support of the Accord 
(Singleton 1990: 188).
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Furthermore, the ACTU recognised that given Australia's continuing external 
debt and current account deficits problems as well as the uncertainties of world 
economic development, moving out of the Accord would be dangerous. Increases in 
real wages could depreciate the benefits already gained. Such increases would 
reduce Australia's industrial competitiveness, encouraging inflation and, in turn, 
could inhibit employment growth and thus disadvantage the ACTU itself (Singleton 
1990: 183).
The resilience and flexibility of the Accord was the major political achievement 
of the Hawke government. The success of the government in persuading the ACTU 
to endorse almost every proposal of the renewed Accord agreements that the 
government introduced reflects the fact that the government succeeded in locking in 
union support. This is one of the fundamental objectives of the consensus politics of 
the Hawke government.
In sum, consensus, of which the Accord was merely the most obvious 
manifestation, was a successful strategy launched by the Hawke government for 
selling its program to the electorate. The consensus-based policy embraced by the 
Hawke government proved was able to mobilise so many interests behind the 
government’s objectives/programs - the party, business, unions, economic advisers 
and, even the electorate (Kelly 1992: 272). In this and in other respects, Hawke's 
commitment to consensus became a handy tool for political management - just as it 
had been a sharp weapon against his opponents before he was elected as the prime 
minister. At the very least, it proved an effective technique of crisis management, 
allowing Hawke to “suspend” difficult political problems while his government 
formulated a response (Mills 1993: 50). The implementation of the consensus 
politics and Accord, unquestionably fits with the key objectives of the ALP: “to win 
an election, to conduct an effective and enduring national government and to provide 
a policy basis for the longer-term success of the party” (Hayden 1980: 238).
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CHAPTER FOUR
LABOR'S “NEW POLITICS” AND MEDIA MANAGEMENT
The electoral dominance of the Hawke government cannot be divorced from its 
superior (compared with the Liberals) exploitation of environmental issues and media 
management. This success derived from two sources: firstly, Labor's capacity to 
reconcile two conflicting interests, the government's need for economic growth and 
the environmental movement's need to protect the environment: secondly, its capacity 
to strike a balance between States’ interests and those of the federal government. In 
relation to management of the media, the success was associated with the 
government's capacity to manipulate media coverage, to adopt a personal approach to 
individual journalists and proprietors, as well as to use "carrot and stick" tactics 
effectively. The successful relationship with the environmental movement and the 
media by the Hawke government created a interdependent and mutually beneficial 
relationships between them - wherein lay the Hawke government's political success. 
This chapter examines and assesses these two factors in the government's long-term 
electoral supremacy.
4.1.1. The Rise of “New Politics”
The rise of the environmental movement in Australia actually began well before 
the election of the Hawke government in 1983. At the local level, for example, at the 
end of the 1960s there was a popular protest movement, the so-called "Green Bans 
Movement", which involved cooperation between industrial workers and middle-class 
environmentalists in Sydney (see Roddewig, 1978) and which resulted in at least 
forty-two bans between 1971-75 (Papadakis 1993: 179). At the national level 
Environmental issues also achieved prominence, including pollution by cars, 
protection of kangaroos and the management of waste.
One of the major environmental issues at that time was a controversy following
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the decision of the Hydro-Electric Commission to permit the construction of a dam at 
Lake Pedder in Tasmania. Although the protest groups were ultimately unsuccessful in 
trying to preserve the lake, their campaign had a significant impact on the future 
development of the environmental movement. This radical social movement for 
environmental preservation represented in embryonic form, the subsequent fully- 
developed green movement in Australia. It marked the coming politicisation of the 
environment in Australia.
First, it encouraged the establishment of two environmental groups which, for the 
first time in Australian history, moved to adopt a "new politics" platform: the United 
Tasmanian Group (UTG) in 1972, and the Tasmanian Wilderness Society (TWS) in 
1976. Later on, these two groups exercised a decisive influence on the development of 
a culture of environment. Second, and most importantly, the Lake Pedder campaign 
influenced the national agenda on environmental policies through its capacity to 
mobilise support not only among Tasmanian activists but among groups on mainland 
Australia (Papadakis 1993: 179).
However, in the early 1970s the prospects for putting the environment on the 
public policy agenda appeared bleak. This was because pressure for radical changes in 
the policy process was only limited. The social basis for support of environmentalism, 
the role of scientific research and the concern of the media were all weak (Birrel 1974: 
262-263). Similarly, there was no strong effort to co-ordinate the activities of state 
agencies responsible for the environment (Papadakis 1990a: 340). Moreover, 
management of the environment and power to legislate and regulate it were vested in 
the states, and the Constitution seemed to impose severe constraints on the ability of 
the Commonwealth to tackle these issues. Management for national change was only 
discussed among a select few, and popular pressure was confined to localised 
conflicts (see Birrel 1974: 260-263 and Sawer 1974: 168-176). This was why at the 
time it was common to refer to environmentalists as "eco-nuts" and reasonable to 
assert that federal intervention in environmental policy was token and "largely 
academic" (Walsh 1974: 155-157) and why the environment had not yet been seen as
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a major election issue.
For the ALP itself the environment was hardly seen as an important issue until the 
beginning of 1970s. Before this, certainly there were references to the problem of the 
environment in the ALP’s platform. In 1963, for instance, the ALP made several 
references to the need for a nuclear free-zone in the Southern Hemisphere, though 
some commentators saw this as a simply for security reasons. Two years later, the 
Platform mentioned the need for reforestation. There was also a call for an 
investigation into the chemical industry and the potential health hazards it posed for the 
community. The 1969 ALP platform signalled that environmental issues had became 
increasingly prominent. It presented a detailed set of proposals for conservation of 
natural flora and fauna, the establishment of a central body with power to control and 
coordinate the wide system of National Parks and Wildlife, and promised funds for 
research in the field (Papadakis 1993: 187). Throughout the 1970s, the ALP platform 
on environmental issues was broadened: to include the assessment of the impact of 
new technologies and research into the prevention of accidents, waste disposal etc 
(Papadakis 1993: 173). However, the ALP still did not see these issues as central to 
its electoral strategy.
4.1.2. The Franklin Dam Case
In 1983, for the first time, the environment became a major election issue at the 
federal level in Australia. It started with the conflict over the Franklin Dam in 
Tasmania (Papadakis 1990a: 343). The Franklin Dam case was significant politically 
because there was an unprecedented mobilisation of support by environmental groups 
in throughout Australia to stop its construction. The Tasmanian Wilderness Society, 
which had at least 11,000 members, was able to attract both national and international 
attention. At the national level, they transformed themselves into a national 
organisation with branches in all states. The Dam conflict led to the formation of a 
coalition that included the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF), State 
Conservation Councils, National Parks Association and branches of the TWS as a
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means of rallying support from 800 conservation groups with more than half a million 
members (The National Times, 16-22  Jan 1983).
In the context of a two major parties contest, the Dam case was also important 
because it was tied to federalism: the struggle between States’ rights and 
Commonwealth power. It was over this issue that the ALP and the Liberal parties 
struggled for electoral benefit. For the Fraser government the Dam case was seen as a 
legal (States’ rights) issue rather than a political one (Burke 1984: 7). Thus, the Fraser 
government was unwilling to intervene directly in the conflict over the Franklin Dam, 
although it previously had shown its pro-environmental policy stance on other issues, 
such as the Great Barrier Reef, Fraser Island and Kakadu National Park. It was 
argued that such an action in the Tasmanian case would encroach on States’ rights 
(Gruen and Grattan 1993: 233), a principle that the Liberals valued very highly and 
which they violated over Fraser Island. Moreover, since a majority of Tasmanians 
were pro-Dam, it would have been an electoral disaster for the Liberal government in 
Tasmania if the federal government had intervened in the Franklin Dam case. To avoid 
a political confrontation with the Tasmanian government, the Fraser government tried 
to neutralise the issue by offering $ 500 million in compensation for the construction 
of a coal-fired thermal power station. But the Tasmanian government foolishly refused 
the offer (Papadakis 1990a: 343). This stance by the Fraser government was certainly 
a fatal mistake. As it occurred in the course of an election campaign, it was clear that 
the Franklin Dam issue had gone beyond the legal context, and become a partisan 
political issue. It seemed that the Fraser government tended to think in the interests of 
the state level instead of the federal level. It had the effect of saving the Liberal state 
government in Tasmania rather than winning the election at the federal level.
The ALP, by contrast, judged the case in essentially political terms. Labor 
politicians made an exact political judgement that there was little national support for, 
indeed considerable opposition to, the position adopted by the government of 
Tasmania. A poll taken in August 1982 revealed that 42 per cent of all Australians 
were opposed the construction of the Dam, 28 per cent were in favour of it and the rest
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were unsure. In September 1982, 49 per cent were in favour of federal intervention, 
37 per cent were opposed to it and 14 per cent were undecided (Papadakis 1990a: 
343). But a majority of Tasmanians supported the construction of the Dam. This was 
because of local sentiment. They tended to think that the Dam was their own (state) 
business and that there was no constitutional right for the federal government to 
involve itself. In addition, the construction of the Dam was seen as economically 
beneficial by Tasmanians, particularly in terms of providing employment.
The fact that there was nationwide support - with the exception of the majority of 
Tasmanians - for federal intervention to stop the Franklin Dam made Labor politicians 
aware that any Commonwealth government which acquiesced in supporting Tasmania 
on an issue that was electorally unpopular would be risking its own preservation. 
Therefore, the ALP brilliantly exploited the issue for its electoral benefit. The Federal 
Liberal government’s failure in the dispute - its unwillingness to intervene, the 
rejection of compromise by the Tasmanian government and the increasing pressure 
from a majority of Australians to stop the Dam’s construction - paved the way for the 
ALP to seize the advantage. In its campaign, the ALP promised to stop the Dam 
construction if it was elected (Papadakis 1990a: 343).
Labor’s estimate proved correct. The Fraser government was defeated in the 
federal election of 1983. Labor was elected with huge support from conservationists. 
In that election 13 Liberal held seats were targeted by the conservationists, all of which 
were won by Labor. According to those behind the campaign, about 2 per cent of 
people shifted their vote on the basis of the Franklin Dam issue. They claimed that of 
the 13 seats, the conservationists’ vote alone was enough to win eight (Australian 
Times, June 22, 1987). Since a majority of Tasmanians were pro-Dam, Labor lost in 
Tasmania. However, it won in almost all states on the mainland, except Queensland, 
which reflected the significant contribution of conservationists to Labor’s electoral 
success. Labor's election supposedly was evidence of what the support of 
conservationists meant in an election.
After it was elected, the Hawke government soon fulfilled its election campaign
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promise and stopped the Dam's construction, using as grounds the Commonwealth 
external affairs power (under section 51 (xx) of the Constitution) to enact a law in 
pursuance of an institutional obligation (The World Heritage Convention). This was 
the first bill introduced by the Hawke government. The constitutional basis of the 
majority decision had not been available during the Whitlam government’s equivalent 
controversy concerning Lake Pedder (McMullin 1991: 426). This Labor tactic was 
successful in overriding the Tasmanian Liberal government and preventing the 
construction of Franklin Dam. The High Court subsequently found in favour of the 
Commonwealth, maintaining the right of the federal government to use its external 
affairs power to put the Gordon below Franklin on the World Heritage list. This High 
Court judgement effectively brought Australia’s areas of World Heritage significance 
within the ambit of the national government’s external affairs power and thereby set 
the scene for the Hawke government to repeat this technique throughout the decade 
(Kelly 1992: 528).
4.1.3. Hard Choices: Economic and Environmental Imperatives
The conflict over the Franklin Dam exerted a decisive influence on the pattern of 
policy under the Hawke government (Papadakis 1990a: 345). It presented a major 
opportunity to the newly Hawke government to use the environmental issue for its 
electoral politics in the next election (Papadakis 1990a: 344). However, the issue of 
the environment also posed particular dilemmas for the Hawke government. These 
included how to achieve a balance between economic and environmental imperatives 
(Papadakis 1991: 242), and how to balance the States’ rights and federal interests. 
This was not a simple choice, because each option had its pros and cons, outside or 
inside the government itself. To resolve this problem, the government needed high 
political skills and accurate calculation. If the government made a wrong decision, then 
the result could be devastating politically and electorally. Therefore, although it had 
sided with the environmentalists over the Franklin Dam case, the Hawke government 
did not promptly respond to the rise in expectation of a more decisive environmental
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policy (Papadakis 1993: 190). During its early period in office, the Hawke 
government, as represented by its Minister for the Environment, Barry Cohen, was 
reluctant to take decisive action on new environmental issues.
The Hawke government’s decision to allow uranium mining at Roxby Down in 
1984 was a good example wherein the government played a game to balance the need 
between economic and environmental imperatives. The decision to allow uranium 
mining in 1984 was forced by three factors: the opposition from the South Australia 
Labor Premier, John Bannon - who was facing an electoral disaster if the federal 
government intervened; recognition of the economic benefits of mining (creation of 
employment etc.); and compensation for the pro-mining (and also industrialist and 
business) interests who might have been disillusioned by Federal intervention in the 
Franklin Dam case. The latter was important for the government to remove any 
negative image of itself as an interventionist federal government resulting from its 
decision on the Franklin Dam case. A more positive image was important if the Party 
were to attract middle class political constituents.
But the government had to pay an high price for this decision. The decision to 
allow uranium mining led to the establishment of the Nuclear Disarmament Party 
(NDP). This demanded the closing of all foreign military bases, the prohibition of the 
stationing in or the passage through Australia of any nuclear weapons and the 
cessation of mining and export of uranium (Papadakis 1993: 181). The 1984 election 
saw a massive protest vote to NDP, though it failed to win a seat.
The issue of uranium mining had made the Hawke government more aware of its 
vulnerability to the issues taken up by new political movements (Papadakis 1990a: 
344). Labor drew an important lesson from this conflict: the outstanding feature of the 
environment as a political issue was its capacity to cut across existing party 
allegiances. (Kelly 1992: 524). Its influence derived from several factors, the most 
crucial being the environmental movements’ ability to mobilise opinion and 
specifically electoral support through their direction of preferences (Gruen and Grattan 
1993: 64). Since the proportion of votes for the major parties was relatively balanced,
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a small number of swinging votes would be significant in winning or losing for the 
major parties. In a preferential system of voting, neither of the major parties could 
afford any possibility of a proportion of the preferences of the minor parties’ vote 
going to other side.
This Hawke government’s awareness of the significance of environmental politics 
was manifested in the conflict over wood chipping in Tasmania (in the Lemonthyme 
and Southern forests). In this conflict the Hawke government again faced a difficult 
problem. For the first time, an environmental issue divided the Cabinet of the Hawke 
government. The government was forced, therefore, to balance these conflicting 
demands. The problem was very difficult, since the logging industry and the 
Tasmanian government were supported by the ACTU. The Tasmanian government 
and the logging industry reminded the Federal government not to seek a decision in 
favour of environmentalists because such a decision would undermine the employment 
prospects of one in seven Tasmanian workers in the forests industry (Papadakis 1993: 
194).
The government accepted this argument and opted for an increase in woodchip 
exports, with some provisions for greater accountability and review of practices 
(Papadakis 1993: 194). However, later on, the government changed its position. 
Learning from the Dam case and uranium mining, the Hawke government knew the 
potential electoral impact if the government did not intervene. Such passivity would be 
interpreted as a favouring the logging industry. It put the case before the High Court, 
which finally it won.
While in the case of the Lemonthyme and Southern Forests of Tasmania, the 
Hawke government used the argument of economic imperatives; in the case of the 
Daintree Rainforests in Queensland, it used another argument: the federal system. For 
example, the Hawke government had previously refused to intervene in this case, 
fearing that such an action would provoke a confrontation over States’ rights, which in 
turn, would have a negative electoral impact. Instead, Labor argued that it would only 
act with the cooperation of the Queensland government (Papadakis 1993: 192).
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Although the pressure mounted, the Hawke government was unwilling to provoke a 
confrontation over state rights, particularly in the period leading up to the 1984 federal 
election (Papadakis 1990a: 347).
But such a stance was, in fact, just an tactic to ensure Labor was not seen as an 
interventionist government by simply applying its external power as it did in the 
Franklin Dam case. Labor was aware that it could not act promptly in every case 
without an assurance that such an action would not override its electoral imperatives. 
To secure such an intervention the government needed a justification. However, the 
Hawke government was also aware that it could lose electoral support by taking an 
ambivalent stance. It became surer of the need to take action given its support from 
conservationists.
Following the Australian Heritage Commission’s confirmation in 1984 that the 
rainforests could be listed on the World Heritage, mounting public support for federal 
intervention and a breakdown in negotiations with the Queensland government - as 
well as the withdrawal of Bjelke-Peterson from the election campaign in 1987 - meant 
that the Hawke government was forced to nominate the Daintree Rainforests for World 
Heritage listing (Papadakis 1993: 192). Once again the Hawke government used its 
external affairs power, and exploited the case as an election issue. There was a feeling 
that it might lose a High Court case against the Queensland government. However, the 
electoral considerations, particularly in the marginal electorate of Leichhardt, forced 
the government to overcome its prevarication (Papadakis 1990a: 347). As a result, in 
the election of 1987, the ACF and TWS decided to support Labor for the House of 
Representatives. However, they supported the Democrats in the election for Senate, 
on the grounds that a Democrat-controlled Senate was essential (Time, June 22, 
1987). The Liberals, in contrast, were trapped once more. Hawke would save the 
forests, and the Liberals couldn't save them.
To minimise the disillusionment of those who were against federal government 
intervention, the Hawke government, as in the Franklin Dam case, again compensated 
and retrained displaced workers with a package worth up to $ 75.3 million. But unlike
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the conflict over Franklin Dam, in this case the package was not given to the state 
government, but to the timber industry, business, workers and local councils directly 
(Papadakis 1990a: 348).
4.1.4. Green Strategy in Progress
After the 1987 election, the Hawke government was put under even greater 
pressure to adopt new strategies for dealing with the conflicts between development 
and the environment (Papadakis 1993: 195). The replacement of Cohen by Richardson 
after the 1987 election, followed by the upgrading of the environment portfolio to 
Cabinet status, revealed the Hawke government’s intention to attract/accommodate 
conservationists. All of these initiatives indicated the government’s attempt to regain 
control of the environmental policy agenda, which was being influenced by new 
coalitions dedicated to preventing developments like mining in Kakadu Park and 
exploitation of Queensland Rainforests (Papadakis 1993: 190). Richardson increased 
the pressure on Hawke, who was already sympathetic to the green cause. Richardson 
himself did not hesitate to express his intention to attract green votes. In his view this 
strategy was a necessity and "would become for Labor the difference between winning 
and losing the next election" (cited in Kelly 1992: 525).
Under Richardson, there were two main approaches that the Hawke government 
developed in keeping solid relations with the environmentalists. These approaches - 
known as Labor’s “green strategy” - indicated the government’s attempt to balance its 
commitment to the environment and to economic development (Warhurst 1990a: 4). 
They were integrated with Labor’s 1990 re-election. First, the government needed to 
persuade environmentalists that it was genuinely committed to their cause (Papadakis 
1993: 190). For this reason Richardson set as his priority to tie Australia's most 
influential green politicians and organisers - such as Bob Brown, Peter Garratt, and 
Philip Toyne - into an informal network which became, in effect, a Labor-green 
alliance (Kelly 1992: 527). This attempt of Richardson’s was a success as he won the 
confidence of these influential green politicians. Richardson was seen by the green
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politicians as genuine about their cause and bringing the clout of a political 
heavyweight to their interests (Kelly 1992: 527).
Secondly, in seeking to balance economic and environment imperatives 
(Papadakis 1993: 190), Richardson, who was backed up by Hawke, was forced to 
face four economic ministers, Kerin, Walsh, Button, Willis, Dawkin and foreign 
minister Evans who formed the nucleus of the anti-Richardson Cabinet camp. These 
four ministers disagreed with Richardson, claiming that such actions were too pro­
green. According to them such actions would damage Labor's economic credentials, 
and, in turn, could disillusion the whole electorate (Kelly 1992: 530). But Richardson 
believed that such an pro-green action was correct for winning the green votes. After 
all, he, as well as Hawke and Keating, were sure that the government could attain its 
objectives: to retain economic credibility and also to win the green vote without, at the 
same time, each vitiating the other (Kelly 1992: 530). Hawke himself was well aware 
that by demonstrating sensitivity on this issue his government would be adopting a 
populist and visionary approach simultaneously (McMullin 1991: 426). The fact that 
the Liberals responded inadequately to widespread concern about the environment 
provided the Hawke government with an issue whereby it could distinguish itself 
sharply and advantageously from its main opponents.
4.1.5. The Final Test: The 1990 Election
The final "test" for this Hawke government system came in the dispute over 
Coronation Hill in Kakadu National Park prior to the 1990 election. This dispute 
derived from the government’s sudden decision to allow the mining of gold and 
platinum in 1987 (while excepting uranium), and a radical change in 1989 when it 
delayed approval for the Coronation Hill mine (in stage III of the Kakadu National 
Park). The decision by the Minister for the Environment, Richardson, to extend the 
Park and thus lock away the bulk of the exploration zone in this Park divided the 
Cabinet once again.
This case was “the biggest environmental decision by the Hawke government in
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its third term, the most overtly political and most bitterly contested” (Kelly 1992: 536). 
Labor’s fragile electoral position and its internal tensions came together in this case. 
The reaction came from two sides: mining industries (BHP) and the government’s 
own economic ministers, Walsh and Kerin. BHP complained that the government’s 
decision was totally unacceptable, given the time and money it had put into the project. 
More than $ 10 million had been spent on it (cited from Kelly 1992: 537). BHP and 
the economic ministers argued that such a move would threaten the inflow of overseas 
funds (investment) need for funding Australian external deficits (Kelly 1992: 537). 
Further, the economic ministers also reminded the government that it should honour 
its promises. The ALP Northern Territory Senator Bob Collins, accused Richardson 
of not considering the mine on its merits. Collins saw the government as a hostage to 
the environmental movement, not an ally of it anymore (cited from Kelly 1992: 537- 
38).
However, these internal tension were secondary to the polling lead which Labor 
had established over the Coalition on the environment (Kelly 1992: 525). The Hawke 
government was aware that public opinion had shifted significantly since 1986, and 
believed, therefore, the Cabinet should change its policy as well (Kelly 1992: 537). 
By the middle of 1989 the environment had, like the economy, became firmly 
established as a key electoral issue. A national poll conducted by Irving Saulwick and 
Associates at the end of May saw the environment along with the economy and social 
welfare as ‘the most important’ issue for the electorate (Age, 7 June 1989). Therefore, 
it believed that any decision to mine in Kakadu would threaten the very image that had 
been created- Labor as the environment protection party. It would threaten the 
significant product differentiation Labor had secured over the Liberals as the best party 
(after the Democrats) on the environment. Labor felt it had to reinforce, not weaken, 
this perception unless it wanted to lose the election. Kim Beazley, for example, 
supported this government decision, arguing:
We are watching a sea change in politics here and overseas. It’s a reversal of
what happened in the 1950s and 1960s when the DLP and the Conservatives
formed an electoral alliance which consigned Labor to a minority position...
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Now there is a real chance of a long-term alliance between the social democratic 
parties and green parties both in Australia and abroad...the greens can marginalise 
the conservatives in the 1990s the same way the DLP marginalised the Labor 
Party for so long (cited in Kelly 1992: 538).
The Hawke government’s awareness of the importance of green vote was 
reinforced by the result of Tasmanian election in May 1989 (Bergin 1991: 234). In this 
election, the Liberals obtained 17 and Labor 13 seats (Howard and Smith 1990: 204), 
and the green independents - who largely campaigned on environmental issues - won 
5 seats (the highest number of seats it ever gained in Tasmania) to hold the balance of 
power in Tasmania. A minority Labor government eventually took office, with the 
support of the Greens. This incredible achievement by the Greens justified the 
significance of the green vote for the Hawke government. The Hawke government had 
judged the way the political wind was blowing, and calculated correctly that there were 
political benefits in adopting a strong environmental stand (McAllister and Bean 1990: 
172).
4.1.6. Struggle for Second Preferences
Besides the lesson from the 1989 Tasmanian election result, the Hawke 
government also learned a lot from the falling primary vote the major parties suffered 
in m id-1987; this trend shaped the politics of 1990 and the nature of the election. 
Polling only 34.7 per cent of the primary vote in the 1987 election, the lowest since 
1960, reinforced the government’s belief that its federal primary vote was likely to be 
about 40 per cent, not enough to win office unsupported. Therefore, Labor had to 
base its hopes of winning office on securing green preferences.
The Hawke government recognised the tendency for disillusioned Labor voters to 
prefer to vote for the Democrats, Greens and independents and minor parties rather 
than the Liberals. The fact that the Liberals could not increase their primary vote, 
despite defections from Labor, revealed the public’s lack of confidence in the Liberals 
as an alternative government. The larger than usual support for minor parties and 
independents, as predicted in all public opinion polls conducted prior to the election,
106
meant that minor parties' preferences would determine the result. Therefore, the Labor 
Party had to seek out the second preferences of these voters. The Hawke government 
saw that a superior environmental performance over the Liberals was necessary to 
maximise the flow of these preferences to it and so to winning the election (Kelly 
1992: 525-26). In this context, Hawke himself believed that a pro-environmentalist 
decision was necessary to validate Labor’s preference strategy.
The Hawke government pursued the Green vote single-mindedly both indirectly - 
by interacting with leadership of the ACF and TWS - and by appealing directly to 
Green voters. "It left no stone unturned" (Warhurst 1990b: 30) in its appeals for the 
support of environmentalists. Also the Hawke government did not hesitate to exploit 
the constraints on minor parties imposed by electoral system. For example, Hawke 
repeatedly stressed that the minor parties such as the greens and the Democrats 
represented minority viewpoints and they could not actually form a government. 
Hawke reminded voters that they only had one real choice: Labor or Liberals (cited 
from Papadakis 1990b: 40). In his address to the National Press Club, he pleaded for 
second preferences overtly:
I want to say to those who intend to vote for third party and independent 
candidates that they should consider with the greatest care where they direct 
their second preferences. This is a vital election and it is - 1 make no bones 
about it - a tight elecdon.
And so I say specifically to them - if you do not want Medicare gutted, the 
capital gains tax scrapped, more uranium mining, a uranium enrichment 
industry in Australia, up-front tuition fees, mining in Kakadu, then your 
preferences between the two major parties must be Labor. That is the simple 
imperative (cited in Australian, March, 11, 1990 ).
A Labor advertisement said: “If you care about the environment, if you care about the
future of Australia, your preference choice must be Labor. Put the Liberals and
Nationals last” (cited from Lloyd 1990: 103). Some commentators saw it as the most
important ad of the 1990 election campaign (Warhurst 1990b: 103).
Furthermore, in his policy speech, Hawke repeatedly reminded the voters that his
government had acted as environmental protectors - pointing to the Franklin Dam, the
Tasmanian forests, the Great Barrier Reef and Kakadu, as well as its commitment to
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prevent mining in Antarctica and driftnet fishing in the South Pacific, and to help in 
tackling the greenhouse and ozone layer problems. Hawke acknowledged that his 
government “unequivocally accepts that responsibility ...to pass on intact to future 
generations Australia’s priceless environment” (Australian Labor Party, 1990: 6). The 
Hawke government also offered packages for funding environmental activities. For 
example, through its Minister for Employment, Education and Training, John 
Dawkins, it offered a $ 400,000 national environment education package (Warhurst 
1990b: 31).
The Liberals, in contrast, did not believe in the so-called conservationists’ vote. 
Howard argued that “they were irrelevant to the Liberal electoral chances” (cited in 
Time, June 22, 1987). The then National Party leader, Charles Blunt, made an even 
stronger statement: “We will not use the Commonwealth’s external affairs power to 
override State sovereignty in this or any other regard”. He promised that the three- 
mines uranium policy would go, the Coronation Hill project would go ahead, and the 
timber and pulp industries would have an assured future (cited in Warhurst 1990b: 
21). It seemed that the Liberals’ pro-business ethos posed a problem for the 
Opposition when expressing its environmental stance and justifying it. This, in turn, 
forced the greens to draw the irresistible conclusion that the Opposition was offering 
them much less than was Labor (Kelly 1992: 528).
Hawke and Richardson’s calculations proved correct. From a traditional 
perspective the Hawke government should not have won the 1990 election. When the 
election was held, economic conditions were bad, particularly in the form of high 
interest rates which have a significant impact on voters with home loans or indeed any 
from of borrowed money (McAllister and Bean 1990: 155). Hip Pocket Nerve 
Theories would have suggested a large swing away from Labor, as a punishment for 
falling living standards of majority of Australians caused by high interest rates 
(Clarke, Stewart and Zuk, 1989; Lewis-Beck, in McAllister and Bean 1990: 155).
But such a traditional view proved not to be the case in the 1990 election. The 
ALP-greens alliance, crafted by Richardson, functioned perfectly for the 1990
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election. In early 1990, the ACF and Wilderness Society decided to campaign against 
the Coalition {Sydney Morning Herald, 1 March 1990). They recommended a vote in 
the House of Representatives for the Australian Democrats, green candidates and 
selected minor parties, and that preferences be given to the ALP. The Director of ACF, 
Phillip Toyne, commented: “They (the Liberals) have alienated every environmentalist 
in the country. Therefore, it would be a disaster if the Liberals were elected” (cited 
from Time, June 22, 1987).The result was that the Liberals were deserted (Kelly 
1992: 543). The Coronation Hill decision tied the greens to Labor at the election.
The significance of the green vote for this Labor victory could be explained by the 
Australian Election Study’s (AES) research data. According to the AES, 54 per cent of 
voters identified with the Labor position on the environment compared with 16 per 
cent with the position of the Liberals. Eighty five per cent of the Democrats supporters 
ranked the environment as an extremely important issue. The corresponding figures 
were similar for Labor supporters (65 per cent) but radically different for supporters of 
Liberals at only 37 percent (Papadakis 1990b: 42). Malcolm Mackerras (1990: 199) 
found that the distribution of Democrat preferences was nearly two to one in favour of 
Labor.
From these explanations, it is clear that the Hawke government stole a march on 
the Opposition on the politics of the environment. The Hawke government responded 
better to the rising tide of opinion by developing stronger environmental policies 
(Kelly 1992: 525). On most of the major issues facing the country it had taken (or has 
been seen to take) a relatively pro-environment stance, when compared with its major 
opponent. The Hawke government, in contrast to the Liberals, after seeing the support 
it got from conservationists in the run-up to both the 1983 and 1984 elections, then 
fought hard over the next few years to retain this support. Unlike the Liberals, the 
Hawke government was able to marshal its tradition of control, power and 
intervention in favour of the contemporary issues of environmental protection. It was 
willing to use the full ambit of Commonwealth powers to protect the environment and 
if necessary to override the States’ rights.
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It would, however, be mistaken to characterise the Hawke government as 
unambiguously pro-environmentalist. The decision to list the Daintree Forests, for 
instance, could also partly be seen as an compensation for the government’s decision 
in allowing uranium mining at Roxby Downs, South Australia, and its unfavourable 
decision over forest logging in Eden, New South Wales (Papadakis 1993: 194). 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Hawke government was able to build 
successful bridges of support to the environmental lobby, notably the ACF and 
Wilderness Society, which by 1989 were among the most powerful interest groups in 
Australia (Kelly 1992: 525 and 543). Thus, conservation of the environment was the 
major positive issue for the Hawke government (Warhurst 1990a: 4). As Kelly (1992: 
525) argued, "the more the environment hardened as an election issue the more Labor 
was the political beneficiary". It successfully brought home to the federal government 
the way in which environmental issues could translate into votes in any national 
election.
The Opposition, in contrast, “fell victim to its state rights philosophy at time when 
public opinion was behind the use of Commonwealth powers to protect the 
environment. It found its own environmental policy was a prisoner of history” (Kelly 
1992: 528). The Opposition could not reconcile its environmental concern with its 
refusal to use the properly tested powers of the Commonwealth. “The Opposition fell 
into a double trap: constitutional defence of the states and an irresolute stance on the 
environment” (Kelly 1992: 528).
4.2.1. Managing the Media
According to Chadwick (1989: viii), information today is the means to power; so 
that those who control the sources of information control the sources of power as well 
as its exercise. Since the mass media exert a considerable influence on public opinion, 
they have strategic political importance. At the very least, the media have the power to 
set the public agenda: to focus public attention on a limited set of events and policy 
issues, with the result that some but not other issues will be publicly debated (Stewart
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and Ward 1992: 191). Although not all policy matters will be debated in the media, 
newspapers, radio and especially television have become important sites of political 
conflict - not independent watchers but part of the political process (Stewart and Ward 
1992: 190). Therefore, it is not surprising that political leaders, governments, the 
major parties, and many other interest groups have been developing quite sophisticated 
public relations strategies in order to secure access to the news media.
The perceived importance of the mass media, and of television in particular, in 
shaping public opinion and hence the policy agenda, has required major parties and 
governments to develop strategies for winning favourable news coverage. The Hawke 
Labor government was no exception. With its claim to office resting on its claims to 
managerial competence, there was an obvious need for the Hawke government to 
convince the electorate that it was indeed competent and responsive to community 
concerns. This perception could be attained through the media. Therefore, the battle to 
influence news coverage was a central element in its success (Parker 1990: 47).
Historically, the Australian media can be said to be anti-Labor. According to Gray 
(1994), until 1980 there was consistent anti-Labor bias from journalists and media 
proprietors, both print and electronic. At least this was believed to be true until the 
election of the Hawke government in 1983. The media were key villains in a bitter 
folklore of defeat. Proprietors and their editors crusaded against Labor, allying with 
conservatives to bring Scullin, Lang, Chifley and Whitlam down (Davis 1990: 356).
One of the most important lessons the Hawke government drew from the Whitlam 
era was that a government could not hope to be elected, or remain in office, if opposed 
by the media. Whitlam’s experience taught the Hawke government that the media was 
one of the most powerful forces in Australia politics and that it could determine who 
governed Australia. The Hawke government understood that the news-making process 
was the essential element in creating public perceptions. It knew well the link between 
political and media strategy, and the importance of the media in creating a positive 
public perception. Therefore, the Hawke government from the beginning paid special 
attention to media management. As a result, virtually everything undertaken by the
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Hawke government was structured with the media in mind. This included the use of 
personal relationships with journalists, recruitment of journalists as personal advisers 
or office staff, material distribution, leaking, opinion polls and exploitation of 
Hawke’s personal popularity.
4.2.2. Recruitment and Personal Relationships
Learning from the Whitlam experiences, from 1980 on Labor attempted to 
increase its expertise in managing the media (Gray 1994). In this, the Hawke 
government drew some important lessons from the communication methods developed 
by Neville Wran of New South Wales, who had a proven record of success. It was 
the Wran government which spelled the end of the traditional ALP. Wran emphasised 
political pragmatism, sound economic management and party unity and victory (Parker 
1990: 42). The Wran government successfully controlled government - media 
relations, and made extensive use of opinion polling to establish the level of 
community support for the party and for particular initiatives. The Hawke 
government’s initiative in applying Wran’s model was symbolised by the appointment 
of Wran’s chief media adviser, Peter Barron, to Hawke’s office staff in 1983.
Hawke had a special interest in appointing this media professional to his 
ministerial staff. He was aware of the advantages of having staff members with first­
hand knowledge of media processes. To use Grattan’s words, they were needed as 
"news gatekeepers" (1984: 6). By recruiting former journalists, the government hoped 
that its staff would have social and informal connections with current official 
journalists (Gray 1994). As former journalists, they would be expected to know the 
way the gallery worked as well as individual journalists’ characters. All of this, in 
turn, would render easier the government’s attempts to create a link to the news room 
and control the public agenda, or at least, keep the ministry sensitive to likely press 
concerns and reactions.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the Hawke government appointed numerous 
journalists, and former media executives, as ministerial advisers, press officers,
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speechwritters, agency directors, party officials and public servants (Davis 1990: 
359). According to Parker (1990: 31), by the time of the 1990 election, most major 
bureaux (except the Age) had at least one member who had been professionally 
associated with the Hawke government or the ALP in Opposition. For example, Alan 
Ramsay of the Sydney Morning Herald had worked for Bill Hayden when he was 
Opposition leader. David Solomon of Australian had worked for Whitlam. Some 
journalists were even hired as ministerial staff. Paul Ellercamp {Bulletin) and Anne 
Summers even went to Hawke’s private office. It was reported that one in five Gallery 
members had worked on the Hawke government's ministerial staffs (Stewart and 
Ward 1992: 197). By contrast, during the Hawke era (up to the 1990 election) no 
press gallery journalists had worked for conservative parties (Parker 1990: 31).
This does not mean that any journalist who has worked on a minister’s staff will 
be a simple mouthpiece for one or another party. However, it unlikely that a minister 
will employ an individual who does not share their basic political philosophy, and 
unlikely that anyone will work for a government or party whose goals and methods 
they oppose (Parker 1990: 32). And that those values, reinforced while on a ministers’ 
staff, are then carried away back into mainstream journalism.
Another strategy to manage the media developed by Hawke government was via 
personal relationships with journalists. According to Gray (1994), this strategy was 
central for the Hawke government. A good personal relationship with journalists was 
perceived by Labor politicians as the best possible way to manage the story written by 
them. The strategy of working with journalists was seen as very useful for 
understanding the way that journalists work and the individual characters of journalists 
as well as for learning about and creating the possibility for two ways access (from 
government to journalists and vice versa). Activities included talking to journalists 
concerning the information they needed and presenting facts, data and information to 
them. The major target was the parliamentary press gallery. This was because of the 
potential for influencing public opinion of the Gallery which has a membership of 
some 160 television, radio and print journalists. Their task was to report federal
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politics, and they provided the great bulk of the news, current affairs and commentary 
which the mass media devote to this subject (Steward and Ward 1992: 196).
While the relationship with the journalists was a useful link to the newsroom, the 
Hawke government also emphasised the importance of informal relationships with 
media proprietors. For instance, Hawke had a close personal relationship with both 
Kerry Packer and Rupert Murdoch. Hawke supported Kerry Packer during the 
controversy surrounding the Costigan Royal Commission. Hawke also gave an Order 
of Australia award to Rupert Murdoch (Davis 1990: 359) and had a close relationships 
with Alan Bond who for a time owned channel 9. The decision of the Hawke 
government to replace the two-station rule with a 75 per cent audience reach limit and 
the establishment of cross-ownership controls was viewed by some observers as a 
deliberate decision to give benefits to the two major media groups of Packer and 
Murdoch. The decision was made, partly, as a device to fit Labor political objectives: 
to hasten the break up two hated institutions, the HWT and Fairfax, which were 
viewed by Labor as its enemies (Chawick 1989: 14-25).
As a result, there were many able and professional journalists in the Gallery, but 
there were not many Liberal or National supporters (Henderson 1987: 3). Most of the 
senior and influential Gallery members were predominantly ALP supporters. 
According to Hywood (1987), at least 80 per cent of the Gallery members voted for 
the Labor Party. These included the most influential journalists - such as Laurie 
Oakes, Michelle Grattan, Paul Kelly and Greg Hywood and Max Walsh (cited in 
Henderson 1987: 6). This may also explain why some journalists were reluctant to 
make strong criticisms of the government. They were too close to their subjects to 
provide truly independent political reporting. It was definitely not the case that the 
Press Gallery supported the Hawke government every day and on every issue, but, as 
Parker (1990: 33) cynically insisted, on balance and over time, a clear preference 
existed.
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4.2.3. Material Distribution
During the first term, the Hawke government’s direct communication with the 
media was largely designed to bolster its own image and communicate its message. To 
attain this aim it announced the abolition of the so-called doorstop interview as soon as 
it was elected. To replace it, the Hawke government established a Prime Minister's 
Press Office and a system of press conferences. The aim of this change was clear: the 
government wanted to avoid or minimise the possibility of the "gaffe". With the 
doorstop interview journalists could ask about anything. This made it more possible 
for gaffes to happen. Under the system of press conferences only questions on 
subjects nominated by the government could be asked. Therefore, the possibility of 
gaffes was reduced (Parker 1990: 52). This was evident when Hawke kept his word 
and provided regular Press conferences; he determined the time of these and, as they 
were often about set events and statements, he started with the advantage (Grattan 
1984: 6). Away from the conferences, if reporters tried to "doorstop" him, Hawke 
simply said: “You know the rule” (cited in Grattan 1984: 6). This move was initially 
welcomed by the print media who had often criticised Fraser for having door stop 
interviews but refusing to have full Press conferences (Grattan 1984: 6). However, 
later on they were aware that the new system could not fulfil their needs. As a result of 
the media complaints doorstop interviews were resurrected in the second term.
From the second term on, the Hawke government’s media strategy took on 
another dimension: that of turning the Liberals into the subject of media scrutiny and 
criticism while at the same time attempting to trumpet Labor’s own image. Like all 
governments before it, the Hawke government used the nature of the Gallery to suit its 
political benefits. The Hawke government understood well the nature of dynamic 
internal competition among journalists. As political journalists they need political 
information, preferably something unique, significant, and newsworthy which used to 
be called "news imperatives" (Parker 1990: 12). Journalists need more and more 
material to publish every day. According to Gray (1994), Australia’s journalists need 
to produce at least 6,800,000 words a day. This results in intense competition between
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journalists within the Press Gallery. As a result, they tended to behave and think 
pragmatically: "as soon as possible and as easy as possible". According to Summers, 
they all had the rat pack mentality: “Each constantly seeking to ‘scoop’ the others. 
They all love the ego rewards, the thrill of seeing one’s report splashed all over the 
front page and knowing it is the object of buried conversation amongst one’s peers” 
(Summers 1981: 160). The Hawke government - in pursuing its political objectives - 
manipulated this competitive nature of the Gallery by supplying current and interesting 
data and information to the journalists to feed their demands for news: a wealth of 
factual information combined with colourful personal elements.
In this context, the Hawke government brilliantly used its own media unit, the 
National Media Liaison Service (NMLS). This was particularly evident after the 
replacement of Gary Scully by Colin Parkes in May 1986. Parkes, who had informal 
links with Hawke and who had formerly acted as head of the Prime Minister’s Press 
Office, transformed the NMLS into an effective partisan offensive weapon. Under 
Parkes, although ministerial responsibility for NMLS changed a number of times, the 
Hawke government ensured that in practice, and particularly after 1986, it mainly 
answered to the Prime Minister. This step was important in shaping the activities of 
the NMLS to the direction of the government’s media strategy. Unlike the Fraser 
government, which could not use its similar media unit - Government Information 
Office (GIO) - effectively, the Hawke government was able to used NMLS 
effectively.
There were three objectives in the Hawke government to control the supply of 
information to journalists. First, this strategy was aimed at discrediting the 
Opposition. In this context, the main task of NMLS became the monitoring of 
members of the Opposition. Data and information which the government supplied 
effectively became a weapon in the government’s campaign against the Opposition. It 
fed the Press Gallery with extensive materials purporting to show errors or 
contradictions in Opposition statements (Parker 1990: 59), including details of gaffes 
by Opposition shadow ministers whose media coverage was carefully monitored in the
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search for partisan advantage (Stewart and Ward 1992: 196). This was a useful tool in 
the tactical media war. By quietly but skilfully and consistently transcribing and 
circulating any comment by the Liberal figures, the government hoped to add fuel the 
to Press Gallery’s fire (Parker 1990: 90). This strategy, as a result, effectively turned 
the Opposition into the subject of debate and, at the same time, improved the relative 
position of the government without distracting from the strategy of equating party and 
government with nation (Parker 1990: 57).
The example of a partisan NMLS can be seen during the week-long mini 
campaign in 1989. In this time the government used the NMLS as a device to show 
and exploit contradictions between Opposition figures’ statements. During that time, 
the NMLS fed (on a selective basis) anti-Opposition radio and other media interview 
transcripts to the Gallery. Only limited and selective transcripts from ALP figures was 
similarly supplied by the NMLS. During this time, the NMLS was solely concerned to 
exploit Opposition matters (Parker 1990: 60). This transformation of NMLS's 
function to a overtly partisan role has inspired some critics to call the NMLS 
“aNiMalS”. Tiffen described the Hawke government’s use of the NMLS as “a tax­
payer funded’ hit-squad” scanning and targeting Opposition statements for 
government attack (Tiffen 1989: 130).
Second, this method was also used for extolling Labor’s image as a successful 
government. This was made by extensively supplying stories, voice tapes and 
briefings about ministerial activity to newspaper and electronic media (Davis 1990: 
359). These materials included discussion papers, reports on policy implementation, 
and even a good deal of information about Cabinet decisions, annual budgets etc. 
According to some commentators, the material supplied by the Hawke government to 
the press heavily outweighed that supplied by the Fraser government. Certainly, all of 
it favoured the government’s point of view.
Finally, the Hawke government used this method to institutionalise its relations 
with journalists. Since they were working to deadlines, and with limited time to check 
facts in a highly competitive atmosphere, journalists, like it or not, were forced to use
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the material the government provided (Stewart and Ward 1992: 193). Although they 
knew that such material was packaged to reach the public in the way the government 
wanted it interpreted, few journalist refrained from using these materials. As Parker 
insisted “No one was willing to, or could professionally afford, to miss an important 
story simply because it had been packaged to enhance the government position” (1990: 
53). The nature of their work reinforced the fact that journalists came to depend upon 
the sources or material the government provided.
Some journalists were aware that they had been manipulated by the Hawke 
government. However, in the vast majority of cases they were willing to acquiesce or 
even actively participate in the process, because the reward they received was a wealth 
of readily useable material with which to satisfy the news imperative. Further, they 
received the status and prestige which comes with being an “insider” (Parker 1990: 
62).
Moreover, journalists were aware that any confrontational attitude toward the 
government could have resulted in another more effective punishment, and one often 
used, namely simply depriving journalists of important information. Keating, for 
instance, even acknowledged that he would withhold information from journalists in 
retaliation for criticism. He said that he had marked certain journalists whom he felt 
had dealt unfairly with the government (Henderson 1987: 6). This method proved to 
be a powerful device given the competitive pressures which motivated media and 
journalists. Alternatively, co-operation with the government’s strategy would be 
rewarded with special items of information (Parker 1990: 55). As a result, the 
journalists became even more dependent on the government. This was why Stewart 
and Ward (1992: 197) suggested that during the period of the Hawke government it 
seemed that the Press Gallery had allowed itself to be dominated by the government's 
"media machine".
It was clear that since they were operating in a closed and particularly competitive 
environment, journalists were not especially well placed to resist attempts to 
manipulate them (Stewart and Ward 1992: 198). This situation was reinforced by the
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fact that Hawke did not hesitate to use the "stick", either by undertaking legal action 
against journalists or publications he disliked or by forcing the journalists to resign 
through his lobbying power (Parker 1990: 53). One example where the Hawke 
government used its stick was in the case of Jacqueline Rees who wrote an article 
about Combe-Ivanov affair in the Bulletin. Hawke complained about his dislike of this 
journalist to the magazine’s editor, Trevor Kennedy, who had been his close friend for 
along time. As result, Rees eventually resigned.
4.2.4. The Use of Leaks
Summers (1981: 161) distinguishes leaks from background briefings. Leaks are 
unauthorised material, while background briefings are authorised. But the substance 
of both are the same. Tiffen (1989: 111) categorised them all as covert manoeuvres. 
What kind of leaks and when they were used, would depend on the situation. For 
example, when the briefing was seen as inappropriate, then the leak was used.
Leaks - because of their nature as involving secrecy or confidentiality, 
controversy and sometimes dramatics - were important because they attracted the 
attention of journalists as well as the public. This was because every journalist liked to 
have exclusive information and every Minister wanted to be able to provide 
background information to newspapers. For some Ministers, leaks were important 
both for their personal publicity and political insurance purposes: they buy immunity 
from press criticism by making themselves indispensable sources (to major political 
correspondents) of information about what is happening in Cabinet (Summers 1981: 
165).
The Hawke government, like its predecessor, was very keen on using the ‘leak’ 
as a device of its media and political strategy. Generally, they were used to have a 
policy stopped, or implemented, or to favour or to denigrate a rival. A leak could be 
used as a strategy to "float a trial balloon" (Tiffen 1989: 105). The aim then was to 
gauge public response to the government’s specific policy without publicly embracing 
a proposal, so that it was easy to retreat if the reaction were adverse. For example, a
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leak to The National Times about the tentative moves by Prime Minister Bob Hawke to 
re-open consideration of mining uranium in some areas in the Kakadu National Park 
(Tiffen 1989: 107). The leak was seen as an effort by the Prime Minister to overturn 
established policy. But before doing so he wanted to ensure that such an action would 
be supported by the public. So he leaked his plan to the media. Furthermore, this leak 
was also used to break an internal deadlock. It was used for resolving the battle over 
priorities in policy formulation/decision in Cabinet (Tiffen 1989: 105).
Leaks could be also used to highlight the urgency of a problem. In this way, leaks 
were used by the Hawke government to make the public aware of a specific problem 
that the government would like to solve. Thus a leak was used to bring conflicts to a 
head via external attention. By making previously unknown data public it was hoped 
to force remedial action by the government supported by public. A spectacular 
example was the leak by Paul Keating which became known as "Banana Republic” 
comment in 1986. This was a leak made by Keating to make the public aware (as well 
as a signal to Hawke) that the government had to do something about developing 
current account problems in the Australian economy. This effort was successful since 
there was strong support from the public as well as criticism of Paul Keating’s idea. 
Similarly, in April 1986 there was a leak of internal company data from Ciba-Geigy 
about the dangers of several chemicals then in use. This resulted in an immediate 
response from Health Minister Blewett, including proposals for uniform national 
pesticide laws (see Sydney Morning Herald 11, 12, 14, 18-4-1986). Finally, although 
rarely, leaks were also used to prevent something being done. This was evident in the 
case of Telecom’s effort to introduce timed local calls in early 1988. This move was 
effectively thwarted by early leaks portraying the negative effects of the policy on the 
government’s image during an important by-election.
Whether such aims were achieved or not, the use of leaks by the Hawke 
government resulted in mutual benefits. Through the leaks the government could gain 
access to journalists and journalist could gain access to the government. For the 
Hawke government, the supply of leaks was important as means of enhancing its
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relationship with the media. By giving journalists access to leaks, the government 
hoped to build debts and special relationships with individual journalists.
For journalists, conversely, successful publication of a leak, especially if 
dramatic, was taken as proof that he/she was doing a good job and had strong inside 
knowledge, and was the most obvious way for news organisations to score 
competitive scoops. Given the competitive and time-limited climate of the mass media, 
leaks became particularly attractive because journalists thought that this was not only 
the way in which they could discover what was really going on, but also they could 
get special material as well finding it easier to obtain than from the usual way they 
worked (Summers 1981: 162-63). Even this was often the only way in which the 
journalists would get any kind of story, and their only protection became to write the 
story in such a way (Summer 1981: 161). This, in turn, would offer opportunities for 
journalists to receive patronage. This was what happened to Greg Hywood and Geoff 
Kitney of The Australian Financial Review. Both journalists were alleged to be the 
ones receiving the most leaks from government, which resulted in a patron-client 
relationships between them. Thus a final motivation for leaks then could be, not the 
achievement of any specific effect through publication, but building debts and 
relationships with individual journalists (Wellerand Grattan 1981: 160). Through this, 
in turn, the government hoped that those journalists would favour government.
4.2.5. Polling Tactics
The use of public opinion polls as a tool for policy directions is a common 
practice in Australia. Almost all government do this strategy. The argument was that, 
if a number of polls are put together in a series, shifts in opinion can be discerned and, 
more importantly, the direction of future movements can be predicted (Parker 1990: 
97). Parker (1990: 98) portrayed the Hawke government as the most poll-driven 
government in Australia’s history. It extensively used the opinion poll technique to 
establish the position of the entire community on a given issue. In Mills’ words, 
Hawke government officials successfully studied and implemented sophisticated
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American tracking and sampling techniques to follow trends in the electorate (Mills 
1986: 7).
The Hawke government extensively and successfully used public opinion polls as 
key ingredients in its administration, as well as a means of managing social conflict by 
bringing its policies into line with popular opinion (Mills 1986: 43). For the Hawke 
government, like other governments before it, polls were an extremely useful tool, not 
only informing it as to public reaction to its policy stance, but where it might stand if it 
adopted a particular line of action. Opinion polling was brought directly into the formal 
policy-making processes of government. Through the polls, the government could 
anticipate issues and prepare its responses. Conversely, actions unpopular with the 
electorate could be quickly recognised as such and discontinued (Parker 1990: 97). 
For example, the government declared that tax reform had to have widespread 
community support (as demonstrated by opinion polls) before being implemented 
(Mills 1986: 43-46). Similarly, in the middle of 1985, the Hawke government 
abandoned its plan to introduce a consumption tax as the poll results indicated that this 
tax reform was unpopular and could spell electoral defeat for the government (Mills 
1986: 43, Davis 1990: 359). The success of its media or communication management 
was based partly on this a so-called "poll driven policy".
The tendency to alter the focus of government activity and political strategy 
according to the findings of opinion polls was persistent, becoming especially obvious 
in the Hawke’s third term. For example, prior to the 1987 and 1990 elections, the 
ALP’s polling organisation (ANOP) conducted extensive polling to determine the 
strengths and weaknesses of the government and it opponents, the issues of 
community concern, and even the possibility or desirability of possible election dates 
(Parker 1990: 99).
Certainly, the Hawke government was not just interested in the evidence of the 
polls per se but it was also interested in the tactical uses to which the material could be 
put. In other words, polls were used as a strategic political weapon: to determine 
election tactics (Parker 1990: 101). It is not surprising to find a tendency amongst any
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governments, including the Hawke government, to release results selectively: to 
endorse only what is instantly acceptable and unproblematic (Tiffen 1989: 138). For 
tactical reasons, for example, the government tended to highlight those polls which 
showed it in a strong position, with solid community support and a good chance of 
winning the election. Polls which indicated a poor position, on the other hand, were 
ignored, their results attributed to unique and explicable factors or attacked for 
unsound methods (Parker 1990: 101), and were not published. This is not to impugn 
the professional integrity of research personnel and organisations, such as Rod 
Cameron and ANOP, but - as Parker insists - simply to note that when data are open 
to a variety of readings there will be always be a tendency to reach a conclusion that 
the client will wish to hear, or for the client himself to make such an interpretation 
(Parker 1990: 71).
The fact that there was a strong relationship between political polls and the media, 
especially those polls which deal with the community standing of major parties 
support the above indication. Most of the major polling organisations now operating in 
Australia have, in fact, developed in connection with media organisations. In addition 
the pollsters were close to, or even sometimes part of, the core leadership group that 
runs political party's campaigns (Tiffen 1989: 138). Almost all polling was 
commissioned by the main political beneficiaries of its findings. For example, Rod 
Cameron of Australian Nationwide Opinion Polls (ANOP) was part of the ALP's 
media campaign machine. George Camakaris of Quantum Market Research played a 
similar role as the Liberal Party's public opinion researcher. Gray's view that the use 
of public opinion polls was a manifestation of a high-level decision to work closely 
with media, therefore, seems to correct (Gray 1994).
Besides as evidence of the "success" of particular policies or of the strength of the 
government itself, the Hawke government also used the poll results as a denial 
strategy and a major tactical weapon to attack the Opposition, especially with those 
polls which showed the Opposition as being less popular. This was attained either by 
shifting the focus or emphasising news such as from party to personal results, or by
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using particular forms of tactical phrasing to interpret the results, or by not publishing 
the results of the polls at all if such results indicated the government was in a poor 
position. A good result for Liberal Parties and their leaders, if reported, was offset by 
contradictory evidence. The ALP’s poor results were explained or counterbalanced or 
were depicted as temporary, marginal and explained by external factors. For example, 
while the other polls indicated the government’s poor situation, the ALP’s polling 
organisation, ANOP, reported that “Labor was suffering a “soft” swing against i t ... 
[and therefore] votes would be easier to win back...Labor would win... but it just was 
not accepted without question” (cited in the Australian Financial Review, 20 October 
1986: 3). The Hawke government tried to create the image that its problems were only 
transitory: attempting to create the opinion that its poor situation would soon be 
changed. Through this the Hawke government tried to shift the attention from 
immediate results to the longer-term outlook.
Similarly, when the poll of 27 September - 10 October 1986 showed the Coalition 
seven per cent points ahead, the government repeatedly said that “the electorate still 
preferred Hawke as Prime Minister over Howard by 58 per cent to 22 per cent” (cited 
in the Australian Financial Review, 20 October 1986: 3). Again, when The Australian 
Financial Review reported that 55 per cent of Sydney voters believed that Labor could 
not handle the economy, the Treasurer, Keating, immediately offset this by stating to 
the press that “it was to be expected (because of the economic restructuring) that there 
would be a marginal shift in support (and) there still remained a tremendous degree of 
support for the government” (cited the Australian Financial Review, 20 October 1986: 
3). In short, there was a consistent pattern in the selection and arrangement of poll 
material. The net (successful) effect was the perception that good results for the 
Liberal parties and their leaders were aberrant, incorrect or tentative and undeserved.
Another tactic was to shift the emphasis from "party" to "leader" when the figures 
indicated a poor result for the ALP. For example, in the polls of 25 September 1987, 
the party figure put the Liberals lead at 47 to 43 per cent over the ALP, but the 
leadership figures showed that Hawke still led over Howard, The Australian Financial
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Review noted on 20 October that:
(With) possibly 18 months to the next election, signs of an up turn in the 
economy and the electorate still preferring Mr. Hawke over the Opposition 
Leader, Mr. Howard as Prime Minister, 58 per cent to 22 per cent, it is far too 
early to write Labor off.
The polls showed that a large majority of voters thought that Mr. Hawke would 
be a better Prime Minister... Mr. Hawke is far and away the most effective and 
charismatic leader the ALP has ever had.
4.2.6. Exploitation of Personal Popularity
The Hawke government's media strategy was enhanced by the personal 
popularity of Hawke himself, as well as his government’s success in a variety of 
fields. Hawke was very keen to exploit his popularity as an asset for media coverage, 
particularly television. This view was based on the belief that, in many ways, the 
leader's performance was more important in electoral politics than the party’s stand or 
policies. As Gray (1994) insisted, "the most important factor in relation to the electoral 
politics was the way the leader was seen and what the leader stood for". This view 
was particularly relevant to attracting the so-called swinging voter. This is because the 
swinging voters are seen as culturally adrift with little appreciation of how society 
works and even less understanding of what is in his or her interests. This make them a 
prime target for emotional political appeals; for impressions and imagery rather than 
political issues; the political leadership figure rather than the policy substance; for 
advertising rather than policy speeches (Windschuttle 1984: 311). In this context, 
television become the most influential medium for such a campaign style. So, 
according to Gray (1994), Labor politics since 1980 have always been about teaching 
its leaders to have strong value and policy issues as well as excellent performance in 
the media, television in particular.
In the 1990 election campaign, for instance, while the Liberal campaign focussed 
more on issues than on personalities, Labor was happy to focus on personalities: the 
personality of its own leader and the many personalities in the Opposition ranks. The 
government believed that it would win the election if it was reduced to a race between
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Hawke and Opposition leader Peacock (Warhurst 1990b: 26). This belief was 
supported by the opinion poll results, which saw the Opposition leader’s popularity 
falling bellow Hawke’s popularity in almost every year since Hawke had been elected. 
As a result, the principal acts of campaigning became "media events", not just press 
conferences and other media appearances such as talk-back radio, but all of Hawke’s 
public activity (Mills 1993: 127). Hawke became the frequently-available, always 
articulate "talent" that the media, especially TV, needed. Labor’s slogan was ‘Bob 
Hawke for Australia’s future’ and it was featured throughout the campaign.
Proceeding from the assumption that the public perception of party leaders was 
the key to electoral outcomes, the government naturally sought to portray the Liberal 
leaders as weak, unpopular, incompetent, and a general electoral liability and subtly 
praised other aspirants in the party. The Opposition’s continued disunity, actual and 
apparent, up to and right into the campaign period played into Labor’s hands. For 
example, the government portrayed Peacock as lacking substance and conviction, 
while Howard was portrayed as too unattractive to be elected, his ideas too radical and 
his political approach too rigid (Parker 1990: 80). A Labor advertisement clearly 
exploited this Opposition weakness: “If they can’t agree on leadership how can they 
govern the country?” (cited in Warhurst 1990b: 26). These approaches by the Hawke 
government seemed to succeed, especially in the first two terms, when it was 
strikingly successful at minimising criticism from the media while communicating its 
own virtues to the community (Parker 1990: 55).
Hawke himself was recognised as having tremendous skill and ability in 
managing and manipulating the media. Everyone acknowledged Hawke’s enormous 
skills as a communicator (Grattan 1984: 6). One of his important skills was that he 
could successfully and skilfully transform the relationship between the Prime Minister 
and the journalists whose job was to report and comment on the federal politics. 
Hawke brought order and structure into leader-media contact. His techniques were in 
complete contrast to those of his predecessor, Malcolm Fraser, and much more 
effective. He was very sensitive to journalists’ needs. He also was clever in attracting
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their sympathy. Grattan illustrated this Hawke media style by pointing out that Hawke 
would always be sitting together with journalists in the VIP plane whenever he went 
overseas. Some commentators described Hawke’s relation with journalists as 
symbolised by their travelling with him as "media seduction" (Haupt and Grattan 
1983: 47).
As in the campaign, so in office: Hawke wooed the press gallery. The devaluation 
of March 8, 1983, for instance, three days after the election, might have been more 
conveniently announced in Sydney, where Hawke was trying to put together a staff, 
ministry, Cabinet and senior Public Service echelon, but he sacrificed his own 
convenience to the press gallery’s and went to Canberra to submit to their questions 
(Haupt 1983: 18). In that way, some commentators argued, the Hawke government 
had a prolonged honeymoon with the gallery members.
There were complaints by the Liberal party that media treatment of it was unfair. 
Leading Liberal figures, such as Carlton, Baume and Eggleton all complained of the 
anti-Liberal bias of the media (Jaensch 1988: 77). However, it would be a mistake to 
say that such a anti-Liberal media stance was solely determined by partisan motives. In 
fact it was partly a reflection of the political conditions of the time. There was a 
widespread view that the Press Gallery was strongly influenced by its assessment of 
the Hawke government’s political competence. The fact that Labor stood on its record: 
party discipline, campaign discipline, internal cohesion, and an absence of traditional 
brawling led the majority of the gallery members to view favourably the Hawke 
government’s performance (Henderson 1987: 3). The government, therefore, did not 
attract much negative attention from the media. Some media even clearly asserted that 
the Hawke government was successful. The Liberals, in contrast, were releasing 
radical policies, had internal divisions, faced coalition tensions (the Joh-for-Canberra 
episode in 1987) and made numerous errors of judgment (Jaensch 1988: 78). The 
overall effect was that issues and events which were potentially negative for Labor 
were not explored closely by the media. This explains why the media, especially the 
Press Gallery, rarely lost its attachment to the Hawke government (and to Hawke
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himself as a person until 1991).
The problems for the media in sharpening and clarifying arguments imposed by 
Hawke’s undoubted skills and force as a public persuader were enhanced by the 
practice of consensus politics. Through the language of consensus, the Hawke 
government was uniquely qualified to embody and embrace the media: drawing the 
press into the process of consensual government, by blurring the difference between 
the party’s and the nation's interests (Parker 1990: 55). The practice of consensus 
politics, in bringing together Australians, as well as promoting the tenets of economic 
rationalism that the Hawke government launched, were sympathetically viewed/shared 
by most of those involved in media. This inherent sympathy for the Hawke 
government’s methods, in turn became the basis of the media’s attitude towards the 
Hawke government (Parker 1990: 51). As a result, the Hawke government could 
exploit any deviation for partisan effect. The all-embracing nature of consensus, 
turning the old enemies into friends, included the media (Parker 1990: 51).
In sum, the Hawke government successfully controlled the "gate" of information 
in its own favour. Although all governments did that, the Hawke government did it 
better than its predecessors. Familiarity with news work routines allowed the Hawke 
government to devise tactics aimed at winning control of the media agenda as well as 
enhancing the government’s image. In this context, the Hawke government actually 
volunteered more information, and made sure that information was infinitely better 
packaged, than did its predecessors. This included an approach to the media which 
emphasised the building of personal relationships, the management of conflict by 
conciliation and negotiation, and exclusion of those who were outside the system or 
who would otherwise not "play the game" (Parker 1990: 51-52). This approach meant 
that the government was shown in the best possible light, while criticism was inhibited 
and opponents attacked (Parker 1990: 46).
It is not surprising, therefore, that some commentators claim that the Hawke 
government was the most communication-conscious government in Australian history. 
According to Sekuless (1991: 43) it was this skilful use of the media, rather than the
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more normal route of parliamentary process which made the Hawke government’s 
success more possible. However, this does not meant that there was no criticism at all. 
The 1985 MX missile test case and the 1985 Tax Summit, for instance, were some of 
the events upon which the media criticised the government strongly. But, as Parker 
argues such criticisms were mainly confined to particularly unusual issues, and were 
definitely the exception to the rule (Parker 1990: 55).
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CHAPTER FIVE
STRUGGLE FOR MAINTAINING OFFICE:
LABOR UNDER PAUL KEATING
This chapter assesses how and why a Keating led-Labor Party won the 1993 
election. The 1993 election was very important for the Labor Party as well as for 
Australian society. First, the election was the first test of the Labor Party without the 
popular leadership of Bob Hawke. At the time when Australia was facing deep 
recession, the election was a test of whether rhetoric, efficient campaigning and policy 
were superior to the leader’s personal popularity as a means of attracting voters. 
Second, it was a test for the Labor party as to whether, after a decade in office - which 
had brought significant changes in policy directions with both positive and negative 
impacts - it could maintain its acceptability in society. In other words, the election was 
a test for the Labor Party's policy directions as well as the electorate’s attitudes toward 
the evolving economic, social and political changes over the previous decade. The 
narrow success of Labor in this election, however, proved that since the program and 
policy plans which the Labor Party and the Opposition offered (as reflected in 
Hewson’s Fightback and Keating’s One Nation) were superficially similar, the 
determining factor in losing or winning was the capacity of each side to sell its 
program and policy plans.
5.1. The Legacy of The Hawke Government
When Paul Keating became prime minister in December 1991 he had achieved the
goal he set out to win twenty-four years earlier. Yet, as he made his first muted
appearances as Prime Minister, he knew that his toughest battles lay ahead. At the time
Keating was elected, Australia was in recession. This recession was longer and more
severe than the 1982-83 recession which contributed to the demise of the Fraser
government and which the Hawke government inherited. In the 1982-83 recession
unemployment peaked at 10.3 per cent. By the end of 1991 it had reached 11 per cent,
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and by November 1992 it had reached peaked at 11.5 per cent. Though progress had 
continued in the area of micro-economic reform, the government's economic strategy 
seemed to be in tatters.
In short, the government had been immobilised during most of the previous year. 
The bitter struggle for leadership between Keating and Hawke had given a negative 
image to the party. The sacking of Kerin and Hawke's refusal to use the opportunity to 
inject new life into the ministry, plus the bungled government response to Hewson’s 
Fightback package, indicated that the government was panicked and seemed to have 
lost its way.
The release of Fightback in September 1991 created a major political problem for 
Labor. Fightback was a quite tightly-costed set of policy proposals centred around 
fundamental reordering not only of the role of the state in the economy, but of the 
whole structure of Australian society (Australian Left Review Vol. 136, February 
1992: 6). Apart from radical tax reform, Fightback contained a host of other 
contentious elements - including the virtual abolition of the centralised wage system, 
the dismantling of Medicare, massive privatisation, a welfare crackdown, user-pays 
education, the expansion of the uranium industry and deep expenditure cuts for almost 
every federal government agency. Thus, Fightback was not only an economic 
document. It was a political strategy: a more or less coherent attempt to capture the 
hearts and minds (or at least the votes) of a range of political constituencies.
In normal times, such a political strategy would not appear such a big political
threat to the government. Such radical policy would be hard for electorate to accept.
Yet these were not normal times. Fightback was released at the time of 10 per cent
unemployment, deep recession, a government which had served for a long time and
appeared bereft of new ideas, and a deep-seated feeling in the community that new
economic and political directions were needed. This was why, following its
extraordinarily successful launch, the introduction of the Fightback package gained for
the Opposition more credit and better publicity than it deserved because of the vacuum
into which it was launched. The populace saw it as a serious and visionary plan to
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tackle the nation's economic ills (Oakes 1992a: 21).
As result, Labor trailed in the opinion polls by between 10 and 16 per cent points, 
and Keating trailed Hewson by more than 70 points. All of the common place laws of 
politics held that Labor could not hope to win the 1993 election from such a position. 
It was no surprise then that from January 1992 till June 1992, Hewson seemed to be 
on auto pilot to become Australia's 24th prime minister. Labor's opponents seemed 
united behind their leader, John Hewson, and committed to his hardline Fightback 
policy agenda. Assessing Keating's position at that time, Gordon said: “When he got 
the job it was clear to every one really that he was inheriting a smoking ruin” (Gordon 
1993: 186).
Given this situation, Keating's first tasks as Labor leader were to do two things: 
restore unity to two opposing Labor camps of almost equal size and to reconstruct his 
own image to overcome that of the architect of the recession "we had to have".
After Keating took power, Labor Party unity under his leadership was rapidly 
restored. This mainly achieved by leaving prominent Hawke supporters, like Senator 
Robert Ray and Kim Beazley, in their portfolios and resisting any impulse to reward 
his own supporters. However, on the second front, Keating had to work harder, not 
only to introduce a program which was economically sound but also one which was 
politically credible, at least in comparison with the Opposition's Fightback package. 
There was a belief among Labor leaders, in particular Keating, that a comprehensive 
counter-attack on Fightback could not be effected until the government had presented 
its own blueprint for recovery, one that reflected a distinctive Labor ethos (Gordon 
1993: 186). Therefore, Keating began work almost immediately on the package that 
became One Nation, when it was released in February 1992.
In many ways, there were many superficial similarities between Fightback and
One Nation. Although the Opposition’s Fightback was more remarkable for its scope,
detail and radicalism than Keating’s One Nation, the similarities between them
outweighed the differences, and to a significant degree it can even be said that they
overlapped one another. Both packages, for instance, were brought forward against a
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background of economic recession: mass unemployment, high foreign debt and severe 
balance of payments problems. They recognised the reality that though Australian 
economic growth was not so bad (averaging 3-3.5 per cent over the decade) but it 
was subject to high unemployment (about 11 per cent). Both implicitly acknowledged 
that Australia could not afford another boom-bust cycle. Therefore, both Fightback 
and One Nation proposed that the tradeable sector be strengthened and sought a high 
growth strategy sufficiently flexible to accommodate unpredictable exogenous or 
endogenous ‘shocks’ that could impact at various states of the political-business cycle 
(see Brain 1992: 7). To this end, the competing plans offered an impressive, complex 
and detailed economic policy. For example, they set out tax scales to apply over the 
period from 1992 until 1996. They also provided details of expenditure over a similar 
period. Furthermore, both packages agreed on internationalising the Australian 
economy and on micro-economic and labour market reforms which would maximise 
Australian living standards. And finally, both were supported by projections of the 
main macro-economic variables over the next five years ( in the case of Fightback as 
far as 2000).
5.2. The Politics of One Nation and Fightback
Despite these similarities, the Fightback and One Nation packages had very
different value perspective and assumptions about the reasons for the problems that
needed to be overcome, as well as for the solutions required to achieve sustainable
high levels of economic growth. One of the most significant of those differences lay
in the role of the public sector. In this respect Fightback represented the internationally
ascendant neo-classical economic paradigm, with a thorough reliance upon the market
as mode of social ordering which minimised the role of the state. In Fightback, the star
players in rebuilding the Australian economy should be “individual Australians”.
Therefore, Fightback emphasised offering “individual Australians” the chance to
“build" and “reward Australia” (see Hewson and Fisher 1991: 23) and proposed to
bring about an historic redefinition of the role of government in Australia. In short,
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Fightback clearly represented the ideology of economic liberalism. It did not 
acknowledge the vital role that the state has played in providing the infrastructure for 
public life and in giving expression to common purposes formulated in the public 
domain. It ignored the role that the state could play in facilitating the recovery of moral 
community undermined by free enterprise (Barns 1992: 28). Fightback was based on 
the belief that market forces would generally produce better outcomes based on more 
efficient allocation of resources than government intervention (Walsh 1992: 36). Thus, 
as Bams argued, what Fightback was really about was releasing the dynamism of “the 
free market” from the dead hand of the state (Barns 1992: 24).
Accordingly, Fightback saw the cause of Australia’s economic failure as not the 
market but the labour union and/or state institutional intervention in bargaining 
processes between employers and employees. Supposedly, these institutions had, by 
various means, enforced minimum wage provisions which prevented the price of 
labour from falling to a level at which “the market would clear.” This was, allegedly, 
the real cause of high unemployment. In order to restore full employment, therefore, 
Fightback offered far more radical proposals than were considered in One Nation. For 
example, as a mechanism for containing wage growth, Fightback proposed radical 
reforms to Australia’s industrial relations arrangements. These included dramatically 
reducing the influence of centralised wage-fixing by the Industrial Relations 
Commission and moving Australian firms and their employees to an unfettered system 
of enterprise bargaining without union participation. The Fightback proposed 
removing the impediments to market clearing prices, weakening unions, dismantling 
regulatory regimes which defended minimum wages and conditions and establishing a 
free market in labour.
In order to achieve a significant cost and efficiency saving to government and
hence the taxpayer, the Fightback document placed a high priority on implementing
corporatisation, privatisation or contracting out of many of the services provided by
the public sector (Hewson and Fisher 1991: 227). These involved substantial cuts in
public expenditure as well as substantial asset sales in a two-stage privatisation
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program. The Opposition believed that the merit of this set of initiatives included very 
large savings on budgetary outlays. For instance, it calculated that total net revenue 
from privatisation (in the form of asset sales) alone would be at least $ 13.1 billion in 
the first two years of a Hewson government (Hewson and Fisher 1991: 273).
By contrast, One Nation saw the major problems in the Australian economy and 
labour markets as a consequence of inadequate skills and/or an ineffective co­
ordination of skills and labour demand. This was to be solved by providing more 
training to workers and/or through an agreement with labour unions, without requiring 
any radical reform of the institutional structure of industrial relations. As the 
mechanism for maintaining low inflation and productivity, for example, One Nation 
focused on union - sponsored productivity bargaining at the enterprise level combined 
with an increase in the minimum level of employment-related superannuation; 
assistance through labour market programs to help those most affected by the 
recession; and a significant increase in infrastructure spending, involving both the 
public and private sectors in that infrastructure provision.
One Nation was represented as a tangible shift in Labor thinking: back to the
Party’s historical social democratic heritage. It included a muted return to
interventionist policy to slow down the economic liberalisation program Labor had
applied during the Hawke years. Because of its historical commitment to the ideas of
the moral economy and social democracy, Labor appeared to believe that, although
freeing up markets was important, state intervention in social and economic life still
was needed. It also believed that social justice objectives were fully compatible with
moves to freer markets and more level playing fields. As a result, One Nation sought
to bring forward economic recovery and jobs through an acceptable level of fiscal
stimulus while securing the productive base of the country by preserving and
continuing structural reform. One Nation revived the Keynesian idea of public
spending and hinted at new initiatives to stimulate industry. Public sector demand was
used in its conventional counter-cyclical mode, with a short term stimulus both to
consumption (such as through the Family Allowance bonus, reductions in sales tax on
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motor vehicles etc) as well as to investment (see Keating 1992).
Where Labor, for reasons of history, identity and fundamental strategic alliance 
with particular group in society (the ACTU) set limits to its market reforming 
initiatives, the Liberals saw an exciting frontier and their chance to make history. The 
Opposition and the supporters of Fightback seemed explicitly and radically to be 
prepared to ignore Australian traditional values in order to pursue the dynamism of free 
market solutions. The Coalition were depicted by Labor and its critics as throwbacks 
to nineteenth-century capitalism, to a free enterprise system in which capital would 
have the freedom to move in whichever direction the market dictated, whatever the 
human cost. On the other hand, the One Nation package explicitly evoked national 
unity and political community. Labor and the supporters of One Nation seemed to 
believe that although freer markets and a more open economy were important, it did 
not mean that they necessarily ignored the ideas of moral economic and social 
democratic ideology. For them, at least rhetorically, maintaining and encouraging the 
ideas of moral economic and social democratic ideology while encouraging full 
employment, competitiveness and economic growth was a must. And both were 
possible.
What become clear, however, was that One Nation emerged as a political response
to Fightback rather than as a coherent expansionary package. Although the differences
between One Nation and Fightback, to a significant degree were ones of substance,
they were obscured by considerable partisan rhetoric, and aimed to search for political
advantage and support from voters. The rationale for One Nation was not only to offer
a program that would seemingly solve Australia's economic problems. It was the first
of several pre-election packages containing inducements for voters. For Labor,
Keating's One Nation economic statement provided the basis for an electoral campaign
where none had previously existed. While Fightback was predicated on the view that
the electorate could not find a positive reason to vote Labor again, One Nation was
designed as tool to minimise that tendency. In Groenewegen's words, "it was
introduced to help rescue the government's fortunes" (Groenewegen 1992: 16) and
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ensure the government's political survival. One Nation was clearly intended to 
neutralise the bid made by Fightback for being the only solution to Australia's woes 
and, more important, to destroy John Hewson as a political figure of substance as well 
(Milne 1992: 25-27).
In the area of taxation, for example, it seemed that the One Nation tax cuts 
proposal was designed simply to match Fightback’s proposed tax cut without the acid 
of the GST. Labor did not offer tax cuts to anyone earning less than $20,700 a year 
and the cuts would not peak until $50,000. The Opposition, on the other hand, would 
produce tax savings for everyone earning more than $6,000 a year. The first $7,000 of 
everyone's income would be tax free, and the tax savings would rise quite steeply until 
they reached a plateau at incomes of $40,000 a year. Ross Gittins calculated that, 
under Labor, the top marginal tax rate faced by people earning up to $20,700 a year 
would be unchanged at 20 per cent. Under the Liberals, however, it would fall to 16.2 
per cent. People earning between $20,700 and $40,000 would have their top marginal 
tax rate cut from 38 per cent (or 46 per cent for the last $4,000 up to $40,000) to 30 
per cent - under either party. But under Labor, people earning between $40,000 and 
$50,000 would have their top marginal tax rate cut from 46 to 40 per cent.
So both sides' tax cuts were aimed mainly at the middle to upper-middle income- 
earners. Under both parties, the biggest proportional gains would go to full-time adult 
workers, whose incomes ranged from a bit below to quite a bit above the prevailing 
average weekly earnings of $32,000 a year. However, since Labor's tax cuts wouldn’t 
start until $20,700 and wouldn’t peak until $50,000 (compared with $40,000 for 
Liberals), Labor's tax cuts paradoxically, would favour a higher range of incomes than 
would the Liberals' ( see Ross Gittins, The Sydney Morning Herald, March 3, 1993).
Keating knew what he was doing when he designed the tax cuts. He chose the
target group of middle-income earners very carefully. First, they were the people who
got least out of previous tax deals. And they had not benefited much from the "social
wage" expenditures, which had offset wages restraint under the Accords of the 1980s.
Secondly, and more importantly, they were the people without whom Labor could not
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hope to win a general election; the people who had been deserting Labor in droves 
{The Bulletin, March 10, 1992: 20). Finally, Labor's decision to exclude people 
earning less than $ 20,700 was because it was more cost-effective to assist some of 
these people by other means - such as fee relief for child care, increases in the family 
allowance supplement, and indexation of the pensioner tax rebate.
One Nation was a strategy to outflank Hewson and Fightback. Labor could now 
boast that, as far as middle Australia was concerned, the government would match 
both the size and the timing of the income tax cuts promised by Hewson without the 
new 15 per cent goods and services tax, which was fundamental for the Coalition’s 
reform plan. While Fightback proposed tax cuts across the board, it used the GST to 
pay for cuts in personal income tax One Nation matched these tax cuts only to a limited 
extent and focused mainly on the middle income taxpayer. This brought the majority of 
voters to conclude that though Keating's tax cuts were a bit smaller, they would still be 
better off with them since they came without the GST. The GST, in other words, had 
been isolated {The Bulletin, March 10. 1992: 20).
5.3. The Selling of Policies
Prior to the election, Keating worked hard to create the impression that the Labor
government was still competent and was able to solve the economic problems Australia
had to have. He claimed that the economy is "on the cusp of recovery." To enhance his
argument, Keating tried to extract something positive from the economic data.
According to him, "the jobs started coming through in those January job figures.
We're off and we've turned the comer and we're going." He predicted that his policies
would produce at least 500,000 extra jobs over the next three years. Keating also
pointed out that there was the dramatic change taking place in the amount of Australia
trade, in the kinds of things Australia exported and in the places to which Australia
exported. He explained that ten years previously Australia had $1 of export income to
$7 of domestic income, whereas a decade later close to one quarter of everything
Australia produced was for export. And exports of goods and services, as opposed to
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rural commodities, were now double what they were 10 years ago. Keating argued 
that with Australia’s international competitiveness increased dramatically, he was 
utterly convinced that Australian prosperity, national well-being, and the ability to 
maintain and build a good society would be achieved (cited in The Bulletin, February 
23, 1993: 17). While John Hewson worked hard to create the impression that nothing 
had changed - the economy was still "bumping along the bottom" - Keating repeatedly 
argued that he had played an important role in big changes in both quantity and quality 
in the Australian economy over the last decade (cf. The Bulletin, February 23, 1993: 
17; see also The Sydney Morning Herald, 12 March 1993).
Keating also worked hard to be seen as the champion of a strong government role 
to bring the nation out of recession and uphold Australia’s egalitarian ethos against the 
laissez-faire policies of the Liberals (Kelly 1992: 675). Keating tried to synthesise 
Labor's stance - Labor as the party of consensus-based market reforms - but he also 
admitted that Labor was still relying upon government as a force for job creation and 
enlightened intervention to secure better economic and social progress. Keating tried to 
find an accommodation between market ideas and government intervention to limit, 
contain or cushion the market adjustment. While declaring job creation to be the 
priority, Keating and his Treasurer, John Dawkins, also tried to dispel the fears that 
they would re-regulate the economy and restore the old system of state regulatory 
power. Keating’s action signalled his belief in the traditional Labor faith that 
government had a role in creating jobs and facilitating the return towards a growth 
economy. This attempted synthesis was a result of the two forces that drove Keating - 
a belief in the 1980s policy direction, of which he was the principal architect, and the 
need to pull Australia out of 1990s recession as fast as possible (Kelly 1992: 664).
Like most other Prime Ministers before him, Keating knew that flexibility was a
necessary attribute in politics. While he was Treasurer, he was often criticised by
colleagues for being a free marketeer, too concerned to impress the financial markets
and not concerned enough about impressing ordinary Australians. For years Keating
called for tariffs to be removed. His position then, essentially took the line that Labor’s
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policies would effectively mean the end of tariffs. But when it was clear the policy was 
failing Labor, Keating softened his image and pursued a social policy agenda. 
Although there was no real change in policy, there was a shift of rhetoric. There was 
no doubt that Keating’s policy was to devise a strategy to consolidate support for 
Labor (Oakes 1992b: 17). Such action was driven by the need to consolidate the 
traditional base Labor vote, working class votes. Keating, as a prime minister facing 
challenges, discovered that voters mattered more. The Keating tariff line was directed 
at them. As a Labor election strategist said “what changed on tariffs was not Keating’s 
policy but the voters he was addressing” (The Bulletin, April 7, 1992).
Keating's efforts to sell his policy plans, however, were not without difficulties. 
Keating faced a great challenge in selling his core message. The assumption that the 
media and voters would automatically react more positively to Keating's economic 
policies was not realised. Although his tariff plan was supported by industry - 
especially the car industry which protested against Hewson’s more radical tariff 
reduction plan and argued that the government should assist it to keep producing - 
nonetheless the introduction of the One Nation package and other policy plans did not 
immediately turn the electoral situation around. When Keating talked about imminent 
economic recovery, people did not believe him. Similarly, when he announced his 
new plan to cut company tax from 39 cent to 33 cent, people seemed unable to 
understand the issues. Things were looking bleak for Labor. The situation got worse 
when the unemployment figures rose to 11.3 per cent at the end of December 1992. 
Keating could not turn public opinion around by simply selling the package even 
though he reacted by claiming that Hewson was inflexible and doctrinaire and would 
not listen to industry pleas, depicting him as a politician at odds with just about 
everyone.
The problem was that Keating was seen by voters as the figure primarily
responsible for the deep recession of 1990-92 (Gordon 1993: 186). It was Keating
(while he was Treasurer) who had single-handedly changed the shape of the Australian
economic debate since 1983. After 10 years of Keating as Treasurer, Australia had a
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million people out of work, shattered consumer confidence and a net $150 billion 
national debt. As he himself had argued for years it was he, not Hawke, who had been 
driving the policy and political engine since 1983 ( cf. in O'Reilly 1992: 22).
Keating, in other words, was trapped by this earlier record. Given the fact that 
unemployment was still high (even getting worse) all of the media as well as 
observers, tended to be sceptical for the future of the Keating government. Oakes 
commented, "the people who 'bring' Keating to the political ball were working-class 
voters, traditional Labor Party supporters". Keating was determinedly courting them 
again, but they were not as easily wooed as he might have hoped. Their perception 
was that, "for much of his time as treasurer, he took his relationship with them for 
granted and preferred to dance with big business and right-wing economic theorists" 
(Oakes 1992d: 18). Now, it was felt he had too many people to distract from their 
economic misery.
Keating seemed to make a serious mistake by gazumping himself at the start of the 
campaign by resting his re-election hopes on his economic policy plans. Delivering an 
economic statement while unemployment was as high as 11.4 per cent made the 
government an easy target for Coalition attack. His action, in other words, helped to 
divert attention from a policy package intended to set the campaign agenda. This 
became evident as the Opposition focused its strategy on keeping unemployment at the 
forefront of political debate. When the Opposition decided that the election would be a 
referendum on unemployment, all Keating's economic plans seemed less convincing. 
As a result, for weeks he thrashed around on other issues, without a clear strategy. 
Unless there was a gradual improvement in the economy, Keating looked a certain 
loser (The Bulletin, October 13, 1992: 16).
But Keating's response to the pressure of his job was driven by a fervent desire to 
win legitimacy as leader in his own right (O' Reilly 1992: 20). He worked hard to 
leave the elector in no doubt that he was the politician in charge. Recognising that his 
attempts to sell his policies positively did not work properly, Keating finally got the
message. He decided to turn around, and not give much attention to policy at all.
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Instead - particularly in the final weeks of the election campaign - he "revived" up a big 
scare campaign on the GST, Medicare and industrial relations. Keating recognised that 
the goods and services tax was the only thing that could allow him any chance in the 
forthcoming election. The fact that the GST was a subject of perpetual debate in 
society provided an important lesson for Labor election strategists to stay single- 
minded about campaigning on the GST. Keating had to frighten voters back into the 
Labor fold. He, therefore, brilliantly engineered a scare campaign. Keating decided 
that the election would be a GST referendum.
Keating's original strategy had been to portray Hewson, with his hard-line 
economics, as representing the values of the roaring 1980s, values which were no 
longer appropriate in the 1990s. His main argument was that slashing government 
spending and reducing demand through GST-induced price rises would worsen the 
unemployment problem, not solve it (The Bulletin, November 24, 1992: 13). But 
Keating did not only wage a simple '15 per cent on everything you buy' scare 
campaign, but he also worked hard to undermine the Coalition's overall economic 
policy. He attacked the Opposition with the accusation that all Hewson's prescriptions 
on tax, industrial relations, health, education and childcare - would stall economic 
recovery.
Keating reinforced the argument by saying...“the key point is that the enormous
imposition of a 15 per cent GST on all their goods and all their services will be not just
an additional burden and hugely disruptive and inflationary. There would at least be a
modicum of fairness if it was all given back to them as tax cuts. In fact it isn’t.
Virtually none of it is given back as tax cuts” (cited in The Bulletin, February 23,
1993: 16). Under this projection, Coalition policies would “rip and tear” the whole
social fabric of achievements going back to Federation and the early institutionalisation
of an "Australian way of life" (Arena, "Editorial" April, May 1993). In contrast,
Keating cleverly turned to the notion of co-operation as the point of difference between
himself and Hewson. The ALP stood for a society in which people cared for each
other and worked in a spirit of co-operation to come to decisions about the directions
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Australia should take.
The message Keating delivered to voters, was that a competitive internationalised 
economy would best be achieved through Labor’s consensus-based economic 
reforms, not by the shock therapy promised by Hewson. Keating played on Hewson’s 
absolutism and tried to exploit the alarm within sections of business community about 
Hewson’s plunge towards faster industrial deregulation and protection cuts. Keating 
used Hewson as a symbol of primitive and heartless capitalism in an effort to 
maximise the differences between Labor and the Coalition. This marked Keating first’s 
step in building a new coalition of interest groups arrayed against the proposed GST 
and the threat to social cohesion that Fightback supposedly represented. Keating 
assumed a new political persona - the leader pioneering the demolition of the principles 
and values associated with the "Australian Settlement" but promising to retain the 
values of egalitarianism, income justice and social stability which had always been the 
hallmarks of Australian democracy (Kelly 1992: 664).
Hewson claimed that replacing various other taxes with a GST would stimulate 
business, thereby creating jobs. But he was not convincing in getting the argument 
across. Through his remarkable powers of persuasion, Keating tried to convince 
voters that neither side had the quick answer to unemployment, so that voters would 
see the GST in isolation and not as part of an overall Coalition plan that would create 
jobs. Keating demolished Hewson's strategy by convincing voters through Labor's 
campaign commercials that "no matter what was claimed the GST would not create a 
single new job". Keating argued that..."it was the Coalition that would inflict a deep 
recession on Australia". He accused Hewson of threatening to kill the economy with 
high interest rates and berated him for a "fight inflation first" policy - both positions he 
had defended in the past {The Bulletin, February 23, 1993).
To win the hearts and minds of Australian women, especially working women,
the Keating conveyed a central message that female workers would be the big losers if
the John Hewson-led Coalition won the federal election {The Bulletin, February 9,
1993). ALP and ACTU strategists reminded women that they would be more
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vulnerable to exploitation under radical changes proposed by the Coalition. This was 
because of their predominance in industries that were under-unionised or characterised 
by part-time employment. Keating repeatedly sought to convince female voters that 
Hewson’s Fightback proposal to dismantle the centralised wage system in favour of 
voluntary, private workplace contracts between employer and employee would 
reduced unions' roles unless they were specifically asked for assistance by workers - 
and there would be no requirement to have the private deals ratified by the Industrial 
Relation Commission (IRC). Similarly, the outlawing of closed shops, the abolition of 
preference for union members, compulsory secret ballots before strike action, 
strengthening of powers covering union deregistration, and the use of the common law 
in ending industrial disputes, would, Keating argued, mostly disadvantage women. 
The removal of the “independent umpire” (IRC) was believed to put female, part-time 
workers at risk from “unfair employers” . As well, workplace conditions long 
guaranteed under the award system - such as the holiday leave loading and penalty 
rates - could become the subject of negotiation between the individual worker and her 
boss.
The proposed plan that workers would have to negotiate with the bosses on their 
own also disadvantaged women workers because of their relatively weak position vis- 
a-vis employers. As one commentator said: “So if your employer has team of 
lawyers, accountants and personnel officers against you, how do you think you’ll 
go?” Similarly, the proposed abolition of penalty rates and casual loadings would 
provide a pittance for the pay for working uncongenial hours, such as night shifts for 
nurses (The Bulletin, February 9, 1992: 21). Keating also reminded women about the 
possibility of employers to use the contracts system for their own benefit. Since the 
contract would be secret, Keating argued, there would be no easy way for women 
workers to check to see whether they were being treated fairly and equally on the basis 
of their abilities and not on the basis of their sex (cf.The Bulletin, February 9, 1993: 
21) .
To improve the women’s vote, Keating launched some measures including the
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child support agency, operated through the Australian Taxation Office, to track down 
ex-spouses trying to avoid child maintenance; initiatives that enabled more women 
(often part-time employees) to benefit from award superannuation; and a rise in family 
allowances. Together with the ACTU, the ALP called on women not only to vote for 
ALP candidates but also to convince their friends to do so. Advertisements were 
placed in leading women’s magazines such as The Australian Women’s Weekly, 
Woman’s Day and New Idea.
Further, Keating made deliberately frightening claims about what the Opposition 
would do to Medicare. He claimed in the Great Debate that Hewson would "destroy 
Medicare", that the chronically ill would be unable to obtain private health insurance, 
and that doctors would be allowed to "set the common fee." Certainly, it was a scare 
campaign. It was true that Hewson would make major changes to the existing 
Medicare arrangements. These included a cut in the Medicare rebate from 85 per cent 
to 75 per cent of the scheduled fee. Although the Liberals wouldn’t increase the levy, 
they would not retain it. The scare campaign was pressed despite the fact that Labor’s 
policy wouldn’t be cost-free either. Labor, for instance, would raise the Medicare levy 
from 1.25 per cent to 1.4 per cent of taxable income from July 1993. But, in the final 
analysis, while the Liberals might not intend to scrap Medicare, they would make it 
more expensive for many people. It was this impression that alarmed many voters.
Keating also tried to distract people from their economic woes by encouraging 
them to think about the kind of society Australia should be in the 1990s. Yet in another 
way he opened up the most basic questions of what kind of society we want to live in 
(White 1993: 5). He repeatedly raised the question of what it is to be an Australian (O' 
Reilly 1992: 21). Keating talked of Australia’s sense of nationhood, of becoming a 
republic by 2001, of multiculturalism, of child care as a major political issue, of 
universal health care, and of reconciliation with indigenous Australians. He became the 
first Prime Minister to launch a campaign for a Republic and (more tentatively) a new 
flag for Australia.
The motive behind this campaign was clear: to revive his own political fortunes.
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Keating had an objective: to dramatise the cultural divorce from the past in order to 
facilitate Australia’s integration with the Asia/Pacific. But more important was the idea 
of abandoning the constitutional monarchy and accepting a republican system, and by 
putting those ideas on the agenda in a way that invested their arrival with a sense of 
inevitability, Keating tried to advantage his electoral self-interest. "His strategic 
message for Australians was that for the first time in their history they [Australians] 
had no imperial overlord -no Britain, no America." The republican issue was used to 
try to discredit the legitimacy of the non-Labor tradition: to assert that over decades the 
conservatives had confused Australia's national interests with those of imperial 
benefactors (Kelly 1992: 679).
The Keating scare campaign strategy proved effective. The GST had been 
Coalition policy for almost 18 months, but it became clear that, until a week before the 
polling day, many voters had not really come to grips with it until Keating forced them 
to. As soon as Keating started hammering the GST with some sense of purpose, the 
opinion polls turned up for Labor. As a result, whereas earlier in the election campaign 
the GST was running third behind unemployment and economic management as the 
priority issue, many voters had pushed it to the top of their list as they walked into the 
polling booths. While unemployment was the most pressing issue, it was the GST 
which dominated the March 1993 election campaign. As a result, as happened in the 
last Debates, Hewson lost the electoral initiative. When he attempt to switch the 
campaign focus back to the jobs issue; he was forced to defend the marketing of the 
GST.
An opinion poll demonstrated that most ALP voters voted as they did because they
did not like Hewson or the Coalition's policies (not because they liked Keating and
Labor policies). A special “exit poll” conducted on the day of the election showed
clearly that Labor won the election because the voters did not like the GST. Asked
which issues most influenced how they voted, 53 per cent of voters nominated the
GST, 51 per cent went for unemployment, 45 per cent management of the economy,
44 per cent Medicare and 25 per cent industrial relations. When asked to point to the
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single most important issue, 27 per cent named the GST, 25 per cent management of 
the economy, 20 per cent unemployment, 11 per cent Medicare and 7 per cent 
industrial relations (cited in The Bulletin, March 23, 1993).
Keating’s strong policy orientation towards women (through childcare and health 
initiatives, for example), proved successful. The female vote counted a week before 
election showed an improvement in the Labor vote. Usually, women were more likely 
to support the Coalition, but this support had fallen away for this election. A survey 
conducted after the election showed that 54 per cent of women voted for Labor 
compared with only 38 per cent for the Coalition, while 46 per cent of men supported 
Labor and 45 per cent the coalition (The Bulletin, March 23, 1993: 15). According to 
Mr. John Mitchell, research manager of AGB McNair, it was the first election in 
which the overall female vote for the ALP had equalled the male vote. The vote was 
51.2 per cent for women and 51.5 per cent for men (cited in The Sydney Morning 
Herald, 15 March 1993).
One exit poll found that beside the GST, Medicare and health policy had been the 
main concern for 49 per cent of women (Time, March 29, 1993: 39). A survey 
conducted by Australian Nationwide Opinion Polls (ANOP) at the end of November 
1992 suggested that women tended to be more worried than men about the possibility 
of a shift away from the centralised award system to individual bargaining. It found 
that while 55 per cent of men favoured the present system and 37 favoured the 
Opposition policy, 58 per cent of women wanted the current system and only 35 per 
cent were inclined to support the Opposition idea (The Bulletin, February 9, 1993: 
21). Similarly, the campaign for a republic stunned the Liberals, who were utterly 
unprepared for this issue. Keating tapped a deep sentiment within the community and a 
wellspring of support which suggests that the centenary of Federation in 2001 will 
provide a context for a shift from constitutional monarchy to republicanism that may 
well succeed.
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5.4. Liberal Manoeuvres
At the end of December 1992, the Opposition beat a tactical retreat. It revised 
Fightback Mark I and produced Fightback Mark II, removing the GST from 
foodstuffs. The changes were driven by political considerations and designed to 
answer charges that the Coalition lacked compassion and flexibility. This tactic, set out 
to minimise one of the Keating’s most potent weapons against the Opposition: the 
charge that Hewson was inflexible and that he was locked into number of rigid policy 
positions. When Fightback was launched in November 1991, Hewson had touted it as 
an economic imperative, "too important to be destroyed by opinion polls or lobbyists" 
(cited in Edwards 1992: 28). Even a few weeks before its revision, Hewson was 
insisting he would stand or fall on an uncompromised Fightback package. But after 
damaging criticism from churches and welfare groups, as well as leading 
industrialists, he had sought hope in the politics of concession to soften his image. 
Hewson and his team learned the important lesson that they would not allow 
themselves to be tied down to a static document. They recognised how desirable 
flexibility was to regaining voter sympathy.
But more than that, the relaunch of Fightback was aimed to “disrupt the trend 
pattern”. This revision was necessary for the Opposition as the trend of public opinion 
was beginning to swing against it. After three years of cruising along in front, 
Hewson’s leadership reached crisis point after October and November 1992. There 
was steady erosion of Hewson’s popularity. Hewson took himself from a 78 - 10 lead 
over Keating in the preferred Prime Minister stakes to a losing position in just 12 
months. Keating finally got himself - and the ALP - into the lead in a Saulwick poll 
which had Labor five points ahead of the Coalition at the first of December 1992. It 
was the beginning of the transformation of Keating from the reviled figure he cut as 
Treasurer into a relatively popular Prime Minister with real potential to win the 
election. It became the moment when the Coalition began their nosedive towards 
change.
The revision and relaunching of Fightback, therefore, was an attempt to keep the
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Coalition in the election race. The revised document indicated that Hewson wanted to
put electoral considerations at the top of his list of priorities. Under this Fightback 
Mark II, the Opposition tried to soften its approach to economic policy. It sought to 
convince the voters that it was possible now to dump the goods and services tax on 
food, take a more compassionate approach to the unemployed, defer public sector 
spending cuts that would have cost jobs, plan to stimulate recovery by encouraging 
business to invest and curb proposed tax cuts for the wealthy to pay for measures 
helping victims of the recession. The insistence that the proceeds of asset sales should 
always be used to repay government debt had been dropped and asset sales were now 
designed to help finance inducements to voters.
As a result, the new package was more attractive than the old one to the market. 
On top of the new Fightback, Hewson’s $2 billion accelerated depreciation scheme to 
boost employment by encouraging business to invest looked pretty good to an 
electorate despairing about the jobs situation. Besides, Hewson planned a $3 billion 
program of spending on public works to kick-start the economy, and $1 billion in 
income-tax cuts from July 1993 for lower and middle-income earners. Hewson 
himself, however, seemed to face a difficult dilemma in revising Fightback. If he did 
make huge changes, this would have damaged the integrity of a package (people) once 
argued untouchable as its components were so interwoven. Yet if he simply fiddled at 
the edges, he would be assailed for having pointlessly raised expectations {The 
Bulletin, December 22, 1992).
The Fightback Mark II GST was still introduced at a rate of 15 per cent on almost
every item of consumption except food. Nevertheless, the Opposition argued that its
impact would be offset in two important ways. First, its application would coincide
with the removal of the wholesales tax, payroll tax, petrol excise, customs duties, the
coal export duty and the Labor-imposed training guarantee and superannuation levies.
Thus it was believed that the cost of goods should drop before they reached the point
of sale, where the GST impacted on the consumer. Second, Hewson promised to cut
income tax to offset the tax’s initial impact on consumers. These were hardly minor
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refinements, given that Hewson had consistently argued that governments could not 
spend their way out of economic difficulties.
But, as he had before, Hewson had problems in selling his message in the revised 
Fightback, partly because its policy package continued to be so complex that it was not 
fully understood by voters. Voters were confused by Hewson’s Fightback program, 
particularly the taxation changes it laid out. There was a pretence that the proceeds of a 
GST would finance big cuts in personal income tax. In fact, $26 billion of the $27 
billion the GST would raise was ear-marked to pay for the abolition of payroll tax, the 
wholesale sales tax and petrol excise and the provision of compensation for those hurt 
by the new tax. The bulk of the promised $13 billion in income tax cuts would have to 
be financed through asset sales, spending cuts and bracket creep.
In addition, Fightback Mark II itself was still vulnerable on the arithmetic. The 
welfare lobby was worried by the $9 billion in spending cuts still planned by the 
Coalition. Furthermore, Hewson would still go into the campaign advocating a new 
tax. Although he exempted food, just about everything else was affected by the goods 
and services tax at a higher rate than 15 per cent, including essentials like water, gas, 
electricity, telephones and clothing. In short, the revised Fightback still gave Labor 
plenty to shoot at. One of the most effective attacks was Keating's accusation that 
Hewson was unreliable because he had changed his mind. Further, Keating continued 
hammering the 15 per cent figure, without any qualification, on the campaign trail. He 
told the Press Club in Canberra that the GST at 15 per cent was a “monstrous tax” 
because it would raise $24 billion in revenue. He was sure electors would not “cop it”, 
as it was not fair.
According to Oakes, a basic flaw of Fightback was that its priorities were not
those of the electorate. Voters, having experienced economic pain in the recession,
wanted relief. But the Coalition offered more pain in the short term, with promised
benefits well down the track. The Hewson plan involved the immediate slashing of
government spending, which meant cuts in services and jobs. The reshaping of the tax
system which, it was claimed, would eventually create jobs by giving new incentives
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to industry would not occur until late 1994 (Oakes 1992e: 17). Moreover, the 
Opposition tax cuts seemed less secure because they would be financed less from the 
proceeds of "bracket creep" and more from cuts in government spending of about $ 10 
billion. They would not be financed from the proceeds of the GST, since much of 
these would be needed to cover the cost of abolishing the three other indirect taxes 
('The Sydney Morning Herald, March 1, 1993). Thus, the radical Fightback policy 
contained an “offset factor” that defused the supposed threat to ordinary Australians of 
the controversial GST.
There was one other problem for the Coalition. The Fightback Mark II policy shift 
was not accompanied by major changes on the strategic front. Hewson refused to take 
hard-nosed political advice from those around him. His first real political decision was 
to adjust and relaunch Fightback, not to reshape the strategy to sell it. He passionately 
believed that the only important thing was policy, repeatedly saying that if..."you get 
the correct policy in place, the politics will look after themselves" (cited in The 
Bulletin, December 22, 1992). Keating by contrast believed, as he repeatedly said, that 
"Leadership is about getting decisions through" (cited in The Bulletin, November 3, 
1992).
The final critical point in Keating assault was that the set of policies, and the sort 
of social vision, found in Fightback had been seen in practice in a number of countries 
and the resultant social and economic balance sheet was not successful. More than a 
decade of Thatcherism in Britain had failed to lead to sustained employment growth, 
had profoundly divided British society, and had left British industry well behind its 
European competitors. In Canada, the attendant publicity about the unpopularity of 
GST and its escalating rates had brought about the resignation of its Prime Minister, 
Brian Mulroney. In smaller, more open economies closer to Australia, like New 
Zealand, the net effects of such a program have been even worse.
Jeff Kennet's insensitive handling of industrial relations in Victoria fuelled to
some extent the electorate's fear of the Coalition's plans. Kennett's radical industrial
relations planned to tear down the award system and impose workplace bargaining in
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its place, was pretty much the same as the policy John Hewson put forward nationally. 
This resulted in a common theme, that was a belief that Hewson was out to look after 
the bosses and the wealthy at the expense of ordinary Australians. Keating exploited 
this issue, sensing that industrial the relations issue could cement working class votes 
to Labor. Labor's television commercials targeted it hard and successfully. Keating's 
key purpose was to convince the voters that what happened in Victoria would happen 
nationally if the Coalition were elected. This tactic was a success. As industrial 
relations is a problem of the working class, unions across Australia expressed their 
opposition to the plan. They joined a national day of action against the Victorian 
government's industrial relations policy.
5.5. Keating versus Hewson
To understand further why Keating was so superior to Hewson in the campaign,
it is necessary to know something about both figures. Keating’s political strengths,
honed over more than two decades, included a capacity for aggression few were able
to match; an intimate knowledge of the rules of the game (and the degree to which they
can be stretched) and a capacity for the kind of spontaneity than can play havoc with
opponents (Gordon 1993: 65). His ambitions were not hidden and they were high. He
was driven by conceit and ambition into annexing the Prime Ministership, and by an
impatience to reform Australia. Some observers, inevitably describe Keating as
arrogant, egotistical and verbally abusive, and of course ambitious. But in Beazley's
view, this capability of Keating's to dominate cabinet was not because of his bullying
but because he was knowledgeable and competent (cited in Carew 1992: 306). He was
recognised as a man with an enormous self-confidence; in Susan Ryan's words, he
had “unshakeable core of self-confidence” (Ryan 1993: 25). Certainly there is ego
involved. But those close to Keating throughout his career say that Keating is driven
by more than simple , personal ambition; that he has a genuine, even patriotic, wish to
foster a more equitable society in Australia, to create an efficient economy that would
be an international force, to harness business and political interests in a way that would
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lift the quality of life for everyone (cf. Carew 1992: 306).
One of Keating's strengths was a capacity to “apply razor-sharp rhetoric to the 
heart of his adversaries' weaknesses while painting his achievement with the most 
grandiose brushstrokes” (O'Reilly 1993: 16), particularly in parliament. Keating 
undoubtedly performed better in parliament than Hewson. Keating for years was 
known as the government’s engine room, the stoker of its ideas and challenger of its 
boundaries of the possible; the proud supplier of the less compromising, harder edge. 
For Keating, the House of Representatives chamber was his favourite arena. In this 
arena Keating was most devastating and most at home (Oakes 1992d: 18). According 
to Carew (1988: 32), Keating has proved to be the most destructive speaker in the 
House since the days of Eddie Ward ( the Labor member for Paddington in the days of 
the Menzies Liberal government). Like Whitlam before him, Keating has always been 
of the view that “you can’t win outside unless you are winning inside” (Gordon 1993: 
65). He was undeniably and genuinely a hard politician - that was the public persona, 
the player who captures the leading roles in the theatre of parliament. As Carew 
describes him, "Keating has undoubtedly cultivated a tough exterior, as politicians 
must, and he has trained himself to be a winner in the bare-knuckle arena of 
parliament" (Carew 1988: 183).
Keating's strength was, to some extent, supported by his capacity to manage the 
media. From the time he arrived in Canberra, Keating was recognised as a politician 
who assiduously worked the press gallery - who cultivated journalists of his own age, 
rather than the elders of the pack, on the grounds they would be around to grow older 
with him (Carew 1988: 31). He had acquired a meticulous working knowledge of the 
press gallery over more than 20 years. No other federal politician had ever matched the 
familiarity with its mores and consummate mastery of its mechanisms that Keating 
acquired, not even Hawke himself (Lloyd 1992: 128). Keating wanted to make sure 
his views, rather than his public image, got through.
By contrast, Hewson's persona was part of the Coalition electoral problem. He
looked elitist and certainly was not in the same class as a “parliamentary scrapper”.
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Keating even sought to portray Hewson as more than a privileged elitist; Hewson and 
other conservatives such as John Howard were sycophantic apostles of "old" 
Australia's links with Britain.
When Hewson was elected his image was of a tough-minded, right wing 
economist with a fervent belief in policy that sought to dismantle government power, 
reduce the welfare state and demand that people support themselves. Consequently 
many commentators saw Hewson more as an academic and businessman than as a 
political salesman. He was so uneasy with the media’s propensity to trivialise that he 
was reluctant to co-operate with journalists and distrustful of advice that he try to be 
more populist. For Hewson the only important thing in politics was implementing the 
correct policy. Every thing else was secondary. He complained that the political 
process, and the media, trivialised and distorted the fact. Therefore, it was not 
surprising that Hewson had problems with the media and why so many voters 
perceived Hewson as dull, uncaring and cold.
According to O’Reilly, there were two factors which explain why Hewson always 
got into difficulties with the media. First, he was very inexperienced. It takes years to 
become a smart politician who can cleverly use the media, even for the people like 
Hawke, Peacock or Howard. Secondly, Hewson was a shy and reserved man, 
contemplative and intense, something of a loner. As a leader he relied heavily on his 
personal staff and was remote from his own backbench. He developed closeness with 
some leading Liberals, such as Robb and Reith, but he had no friends in politics {The 
Bulletin, November 3, 1992: 30). Given these weaknesses, it was no surprise that 
Hewson could not match Keating's superiority in almost every area of election 
campaigning.
The Mackay Report on ‘The Keating/Hewson Factors’ in April 1992 underscored
Hewson’s failure to evoke strong responses among voters. The report concluded that
whatever misgiving the electorate might have about Paul Keating, people at least felt
that he was a visible, tangible presence in their midst. “They might not like him or his
message, but they could’ not ignore him". By contrast, Hewson emerged from the
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study as a rather grey, shadowy presence in federal politics... "People were puzzled 
about his style; fascinated by his wealth and perplexed by his perceived failure to seize 
mass media opportunities to communicate with the electorate" (The Mackay Report, 
April 1992).
5.6. Labor as The Winner
There is no doubt that the 1993 election was about a head-to-head test of rival 
party leaders, competing policies, key issues: Paul Keating versus John Hewson, 
Fightback versus One Nation, the goods and services tax (GST) versus unemployment 
(Oakes 1992c: 18). Howver, in the final analysis, the ALP won the March 1993 
election because they ran a very strong negative campaign and, with the help of the 
media, were able to control the agenda of the election issues which were debated. The 
most effective tool that Keating could successfully bring to bear on the campaign was 
what the commentators called the political artistry he had spent 20 years developing. 
He not only knew where the country should go, but he also could get the people to 
follow him. This political artistry of Keating's was superb, as was particularly evident 
during the final stages of the campaign. He made the GST scare bite - gave it a much 
greater potency than the Coalition or even most commentators imagined it could 
possess. More than that, he put it and other aspects of the Labor campaign into a 
framework that capitalised on the way the Coalition had chosen to run their last days of 
electioneering (The Bulletin, March 23, 1993: 17).
Keating led the ALP to victory by concentrating on the differences between the
two parties, reviving old antagonisms, keeping the focus on the GST as much as
possible with eyes averted from unemployed. Keating’s genius in all this had two
facets. Firstly, the way he psyched out Hewson, leaving him looking off-balance on
the GST, fed the community's alarm. Australian voters rarely embrace referendum
questions, and Keating sensed he might effectively turn the tax proposition into a
referendum. Secondly, Keating's warning that there was something “un-Australian”
about the Coalition’s intent - that Hewson wanted to destroy the essentially egalitarian
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nature of the country by imposing the tax, dismantling Medicare and the wages system 
and making life a scramble for survival - was obviously heeded in the electorate.
Hewson has a point in his claim that the election was won on the politics of fear; 
though the ALP might counter that it had aroused hopes as well as legitimately 
building on fear. However, such a claim is not really fair. The truth is that both 
Keating and Hewson used scare tactics. Keating ran scare campaigns on the GST, 
Medicare and industrial relations. Hewson ran a scare campaign on unemployment. It 
was in this skill, however, that Keating showed his superior strength and capacity 
compared with Hewson. Keating won the "war". The Coalition failed to anticipate and 
respond to the type of campaign that Labor launched. There were few signs that 
Hewson had any idea how to deliver the promises he made. He did not succeed in 
demonstrating how the GST package would solve Australia's problems and, in 
particular, how it would create jobs. The Coalition could be given credit for running a 
relatively disciplined campaign. But it failed fundamentally to engage the electorate in a 
convincing dialogue on the substance of the issues. The coalition failed to 
communicate its policies. It was totally ineffective in presenting its ideas and 
programs. Hewson provided ammunition for Labor and the media to paint him in the 
role of a radical reformer with untried and untested prescriptions. Hewson chose to 
paint himself as an economic reformer bringing change - as radical. The radical image 
of a reformer projected onto Hewson also enabled Labor to paint him as a figure of 
conflict.
It is true that Hewson did outline a program of radical economic change. He
provided considerable detail, 16 months before the election. But it is also true that,
from the outset, Hewson sought to mislead the public on his motives for the package,
on its economic benefits and on its consequences for people's hip pockets. On several
occasions, for instance, he said he could not give specific answers about the impact of
the new tax on individual enterprises. The Coalition's campaign's, therefore, appeared
to have missed the voters who were most likely to decide the election: blue collar,
middle income earners who had deserted Labor over the past 10 years, but returned to
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it in droves because of the GST, industrial relations and Medicare. Therefore, the 
election result was no simple response to scare mongering. There was plenty to fear; 
the possible impact of GST was enough to make any voter shiver.
The election result sent a clear message that Australian society was not prepared to 
join in any radical overhaul of its ideology. When they faced a hard choice, between 
the need for change (new government and new policy) and certainty about their future, 
the electors marginally tended to choose the latter. The fact was that the electorate was 
suspicious of radicals and found more comfort in status quo policies (Cooray 1993: 
5). As some commentators said, Australian society was still conservative; in this case, 
they tended to choose “the devil-you-know” than “the GST-you-don’t know” (cited in 
Time, March 15, 1993). It seems that one of the mistakes which Hewson made was to 
offer to solve the economic problems. He was thus pushed into position of trying to 
explain how the GST would provide a stronger economy and more jobs. He was 
placed in an impossible position.
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CONCLUSION
THE FUTURE OF LABOR: THE “NATURAL” PARTY OF
GOVERNMENT?
The period of the Hawke and Keating governments represents an outstanding 
development for the Australian Labor Party - that it has developed the capacity for 
survival, growth and continued electoral dominance. The Labor Party has withstood 
the combined challenges of time, social and (unanticipated) economic change, and 
bitter political and personal infighting (Simms 1994: 11). It has been shaped by the 
times and circumstances in which it operated; by the lessons it drew from the 
experience of the Whitlam years; by the drive of its leaders, particularly Keating and 
Hawke; and, most important, by its capacity to adapt itself to the changing 
environment and to the changing nature and aspirations of the electorate (Gruen 
1993: 263). By contrast with its opponents, Labor has been successful in broadening 
its ideological appeal and convincing electoral majorities that it is a united, 
professional, competent, national party, fit to be trusted with economic management, 
and better able to deal with the quality of life issues which have became of greater 
concern recently. The ALP has became technically adept at winning elections by 
directing its appeal to so-called swinging voters in a number of strategic marginal 
seats. It has done better than its opponents in attracting support from newly- 
emergent political interests - migrants, female voters, the tertiary educated and, more 
recently, the welfare, conservation and environmental lobbies (see, for example, 
Emy and Hughes 1991; Aitkin 1982; Bean, McAllister and Warhurst 1990). In short, 
as Kelly (1990: 684) insists, the ALP has been able to escape from the past and to 
build upon that history: to impose reforms but also to win popular mandates. This 
has involved audacity, improvisation, deals, tension, consensus, political skills, and 
even miscalculation and economic recession.
The remaining question is, what will be the future of the Labor Party? Can it be 
the "natural" party of government? It is a difficult question to answer. The answer
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will very much depend on how we define the "natural" party of government and the 
literature is of little help here since it offers no formal definition of the concept.. If 
the "natural" party of government means a party which can govern or always be in 
power at any time (without interruption to its rule by other parties), then the ALP 
cannot be any more than any other party in the democratic world - a "natural" party 
of government. The changing of government in Australia is certain, and it is only a 
matter of time.
If, however, the "natural" party of government means mental construction of the 
voter such that a conviction arisen and spread within the electorate that certain party 
is assumed to be worthy of retention in government until or unless it does something 
to loosen the electorate's hold on that conviction, then the ALP has a chance to be 
the "natural" party of government. Judging from the success of the Hawke and 
Keating governments over the past 12 years, it seems that the Labor Party has a 
chance to be in office at least until the end of this century. As long as it can maintain 
its current capacity, quality and competence, and as long as the Liberals remain 
weak, the Labor Party can and will be the "natural" party of government.
In addition, as an incumbency party, the Labor Party has advantages over its 
opponents. It has more experience, resources and skills in creating strategies for 
obtaining its own interests - including, for example, access to the media, skilled 
personnel and so on. The greatest asset of the ALP is that it has a will to draw 
lessons from its experiences and is able to adapt to the changing social and economic 
environment.
Paradoxically, given its reformist history, conservatism in Australian society 
could also be a major contributor to Labor's future success. People's need to protect 
and maintain what they have, and the attitude of avoiding any risks or embracing 
anything will which they are unfamiliar (anything new) could keep the voters in 
Labor's house, particularly if they feel that what Labor has given them in the last 12 
years is better than before or better than the Liberals can possibly provide. The
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experience of the 1993 election can be seen as the best example of this so-called the 
advantage of conservatism.
Nevertheless, the electoral success the Labor Party enjoyed in the last decade 
cannot be seen as guarantee that the Labor Party will be successful in the future. This 
is because such success does not necessarily reflect a "real" acceptance by society of 
the Labor Party. Electoral success might be strongly influenced by the social, 
economic and political situation or conditions of the time. Relevant to this argument 
is the question of whether such successes are the result of Australian society 
accepting the products of the Labor Party's transformation or the result of other 
factors. For example, the electoral success Labor enjoyed in the last decade might 
have been caused by the weakness of its opponents, the Liberals. Such conditions 
can change over time, even over the short term.
Therefore, the most important factor for the Labor Party's success in the future 
or otherwise is - because change is permanent - how far the ALP can best adapt to 
and incorporate that change. Implicitly, too, how far transformation which still in 
process and its output/products are in accordance with the needs of modern 
Australian society. This involve the question of how far the majority of Australian 
society can accept and benefit from the programs and policies offered by the Labor 
Party and how far the Labor Party can consolidate and unite all the different 
elements of strength in its body while the process of socio-economic change is 
underway. It is the answer to these questions which will determine the success of the 
Labor Party in the long-term.
One of the most important factors which determines Labor's future is that of 
economic management. At the practical level, Labor's future will depend particularly 
on the extent to which the ALP is able to maintain its relationship with the unions, as 
embodied in the Prices and Incomes Accord. As the Accord is the cornerstone of the 
successful Hawke and Keating governments' social, economic and political strategy, 
the continuity of the Accord is the major factor in determining whether the ALP can 
maintain its popular support. Labor will have a serious problems if its current
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“experiments” in economic policy prove unsuccessful. Failing to maintain that 
continuity - including adjustment to changing situations and objective conditions - 
would damage the party not only economically, but, in turn, politically. The reason 
for this is the fact that although other issues may also be prominent in an election - 
particularly during hard economic times - it is the issue of the economy which 
dominates the way Australian voters monitor the performance of, and attribute 
responsibility to, their government. If the government is credited with good 
economic management, as measured by economic performance and conditions, the 
voters are more likely to support the government. Conversely, if economic 
performance is seen as bad, the voters will see such conditions as the responsibility 
of the party in government and, therefore, will punish it at the ballot box. In this 
context the voters tend to assess economic performance and attribute responsibility 
simply via the sensitive “hip-pocket nerve”. They do not have to know the situation 
within which the government works. For example, they do not have to know what 
the international economic situation is, the impact of CPI on prices, unemployment 
levels in industry, the impact of interest rates on inflation etc (Gow 1990: 61).
So far, in trying to solve Australia’s economic problems, a Labor government 
appears increasingly to carry out reforms more for their short-term benefits (electoral 
interests) than their long-term consequences. In this context, Labor laid its future on 
the argument that it should not regard itself as a working-class party and that 
electoral success depended on broadening the basis of its class support (Aitkin 1982: 
315). In order to appeal to the wider society, the Labor Party has provided policy for 
and focused attention upon the interests of a wider cross-section of society rather 
than the interests of certain limited sections of society, let alone the working class.
As a result, despite its electoral success, there is a good deal of disquiet within 
the party that the character of the ALP is changing, and has already changed 
significantly in the last two decades. Comparing the Hawke-Keating governments' 
economic policy in the 1980s with those of the Curtin-Chifley governments in the 
1940s, Battin found that the 1940s and 1980s Labor governments presented a stark
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contrast. In the 1940s the Labor Party leadership took as its starting point the belief 
that government intervention was fundamental to any society hoping to achieve 
justice. This belief assumes, of course, from the idea that the role of government is to 
institute principles of social justice. In the 1980s the Labor Party leadership began 
with the belief that the free market, with some regulation, would deliver benefits in 
the long run to its traditional constituency (Battin 1993: 238).
Certainly in pursuit of that end the ALP did not so much apply a total 
capitalism, rather tried to humanise it. However, the process of humanising 
capitalism which Labor has under taken during the last two decades has meant that it 
is no longer a working class party, nor is it socialist (if it ever was). The ALP 
appears to be a party in transition, moving further away from its origins as a 
distinctly trade union - oriented party. Battin (1993: 234) argues that, "what was new 
about the political economy of the Hawke-Keating governments was that the 
tradition which breathed life into the collectivist sentiments of the ALP - the socialist 
tradition - was comprehensively silenced". Further: "It is the very belief in false 
'pragmatism' which has seen 1980s Labor without any philosophical base upon 
which to draw - other than that of its opponents. Any residual Labor initiatives are 
there in spite of, rather than because of, the pursuit of'pragmatic' ends" (Battin 1993: 
233). Preoccupied by a notion of "social harmony", the Hawke-Keating governments 
were founded on a consensus which meant, for all intents and purposes, introducing 
the policies of the most economically libertarian opposition in Australia's history.
This is certainly a potential problem for Labor in the future. Firstly, the electoral 
cycle does not, in fact, necessarily coincide with the vicissitudes of economic policy­
making or even the cycle of the economy. The fact that the government is still facing 
economic problems for which there are no obvious or consensual solutions, seems to 
support this argument. Although social and economic problems have been on the 
agenda throughout the Hawke and Keating governments' period in office, yet they 
have not finally been resolved (Emy and Hughes 1991: 127-28). Australia’s 
economic conditions - of high unemployment, increasing interest rates, record
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external debt and fear of another recession - can provide a natural climate for a 
change of government. This is an election the Opposition usually wins.
Proponents of the sensitive ‘hip pocket nerve’ theory predict that it should be 
relatively easy for any opposition to topple a government that, after more than ten 
years in office, would have considerable difficulty in blaming the country’s 
economic problems on their predecessors (Gow 1990: 55).
Secondly, the recent development of the Labor Party, theoretically, is potentially 
divisive. By focussing primarily on the electoral benefits of pragmatism, the Labor 
Party has de-emphasised the syndicates which produced it and which have been most 
instrumental in sustaining it. Jaensch (1989a: 190) argues that the “de-emphasis of 
an ideology expressed in a sacred Objective is not, and will not, be carried without 
severe strains”. Although Labor continues to response its principles in official 
statements (albeit in a watered-down form) the party contains elements which see 
this weakening as the abandonment of the raison d’etre of the party. Tension may 
arise when such recognition alienates those sections of the party which have fought 
for certain principles, especially “socialism”. This is the case now, as many of the 
ALP’s traditional supporters are growing restive at the degree to which Labor in 
office has gradually played down its traditional values as a working class party of 
social and economic reform, and acquired the intellectual baggage of its opponents. 
The Left faithful condemned Labor as “selling out” on party principles and traditions 
such as the belief in public enterprise and its identity as a working-class party.
The influx of middle class members from the 1960s onwards has been an 
important source of strength for the ALP and the foundation of its electoral success 
in the 1980s and 1990s. These middle class members provided a pool of new talent 
upon which the ALP was able to draw in formulating policy, and from which it was 
to recruit the candidates needed to give it a much needed new and more acceptable 
public image. In short, the middle classing of the ALP encouraged changes to Labor 
ethos - to ingrained party practices and traditional ways of doing things which had 
come to be obstacles to Labor's electoral success (Ward 1989: 174). As a
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consequence of their tertiary education, these new members were closer to specialist 
or expert advice and familiar with abstract ideas, written reports, research techniques 
and other means of proficient decision making. As a result, unlike Labor in the 
1960s, the ALP under Hawke was much more professional: it streamlined policy 
making, improved its administration, polished its image and refined its campaign 
(Ward 1989: 184). Its economic platform, for instance, was better researched, more 
coherent and more openly linked to the issues of implementation than any that had 
been previously produced by the ALP (Considine 1983: 224; see also Encel 1964: 
24-25). It contested elections using sophisticated market research and advertising 
techniques.
Nevertheless, this new middle class constituency of Labor's - as it has been 
developed in the 1980s - can also be a source of Labor organisational frailty in the 
future. Ward (1989: 172) noted that the middle classing of the ALP has brought 
large numbers of members into the party who appear to have a substantially different 
approach to, and expectations of, political activity. From a survey he conducted, 
Ward found evidence that, at least amongst branch secretaries, middles class ALP 
members tended to have expressive rather than instrumental political styles (Ward 
1989: 171). Unlike the political concerns and orientations of traditional Labor 
(working class) members whose primary reason for joining the ALP was a desire to 
work politically for specific goals or benefits, either for themselves or for a group 
with which they identified, those of middle class members were more often 
concerned with intangible issues, and hence were more "idealist”, and less "down-to- 
earth" (see Forester 1976: 92).
The tendency for middle class ALP members to have a predominantly 
expressive rather than instrumental political style contains a clue to how Labor will 
change or adapt itself in the uncertain environment of the future. The problem is 
there is a significant difference between the attitude of the blue-collar and middle 
class members toward the ALP. Blue-collar members with an instrumental political 
style tended to have long standing loyalty to the ALP. They are not likely to swing
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their support to other parties as long as the party is able to deliver tangible pay-offs 
when in office. The idea of being "good Labor man", of "loyalty to the party" is still 
a component of traditional Labor ethos which shapes sentiment among blue-collar 
members.
On the other hand, middle class members with an expressive political style 
appear often to have been drawn to the ALP because they believed its doctrine was 
expressive of their beliefs. In this context, middle class members are more likely to 
reserve their attitude and position. This certainly can be a source of dilemma for the 
ALP in the future. Any inability of the ALP in government to meet the expectations 
of middle class members - to act in line with the notion that the Labor government 
ought to be accountable to the party, and that policy is properly decided within 
consultative party processes as well a strong reforming tradition - is able to cause 
wide-spread disillusionment amongst the middle class. For example, the Hawke 
government decision to sell uranium to France caused many middle class members 
to have reservations about the political direction in which the party was heading 
(Ward 1989: 178). They regarded the Hawke government decision as a betrayal of 
party policy and tradition.
The fact that middle class new comers have not entirely transformed the ALP in 
their own image adds another problem for the ALP. The fact that, despite its 
changing composition, the ALP itself has proved resilient, means that the influx of 
middle class members raises a structural problem for the ALP: the existing 
structures, such as rule-bound branch meetings and factional politics, remain ill- 
suited to the needs of the expressive political style of the middle class. The 
persistence of habits and practices entrenched when Labor was primarily a workers’ 
party can cause a wider degree of disenchantment or impatience with long standing 
party practices and customs amongst middle class party members. This is evident in 
the complaints and criticisms of many middle class members that the rule-bound 
nature of local branch meetings is overly formal and ill-suited to discussion, debate 
and development of policy ideas. Many appear frustrated by the restrictions imposed
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upon branch life by rules and practices originally intended to mobilise and facilitate 
working class involvement (Ward 1989: 180). Many others have criticised the 
faction system as "undemocratic', and complained that "members who do not wish to 
belong to a faction have no opportunity to help make policy" (cited in Ward 1989: 
181). If this trend cannot be resolved by the ALP, it can be a source of internal party 
conflict in the future which, in turn, can weaken its chance to be the "natural party" 
of government.
Furthermore, Ward (1988: 209) noted that the ALP has not recruited uniformly 
from the middle class. According to him, it has attracted few members from amongst 
graziers, proprietors, owners, business managers, professionals in private practice 
and others of the established (old) middle class who have long been stalwarts of the 
anti-Labor parties. Rather it has attracted salaried, tertiary educated professionals, 
notably teachers, administrators and others of the so-called new established middle 
class (see King and Raynor 1981: 43). In short, Labor has not attracted members 
from sectors of the middle class which have traditionally supported Labor's political 
opponents. This means that Labor's future political economy remains greatly 
dependent on this section of society. Failure to adapt to their needs be as damaging 
as failure to adapt to the demand of its traditional supporters, the working class. The 
middle classing of the ALP which has been a major source of its electoral success in 
the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s, therefore, could also be one source of 
organisational frailty (Ward 1989: 184).
Thus, a critical question for the future of the Labor government is whether the 
degree of pragmatism, overt electoralism and economic rationalism displayed by the 
current leadership is able to be successfully maintained. As the nexus between union, 
party and community has been broken, where should the ALP seek its ideology and 
how wide should the enlarged nature of its support be? Suppose Labor succeeded in 
transforming itself to the more middle ground politics, there is still a question: could 
the party survive without unequivocal support from its traditional social base? 
Furthermore, is the Labor Party able to keep some rational balance between the
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often- conflicting elements within itself: conflicts represented between the Left and 
Right, between those who emphasise wealth creation and those who stress wealth 
redistribution. In short, Labor's future will not depend merely on whether it can 
deliver economic growth and cope with the new debates, but also on how it can 
handle its internal conflicts in dealing with these problems.
All attempts to solve this problems involves some risks for the future of the 
Labor Party. If, for example, it tries to go too far too quickly - moves too 
pragmatically across the centre ground in search of votes - it may not win future 
elections. Firstly, such a move may alienate its most enduring supporters, the 
working class (Emy and Hughes 1991: 132). Secondly, such a move too far to the 
"right" will split the Labor movement by antagonising the unreconciled radical 
socialists among its rank-and-file. Finally, it will come up against the barrier of the 
innate conservatism of Australian society.
If, however, Labor adjusts itself too slowly to the changing views, aspirations 
and needs of the community, it will be doomed to futility. If, for example, it is forced 
to resume in its "traditional" (pre-1980s) stance - to agree to the demand and practice 
of its traditional supporters let alone working class - it will dissatisfy its new middle 
class supporters who has been its main element in achieving electoral successes in 
the last decade. Any attempt to retain the ethos and practice of the past will certainly 
be opposed by the new middle class element which may cause damaging results to 
the Labor electoral strategy. For instance, to agree to demands for wealth 
redistribution that exceed what is reasonable in view of the pace of wealth creation - 
it will be toppled from office.
This is an especially great danger for Labor's security in government since it will 
be more susceptible than a non-Labor Party to union pressures to retard the essential 
process of wealth creation by a premature and excessive emphasis on wealth 
redistribution through wage increases. This was the case of the Whitlam 
government, whose expansionist programs, based on the analyses and expectations 
of the 1960s confronted the declining world economy and rising oil prices of 1970s.
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Labor's future, therefore, will depend on its capacity to reassure its supporters that, 
however slowly, it is nonetheless marching in the ideologically correct direction 
towards a more equitable as well as productive society.
So far it seems that the ALP under Hawke's and Keating's leadership has had the 
capacity to appeal to all sections of society by recognising (as mirrored in its policies 
and programs) that individualism is socially as important as egalitarian values. But 
since there is still potential conflict between these two sets of values, there is a great 
need for Labor to be more careful in designing its policies and more careful in 
choosing and co-ordinating its programs. It should continue to develop policies and 
communicate them in ways which are correct politically and economically in that 
they fit in with the electorates views, aspirations and needs. The experience of the 
Whitlam government - which profoundly influenced the Hawke and Keating 
governments - demonstrates that, to achieve even limited objectives, Labor must 
closely analyse the forces in society which it needs to overcome and ally itself more 
closely with, and to a degree share power with, groups in society which pursue 
similar aims and objectives (Wilenski 1980: 62). This include the capacity to adjust 
continuously to the increasing salience of "new" issues such as feminism, the 
environment, human rights, self expression, equality, gay and Lesbian rights etc. 
Should it fail to solve this dilemma, the Labor Party will face a serious problem 
before the end of this century: it will alienate the very interests from which it is 
seeking to win support. Some of the elections between 1983 and 1993 have sent 
clear messages to the major parties, that some people are looking for a party to come 
up with policies in line with the views, aspirations and needs of the numerous sub­
groups that constitute the Australian people.
Finally, there are some other factors which will influence the future of Labor. In 
the 1990s Australian society is living in a period of dramatic development and 
change. In the future these trends seem likely to be even more unpredictable. Like 
other societies, Australian society is subject to the influences of change - from 
domestic as well as overseas forces. Australian voters are not static. They are
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changing as the social, cultural and economic environment changes. As a result, their 
views, aspirations and needs can and will change. This reality demands that the 
major parties adapt themselves to change, because only the party which is able to 
reach out to the changing views, aspirations and needs of the people can retain 
popular support.
The problem is that Labor - Jupp (1982: 179) argues - like other political parties, 
forms part of Australian society. It, therefore, cannot stand apart from changes in 
society and it cannot always control the environment within which they operate. Far 
more of this environment than they are willing to acknowledge is determined by 
events and forces external to the domestic political and economic sphere, and which 
cannot necessarily be coped with by the ALP; many changes in society may be 
beyond their control or comprehension. Recent developments indicate that for Labor 
government has become more difficult and more complex because of changes to 
society and the political process. There has been a pervasive sense that the 
government now tends to be “overloaded”, that it has taken on too much, that it 
cannot accommodate the pressure of demands upon it and, that it has less control 
over its social and economic environment than before. Policy conflict has been 
common; problems of policy direction, accountability and control have been real; 
getting the bureaucracy to do what ministers want has not always been easy. Overall, 
such factors have produced a strong sense of the limitations and constraints facing 
governments. These are reinforced by the fact that Australian Constitution creates 
difficulties for the federal government: it limits the autonomy of, and the options 
available to, the political decision-makers in adapting to a changing global 
environment. These factors have produced a more sober assessment of what 
government can actually achieve: that it is not omnipotent, nor free from error (Emy 
and Hughes 1991: 527). In this regard, Labor, therefore, should be able to mould a 
strategy to shape community perceptions and resist the Liberals' claims that Labor 
has lost its reforming zeal and has become senescent after 12 years in office.
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